Nations and Identities: The case of Greeks and Turks

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Preface

Nationalism, national identity, national stereotypes and prejudices are issues of academic interest for many; for me they are also phenomena that shaped my life. I was born as a member of an ethnic minority - a Greek in Istanbul - and ethnic issues rang our doorbell when I was a boy. In the streets where I played with my peers I felt what later I came to identify as “being the other”. The contradictions between what I heard at home on one hand and what the wider society propagated on the other caused my curiosity; later these controversial discourses became disturbing and then matters to be investigated.

I got my first degree as a civil engineer in 1965 and lived in Turkey until 1971. I got married, I served in the Turkish army, worked as an engineer and we had our first son in Turkey. I was active in the wider society: I took part in the Turkish leftist movement in the sixties as a member of TIP (Turkish Workers Party); I participated in the Turkish varsity team being a champion in 100 meters running. Most of my friends were my Turkish class mates. All these were the centripetal forces that helped my integration. There were however, centrifugal forces, too: The racist Income Tax of 1942 against the minorities, the riots of 1955, the expulsions of the Greeks in 1964 and some other “minor” xenophobic practices which effected seriously our family. When I served I was deprived the right to become an officer, as all males with high education did and I served under unpleasant conditions. After 1971 I moved to Athens.

In the seventies and eighties I worked as an engineer and as a contractor in various countries and mainly in Saudi Arabia. I was bilingual and I made use of this advantage translating and publishing mostly Greek and Turkish poetry. This was a new hobby. At my 48, I decided to leave engineering. In the years 1990-1994 I worked at Ankara University establishing the Modern Greek Department. During these years I taught Greek literature and history and I started my PhD degree in political science at the same university. My dissertation was on the images of Turks and Greeks vis-à-vis the “other” as these appear in literary texts. Later I taught Turkish language, history and literature in Greek Universities for nine years.

My field of interest is Greek-Turkish relations, history and national perceptions as expressed in literary texts, in textbooks and in historiography. I approached the issues comparatively. Teaching, however, for me was not so much a way of “enlightening” the students but rather a means to understand my immediate environment, myself and basically the dominant ideology of our time: nationalism. In a way, I wanted to peep in the social dynamics which determined my life. My communication with my young audience was a test area where I tried to cope with nationalist understanding. I tried, I suspect in most cases unconsciously, not only to demonstrate nationalistic phenomena which I perceived as unconstructive and harmful, but I also expected that my students would follow my understanding and transcend nationalist ideology. Indisputably, I do not perceive myself as an impartial agent but an active factor in the current dispute of “national identity”.

Teaching nationalism

This book is comprised of some of my publications in English which had appeared in various forms and which I used at Işık and at Bilgi Universities (in Istanbul) where I taught as a visiting instructor during the academic year 2009-2010. My main concern was to do
something more than “offering information” about nationalism and its consequences: I rather stressed the stereotypes, the prejudices and xenophobia which lead not only to tense international relations but also to ethnic strife within the countries. My conviction is that the traditional approach in teaching nationalism, where the history and the present status of nationalism are presented chronologically has limited results. I noticed two tendencies in the students who study nations and nationalism:

a) They are under the impression that they are studying a social phenomenon detached from themselves. They rarely suspect that the subject is also about their being, their own attitudes and their way of thinking. They “learn” what is being taught but they do not associate nationalism with their beliefs and understanding.

b) Those who see that the course is about their identity and their related behavior often react by developing defense mechanisms; they defend nationalist discourse and they do not internalize the modern understanding of nation. In short they do not abandon the nationalist paradigm. They develop a tendency to attribute all negative aspects of nationalism to the “nationalism of the other” and perceive “our” nationalism as just and positive, or at least an unavoidable reaction. This attitude is not necessarily voiced openly but is preserved in the back of their mind.

In fact, the difficulty in teaching nationalism is that this study encompasses the students and quite often the instructors, too. It is not about “something” but also about “us”. My experience with my Turkish and Greek students has taught me some lessons:

a) The students were very receptive when I demonstrated the contradictions, the shortcoming, the myths, the conjectural and negative nature of nationalism of the “other”. As long as my examples were chosen from the Turkish case as I spoke to the Greeks and/or from the Greek case when I spoke to the Turks there was no problem. But the parties were not ready to accept “criticism against their part”. I refrained, therefore, to exert this “criticism”, until they were ready for it. The parties seem ready to accept a “criticism against their part” provided this does not have a personal character (is not directed solely to “our” nation) but it is a universal one.

b) So, comparative approach seemed to be the first answer to the difficulty. Once the students were familiarized with the nationalism of the “other” and having understood the mechanism of nation-building (of the “other”) the shift to “our” case was quite easy.

c) One additional component helped. During the first lectures I concentrated in showing the relativity of (national) convictions: each nation has its own truth. Therefore, how can we be sure of our own? My teaching started with questioning the receptors of the course. Are we in a position to understand (and judge) the ideology which has formed our way of judging? This problematic proved an efficient stimulus.

About the essays in this volume

I arranged the articles in a way to compose a comprehensive and functional unity. I started the course with an article on the textbooks used in the primary schools in Greece and in Turkey in the decade of 1990 (“History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey”). I explained to my students that the idea of this study came to me when I noticed that our son who had started school in Athens began to express strange and negative views against the Turks. The textbooks have changed substantially in the following years; however the basic conclusion and questions are of great importance. Why did the two states produce such one-sided, biased
and fanatical books? What kind of citizens did they intend to have? Can citizens who are brought up with this kind of an education think without prejudices about the “other”? How can we trust our judgment about the “other” if our related education has been of this kind the last decades? What can we say about our nation-states judging this educational approach?

The second article (“The Contrasting Images of Greeks in Turkish Literature: Fiction versus Memoirs”) also gives an insight of how “we” as persons conceive problematically our environment. National images and stereotypes limit our capability in judging the “other” and consequently “ourselves”. This shortcoming may be associated with the textbooks and the central educational system of nation-states, as was shown in the previous article. Literary texts on one hand, reflect the way the authors and/or the society think but on the other hand, how they “educate” the nation, too. This can be seen as an additional characteristic of the nation and the nation-state.

The third article (“Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature”) shows the relationship between national myths, historiography and national identity. Greek national identity is heavily based on the negative image of the “other” - an image which was also met in the textbooks and in the literary texts. The myths are internalized and taught as “history” even though an unbiased approach would show the shortcomings of these approaches.

With the fourth article (“Greek-Turkish Conflict and Arsonist Firemen”), which shows how national identity limits and misleads our judgment, the introductory session of the course is completed. In this article I showed that to be an academic and/or a specialist in a profession does not rule out the possibility of being prejudiced and a victim of socially imposed stereotypes.

The purpose of the first four articles is to prepare the students to face and understand the modern interpretation of nationhood and which I believe to be the hardest-to-accept-findings related to the nations and the national identity. The core of nationalist thinking is based, and this belief is shared by the majority of the citizens of Greece and Turkey, on the “eternal nature” of the nations – “our nation started in antiquity and will last to eternity” is the sacred belief. The modern view of a national identity and of nation-state which appeared only the last centuries is met with profound disbelief. Normally the students respond to the test questions as it is expected from them, but they rarely internalize this “information”. These introductory articles, therefore, show how modern citizens are conditioned to think in a certain “national” manner and how “we” should free ourselves from stereotypes and prejudices in order to be able to understand modern historians and academics, say E. Gellner, B. Anderson, and others.

The fifth article (“History Writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other”) is about historiography and the founding of the grand national narratives. Nation-building is mostly the task of the historians which were very influential at the dawn of nation

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1 I usually ask my students to comment on the course. Here are two typical answers:
Student A: We looked first at the individual before studying the society. We looked at the way we are educated in our families, at school; what is the role of the state and the media in our formation. We tried to answer these questions. We saw that the attitudes, the thinking and the perceptions of people are the outcome of their upbringing.
Student B: We carry all through our lives the ideas (right or wrong) which we obtain during our education. Our worldviews are rooted unconsciously deep inside us.
states. Students already familiarized with the “purpose” of textbooks and the generalizations of literary texts are able to follow the reasoning of the efforts of these historians. This article is factual. The theoretical background has been set up in the previous articles.

The sixth article (“Ethnic Identity and Nation Building: On Byzantine and Ottoman Historical Legacy”) is about a typical practice of nation-building: inventing tradition, creating imaginary national cultures and national identities, at the same time ignoring and silencing purposely legacies which remind us the “other”. These are actions which as a consequence set fictitious barriers between groups of people. The examples are chosen from familiar everyday practices in Greece and Turkey.

The seventh article (“Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in each other’s mirrors”), like the last article, are the most political ones. It approaches bilateral political issues, however, not as an independent sphere of “national interests” and of calm evaluations of interests, but as by-products of the above: of controversial identities, conflicting interpretation of the past, prejudices and images of the “other”. The students at this stage is able to see that the arguments of the parties are influenced, even determined by an ideology which is deeply rooted in their environment.

The eighth and ninth articles (“Non-Muslim Minorities in the Historiography of Republican Turkey: The Greek case” and “Constructing Memories of Multiculturalism and Identities in the Turkish Novels”) are about minorities and ethnic groups vis-à-vis nationalist understanding. The stress is on how national groups are xenophobic against what they consider foreign and against the “other”. Intricate situations where the “other” is invented as a scapegoat or as a reference for self-identity or where he/she is imagined in order to rationalize national history are studied in these articles.

The tenth and final text is the longest. It is the outcome of three workshops with Greeks and Turks and it is about the way each group perceives the “other”. Here I try to describe the way national identity and nationalism operate in practice and at the level of judging and evaluating the “other”. Also the perceptions and complaints of the Greeks and the Turks which they presently voice and experience are presented in this article.

Few notes on this edition

These articles are published at various times and the relevant information is given for each individual text. Almost all articles have been mildly or substantially amended to suit and satisfy this new addition. I thank all editors and publishers who have contributed in the original publication.

I need to remind the reader that I used three (but very much connected) versions of my name when I first published the said articles: Iraklis, Heracles, Herkül or Hercules (and Millas as a steady family name!). In fact these are the Greek, Turkish and English versions of the same name.

Hercules Millas
Istanbul, Silahtarağa, 4. 2010
This essay is based on a study of history textbooks used in primary schools in Greece and Turkey in recent years. It was undertaken in order to find out how and what Greek and Turkish children, respectively, are taught not only about their own nation but also about the nation next door, and about the relationship between the two neighbouring countries. The essay starts with the general historical background. It goes on to examine the textbook material, and notes changes in recently revised editions of two Greek textbooks. Finally, it records recent moves in both Greece and Turkey to amend and improve history textbooks.

Success in amending the school books is necessary not only to restore 'reality', but as the prerequisite for improvement of Greek-Turkish relations both at popular and at government level. This is the conviction - and the aspiration - behind this study.

Historical background

The modern Greek state was established in 1829 after a national liberation war against the Ottoman Empire which lasted seven years. The Ottomans had subdued the territories which constitute modern Greece as early as the fifteenth century, fighting mainly against the declining Byzantine Empire, the Venetians and the Genoese. In Greek historiography the four hundred or so years of Ottoman rule are known as the Tourkokratia, a word whose simple meaning ('Turkish rule') has overtones of the 'dark years of bondage'. The Greek revolution, which during its course managed to mobilize a large part of the Christian Orthodox population against the Ottoman Turks, ended successfully after the decisive intervention of England, France and Russia.

The liberated Greece of 1829 comprised only a small section of present-day Greece. The Balkan wars (1912-13) enabled Greece to extend its national boundaries at the expense of the Ottoman Empire (the 'sick man of Europe'), annexing Northern Greece and most of the Aegean islands, though the Dodecanese remained Italian. With the defeat and partition (by the Treaty of Sevres) of the Ottoman Empire at the end of First World, Greece, with the encouragement of Great Britain, seized the chance to occupy İzmir and its environs, that is...
western Asia Minor (1919). In spite of growing Turkish exasperation and resistance, Greek troops advanced eastwards, almost to the outskirts of Ankara.

A successful counter-offensive by the Turkish army, led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) in revolt against the defeatist Ottoman leaders, caused the disorderly retreat of the Greek army and its decimation. In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne officially established the modern national state of the Turks. Except for the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul and the 'Muslims' of Western Thrace, the Turkish and Greek minorities in the two countries were then forcibly exchanged.

An important and painful historical stage was thus eventually completed. The gradual development of national consciousness and sentiment had given rise to the two national states. By a rare and perhaps unique coincidence, each nation had fought against the other for national recognition. The Greeks first, then a century later the Turks, fought for liberation, each perceiving the other as an obstacle and a menace.

A period of Greek-Turkish 'friendship' followed, inaugurated in 1930 by the respective leaders, Atatürk and Venizelos. Turkey renounced the Ottoman policy of endless expansion and proclaimed its national boundaries as final, and Greece in turn abandoned its 'Great Ideal' (Megali Ilthea) familiar to both Greeks and Turks, the longstanding dream of recapturing Constantinople and achieving more or less Byzantine frontiers.

The shallow roots of these newly-established good relations were exposed by two incidents during and just after the Second World War. In 1942 a new tax on wealth was introduced in Turkey. Local assessment boards (all Muslim) categorized taxpayers as Muslim or not, and levied up to ten times as high a charge on the second group. The Greek minority of Istanbul, along with Armenians and Jews, suffered gross discrimination in the assessment. Hundreds of Greeks and other non-Muslims who could not pay were taken to labour camps in Anatolia. Greece, under German occupation, could not react. Enforcement of the tax was curtailed only when the course of the war turned against the Nazi forces.

In 1947, through the Treaty of Paris, Greece annexed the Dodecanese, islands in the south-eastern Aegean which belonged to Italy but were mostly populated by Greeks. Semi-official Turkish declarations in the run-up to this treaty suggest that the arrangement did not please Turkey. Amicable relations continued, however, in spite of such friction and grievances; indeed a new wave of friendship began from 1952, when both countries joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

But the Cyprus issue brought underlying tensions to a head. Turkey reacted to Enosis, the possible union of the island with Greece, and the widespread riots against the Greek minority population of Istanbul in September 1955 marked a new era in Greek-Turkish relations. Eventually, in 1974, the military junta ruling Greece attempted a pre-emptive move, with a secretly planned and executed coup against the Cyprus government of Makarios. This broke the Treaty of Zurich (1960), which had recognized an independent Cyprus while protecting the rights of the Turkish minority. Turkey, one of the guarantors of the Zurich agreement, thereafter moved its troops into Cyprus to define and secure a Turkish zone.

Today, in spite of the Papandreou-Özal détente of Davos in February 1988, a number of issues seem to be causing friction between Greece and Turkey. The most important disputes and grievances concern the status of Cyprus, the continental shelf in the Aegean sea, the present and future of the minorities in Istanbul and Western Thrace, and the military status of the Aegean islands.²

² [Note of 2010: It is of interests that twenty years after the publication of this article the same “issues” are still pending. The difference is that at present the parties do not perceive these issues as crucial as before; and therefore the bilateral relations are not as tense.]
Cause or effect?

It is tempting to conclude that the prevailing resentment between Greeks and Turks, the reciprocally felt animosity, mistrust, suspicion and indignation which can be identified not only in daily politics but also in the mass media and at popular level, are simply the result of 'history'. History, however, is not a prime mover; it is not a detached and impartial source which unilaterally shapes human sentiments. Social developments naturally influence feelings and views, but history itself is in turn affected by popular beliefs and prejudices.

Present-day Greek-Turkish relations can best be understood not through an abstract concept of history-as-destiny, but by probing into ideology, into the motives and the beliefs (which themselves are not of course fortuitous) both of the peoples and of the governments. Greeks and Turks have been educated to become antagonists and opponents. For generations they have been fed with aggressive ideologies, with prejudices against the other side, with one-sided information and with historical distortions and exaggerations, as if they were armies already marshalled, being exorted before the last deadly charge. This educational practice then naturally generates its own increasing momentum.

Textbooks in general

Learning is of course not only a question of textbooks: teachers, the mass media, sermons and so on all play their part as well. Here, however, it is textbooks - those used to teach history in Greek and Turkish primary schools between 1988 and 1989- which will be explored.3

The main difference between Greek and Turkish history textbooks is that the Turkish texts make limited reference to Greeks, whereas in the Greek ones Turks are prominent. This is because the Ottoman Empire was for centuries entangled with a multitude of other states (France, Hungary, Russia, Iran, and so on), while modern Greece most often confronted the Turks.

In both cases, the general stance of one country's textbooks towards the other country changed little over at least the last fifty years. Marginal changes occurred with the shifting phases of bilateral relations, or when governments with new or different political positions came to power. The Turks in 1977, for instance, stressed 'a rising tide of nationalism'.4 And last year in Greece a noticeable change occurred in the textbooks for Grades Four and Five, which moved away from nationalism towards a more humanistic understanding of history.5

Despite the dissimilarities, which arise partly from differing historical heritages and partly from different historical interpretations and ideologies, there are still striking resemblances in the ways each nation has handled the image of its neighbour and presents the mutual relationship. The emphasis here will be on those similarities, especially in the presentation of Greek-Turkish relations.

3 A similar comparative study of Greek and Turkish history textbooks appeared in the Turkish periodical Yenidüşün in September 1987; and a translation followed in the Greek Elefterotipia, 24 February 1988.
4 Türker Alkan, The Political Integration of Europe, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 1982, p. 88.
5 In both Greece and Turkey these approved textbooks are the only ones provided in the primary schools: teachers have no choice but to use them.
The superiority of 'our' nation

The basic belief which is impressed upon nine to twelve-year-old pupils is that they belong to a superior nation. Such notions as equality among nations and peoples, or that civilization can derive from the interaction of different cultures, are not to be found in these textbooks. The Greeks (the present Greeks) claim they are the founders of world civilization, and the Turks claim that the ancient Aegean civilization (that is, the ancient Greek civilization) flourished because of the Turks!

According to the Greek sixth-grade textbook, the Greek nation is already around 4,000 years old:

After the wars against the Persians . . . a new Greek civilization was created which the whole world still admires . . . This civilization was later conveyed and spread to deepest Asia by Alexander the Great. When the Greeks became Roman subjects, this civilization was carried to Europe and formed the basis of present-day civilization. [During the Byzantine era the Greeks] fought against the barbarian nations to save civilization and Christianity. When Sultan Mehmet II brought this long and glorious historic period to a close, Greek intellectuals escaped to the West and took with them the torch of Greek civilization, helping to kindle the Renaissance in Europe . . . The Greeks were enslaved by the Turks for almost 400 years . . . With its trust in God and its patriotic devotion, the eternal Greek race was reborn. (G3, pp. 186-7.)

The Turkish textbook for the equivalent school year tells another story:

Archaeological excavations and research in Central Asia have shown that the oldest civilization in our world was the creation of the Turks . . . Turks from Central Asia migrated to various parts of the world and helped the natives who still lived in the Paleolithic Age to move on into the Neolithic Age. They learned from the Turks how to cultivate and how to work metals. In these new countries the Turks made further advances, building big cities and founding strong states. Important centres of civilization were thus created in Mesopotamia, in Anatolia, in Syria and around the Aegean Sea. (T3, p. 25.)

The Greek textbook, then, has Alexander the Great bringing civilization to the people of Asia. In the Turkish one it is the other way round:

The first human beings lived in Asia; the great religions were born in Asia . . . Asians were the first to invent gunpowder, the magnetic compass, paper, porcelain, silk, glass, the calendar and writing. The oldest and greatest civilizations, as well as the first great states, were founded in Asia. The hardest working and the highest-minded nations are in Asia. (T2, p. 192.)

The naiveté of the above passages is not just because they were written for children, in a simplistic style. Such understandings are accepted respectively in Greek and Turkey as the 'official view of history', and can be found in many history books. Supervision of the writing of history is a major preoccupation for politicians in the Balkans: indeed Atatürk himself formulated the Turkish official historical line.₆

Belittling the neighbour

₆ For an extended study of the Turkish official line (its origin, significance, authors, evaluation etc), see Büşra Ersanlı, 'The First Turkish Historical Congress' (in Turkish), Toplum Ve Bilim, autumn 1987.
Superiority is always relative, and requires that the other party be discredited. To enhance the claims of one nation to be civilized, the past, the ancestry and the 'character' of its neighbour are proclaimed barbaric. Past events are fabricated, or exaggerated, or evaluated by anachronistic modern standards, without any historical context or understanding.

Thus Turks were till recently presented to Greek schoolchildren as follows:

Emperor Constantine . . . made preparations for the defence of Constantinople even though he knew, as once Leonidas in Thermopylae was also aware, that the barbarians would eventually win . . . Sultan Mehmet II. . . . aroused the fanaticism of the Turkish soldiers by promising wealth in this life and happiness in Heaven. Those who died in their efforts to take the city would meet the Prophet (Muhammed) and His rich offer of food in Heaven . . . Terror and horror followed the capture of the city: massacre, plunder, enslavement, vandalism and other barbarisms. Those who sought sanctuary in the church of Saint Sophia fell victims to the fury of the janissaries. (G2, pp. 152, 157.)

In the new version of this textbook, however, there are some significant changes. The reference to the expected victory of the 'barbarians' has gone; so have 'the fanaticism of the Turkish soldiers' and their expectation of 'food in Heaven'. With the fall of the city, according to the new book, the Turks started 'to plunder, to kill and to vandalize', but that is all: the 'terror and horror', the 'massacre', and the references to 'barbarism' (so often before attributed to the Turks) are all omitted. (G2 New, p. 198.)

In the sixth-grade textbook (not yet revised) further brush strokes develop the portrait of the Turk:

In Turkey the textbooks are no better. According to the fourth-grade book:
In 1200 BC barbaric tribes . . . invaded the region which is called Greece today. In doing so they devastated the region and pitilessly killed the aboriginals. The Romans called these unknown tribes 'Greeks'. (T1, p. 191.)

These Greeks subsequently – Turkish fifth-graders are taught - :

intemixed with other tribes which came from Anatolia, thus forming a cross-breed. Then they were mixed with the Macedonians, the Romans, the Slavs and the Albanians. Therefore the Greeks of today have nothing in common with the ancient Greeks but a common language and some customs. (T2, p. 15.)

So history 'proves' the desired point! And there are lessons to be drawn:

Greece attacked the Ottoman Empire (1912-13) when the empire was at its weakest. During this war the aggressors acted with cruelty. They killed the Turks without pity [pity is altogether in short supply -HM] . . . Until the Greeks appreciate our friendly offers we should be very wary and cautious with this neighbour. Turkish boys and girls must realize this. (T2, p. 152.)

In 1821 'most of the Turks who lived in Peloponnese and on the islands, were killed by the Greeks - forty-five to fifty thousand died'. (T2, p. 64.) During the Turkish War of Liberation 'the Greek army killed civilians without hesitation, women and children included, and set fire to villages and towns'. (T2, p. 99.) And as final touch, to be sure of making an irreversible impact on these children of impressionable years as well as demonstrating the unchangingly pitiless Greek character, the 'historians' record that in 1821 'the Greeks showed by their actions that they are capable of killing without mercy even the babes in their cradles'. (T2, p. 64.)

Omissions

Two categories of events are skillfully left out of these textbooks; first, 'our' ugly or unpleasant deeds, and second, any praiseworthy actions by 'them'. Schoolchildren in each country almost never read or heard that their ancestors might have injured the other side.

According to the Turkish textbooks, 'when the Turks captured Istanbul (in 1453) nobody was hurt and nobody lost property'. (T2, p. 19.) According to the Greek textbooks, when on 23 September 1821 the Greeks captured Tripolis in the Peloponnese, 'the Greek army rushed into the city; it is impossible to describe what followed'. (G3, p. 76.) What in fact followed was a massacre. (According to the memoirs of the Greek commanding officer, 'From Friday to Sunday, the Greek soldiers went on slaughtering women, children and men. 32,000 people were killed around Tripolis. One man alone, from Hydra, killed ninety . . . At the end a crier was sent out and the massacre was terminated."

The expansionist, aggressive and booty-seeking policies of both Greeks and Turks are metamorphosed into humane expeditions, acts of benevolence and expressions of tolerance.

Alexander the Great was not only a great conqueror . . . but also a man who civilized [the East] ... He respected the religion, the traditions and customs of [the conquered]. (Gl, p. 168.)

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7 Th. Kolokotronis, Memoirs. The sufferings of the defeated when the Ottoman army entered Constantinople in 1453 are extensively described by many Greek historians.
Sultan Mehmet II is the best example of the greatness and of the humane approach of the Turkish nation. He allowed the inhabitants [of Constantinople] to live as before and respected their religion, tradition and customs. (T2, p. 19.)

According to these textbooks, expansionist wars were fought for the triumph of tolerance, or at least 'because we had no choice':

The ancient Greeks had to cope with many difficulties [as they established their colonies]. The greatest difficulty was the attitude of the people living there already. Their attitude was sometimes friendly and sometimes hostile [meaning, they defended their homeland: HM]. In this second case, the Greeks had to fight. (Gl, p. 43.)

Mustapha Kemal [in 1919] did not respect the Treaty of Sevres. He revolted . . . and started to fight against the Greeks [meaning, he defended his country: HM]. Greece was therefore obliged to enforce the Treaty by means of guns. (G3, pp. 167-8.)

Byzantine . . . Constantinople was squeezed between Turkish territories. The strait of Bosphorus was very important and could not possibly be left to the enemy. (T2, p. 19.) The Ottoman State was not aggressive. But when its neighbours posed a threat, and only then, it acted promptly to check the danger. (T2, p. 27.)

Beograd had to be conquered in order to defend the Ottoman territories. (T2, p. 28.)

The concept of an all-benevolent nation constitutes part of both 'official' histories. In the two new Greek textbooks, however, this concept is significantly modified. For instance, they suggest that the Ancient Greek colonies were established to deal with unemployment and in the pursuit of wealth. (G2 New, p. 38.) And instead of reading how Alexander the Great was a conqueror who civilized the East, students are asked to discuss 'how Greek customs changed as they came in contact with new people'. (Gl New, p. 205.) The most important development in these new Greek textbooks, although it is not the focus of this essay, is that they emphasize daily life, whether urban or rural, and deal with women and children. They present a people's history, rather than the heroic deeds and military victories of which 'history' previously consisted.  

Positive aspects of the neighbouring nation's history are in each case generally ignored or even denied. Turkish children are told that the Ionians were a people 'completely alien to the Ancient Greeks', and mention of Homer or Democritus, or the language spoken by these 'Anatolian indigenous people', is discreetly avoided. (This denial can be partly explained perhaps, though not justified, as a reaction to the arrogance with which some modern Greeks appropriate the legacy of an ancient civilization.) Correspondingly, one searches in vain for mention in Greek textbooks of the cultural heritage of the mighty Ottoman civilization. For Greek school-children, and by extension for Greek adults, the Ottoman Empire and barbarism belong together.

The national liberation wars of the two nations, the historic moment of which each nation feels really proud, are also reciprocally scorned and dismissed. The Greek Revolution of 1821 was a turning point in Balkan history and beyond, while the Turkish liberation war of 1923

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8 The History of the Human Race, by the distinguished historian, L. Stavrianos, an exemplary textbook now being used in Senior High Schools, illustrates the new tendency and the abandoning of the ethnocentric approach. [Note of 2010: Unfortunately this was book was used only for a year]

9 The eminent Turkish historian, Mete Tunçay, publicly criticized these textbooks and this 'Grecophobia' at a conference in 1977 (see note 9); and of course numerous well-known Turkish scholars of Ancient Greece, like Ekrem Akurgal or Suat Sinanoğlu, have refuted the blinkered 'official' line.

10 'Only one of the 1820-22 revolutions maintained itself, thanks partly to its success in launching a genuine
was one of the first anti-imperialist wars in history and was to inspire others. This is how they are presented in each other's textbooks.

The Ottoman Empire treated the Balkan people well. Nobody suffered because of religion, language, customs or traditions . . . The Greek uprising was initiated by the Russians. It was suppressed but Russia continued to incite the Greeks . . . All Europe helped with plenty of money . . . Eventually England and France intervened . . . Independence was granted to Greece. (T2, p. 64.)

The Turkish Revolution is recounted as follows in the Greek textbooks:

On 15 May, 1919, the Greek army landed at Izmir as required by the Great Powers. Mustafa Kemal refused to comply with the Treaty of Sevres . . . He fought against the Greeks . . . Later, having received support from the Allies, Mustafa Kemal attacked and the Greeks were defeated. (G3, p. 168.)

Not a single reference is made to the people, to liberty, to sovereignty, to self-determination, to personal sacrifices, or to national inspiration, when it is a question of 'their' history. Lofty ideals are reserved only for 'our' revolution.

Undermining each other’s sovereignty

Both Greece and Turkey have a number of times renounced their earlier expansionist policies. Officially, Megali Ithea (recovering Byzantine territory) and Gaza (war for the extension of Islam) or Pan-turkism are dead. Nevertheless, schoolchildren will still encounter passages in their books which imply that there is something wrong with the present borders between these two countries.

Turkish children read that 'in the Second World War the whole of Greece was invaded by the Germans. In spite of this defeat the Dodecanese were granted to Greece'. (T2, p. 152.) Or again:

Most of the Aegean Islands were given to Greece by the Great Powers. When in fact these islands are very close to our coasts. Previously the whole Aegean coast, the islands and Greece were under Turkish rule. The islands of the Aegean sea were a part of the Ottoman Empire sixty years ago. (T1, p. 154.)

Children who live on these Aegean islands or on the Greek mainland find in the supplementary readings in their history textbooks a poem relating to the Fall of Constantinople, once quite popular, which ends 'Don't cry, Lady, a time will come when the city is ours again'. Then they read the legend of the Greek king turned to stone by an angel the day Constantinople fell, who is hidden in a cave, and will one day come back to life and 'chase away the Turks . . . and much killing will follow, so much killing that the calf will float in blood'. (G2, p. 163.) It is interesting that both poem and legend are retained in the new textbook introduced for 1988-9. (G2 New, pp. 200-1.) The justification is probably that they are part of the popular literary tradition. But still two questions remain: why out of hundreds of poems and legends are this particular poem and this bloodthirsty legend considered the

most suitable for children; and why are this poem and this legend presented as a sample of 'our people's belief and expectation'?

Estimating the damage

Besides distorting and manipulating historic events, these textbooks are also arbitrary in their evaluation of them. Severity and harshness in ancient times and more recently are used to 'prove' the continuous and characteristic brutality of the neighbouring nation. Labels such as Greek and Turk create images of permanent ethnic prototypes, ignoring the complexity of life and the way that ethnic groups change and evolve. These textbooks leave the impression that they are concerned with two invariable, unchanging racial groups.

The notion of immutable nations is then further reinforced by assigning definite national characteristics: 'our' nation is superior, benevolent and strong; the other is harsh, uncivilized, insignificant and so on. Children are left to conclude that the other side was always in the wrong, and their own side always almost perfect.

It is difficult to assess the harm done. But judging by the image which each nation has of the other - and there are some gloomy poll findings - this educational procedure is quite influential.

Amending the textbooks

Both in Greece and in Turkey there has been criticism of the nationalistic approach to history and in particular of its presentation in the textbooks. Historians, teachers, psychologists, philosophers and others have all been involved.

At a three-day conference in November 1975, for instance, Turkish historians engaged in extensive discussion of the textbooks used to teach history from primary level up to the universities, and many voiced criticisms of the 'official' line. Since then a study of primary school reading books in Greece has appeared, by Anna Frankouthaki (1978); and in Turkey a content analysis of Turkish, French, German and Italian history textbooks, by Türker Alkan (1982). Nicos Ahlis has analyzed the way Bulgarians and Turks are presented in Greek High School textbooks (1983). In the mid-1980s Vasilis Kremidas, in co-operation with other Greek historians, brought out his exemplary five-volume history for intermediate-level teaching, which is being extensively used outside schools. And in 1988 Hristina Koulouri published an anthology from Greek textbooks of the period 1834 to 1914.

The Greek-Turkish Friendship Committee, established when bilateral relations were in decline (1986), has repeatedly called for improvements to the textbooks. The Friedrich-
Naumann-Stiftung (German Institute) organized an international conference in Athens in December 1988 to discuss them. At a conference in Istanbul in 1986, initiated by Unesco, where Greek and Turkish officials discussed their countries' textbooks, it was decided that the Balkan countries would study their neighbours' textbooks and suggest amendments. A second Unesco conference two years later, in Patras (Greece), brought together official representatives from Albania, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

With the renewal of closer relations since the Davos meeting in February 1988, the prime ministers of the two countries undertook to try to amend the textbooks as a step towards improving bilateral accord. The Greek and Turkish branches of Unesco are currently working on this, under government guidance.

Conclusion

Biased textbooks are only one of the ways in which opinion is formed, but one of the most important, since textbooks are central to the 'education' of the whole nation. Evidently they need to be amended, not only for the sake of historical honesty, but also for practical political expediency: if Greeks and Turks are to live as good neighbours they have to overcome their nationalistic prejudices. Even the governments which authorize the use of these textbooks admit their harmfulness.

Both Greece and Turkey have historians and educationalists capable of surmounting the past in the interests of a more humanist future. Why don't they do it, then? There are a series of probable reasons. Most people are happy with the myths which they learned at school, and as voters now they will resist drastic change. Foreign policy is a battlefield for politicians, and any attempt to change the 'official' historical line will be exploited by opposition parties. Many of those responsible for amending the textbooks were themselves brought up on them, and believe they are still valid and useful. And finally, the politicians seem to see the whole issue of amending textbooks only in the context of bilateral relations, not as a measure which will free and enlighten the children of their own country. So demands for reciprocity, endless negotiations, and worries about the risk of too hasty concessions mean that change is delayed, inadequate and ineffective.

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17 As an example of a new general historical perspective on the Turkish side, see the four-volume History of Turkey prepared by S. Akşin, U. Hassan, H. Berktay, A. Ödekan, M. Kunt, H. G. Yurdaydın, Z. Toprak, Mete Tunçay, Cemil Koçak, Hikmet Özdemir, Korkut Boratav, Selahattin Hilav and Murat Katoğlu, Cem, 1987-8.
Notes

Abbreviations in the text refer to the following textbooks used in this study:

Greek:
- GI: *Arhaia Ellatha* (Ancient Greece), Fourth Grade, prepared by G. Kamaterou-Glitsis.
- G2: *Romaiki kai Vizantini Istoria* (Roman and Byzantine History), Fifth Grade, prepared by A. Bouyioukas.
- G3: *Elliniki Istoria ton Neoteron Hronon* (Greek History of Recent Times), Sixth Grade, prepared by H. Diamantopoulos and A. Kiriazopoulos.

Two new books were introduced in 1988-9, replacing GI and G2 above. They are:
- G2 New: *Sta Vizantina Hronia* (In Byzantine Years), Fifth Grade, prepared by V. Asimomitis, M. Karla, N. Nikilopoulos, Y. Papagrigoriou and Y. Salvaras, under the supervision of D. Melas.

Turkish:
- TI: *Sosyal Bilgiler* (Social Knowledge), Fourth Grade, prepared by F. Sanır, T. Asal and N. Akşit.
- T2: *Sosyal Bilgiler* (Social Knowledge), Fifth Grade, prepared by F. Sanır, T. Asal and N. Akşit.
- T3: *Milli Tarih* (National History), First Grade Junior High School, prepared by N. Akşit. (This last book is used here to provide comparability. Greek primary schools have six grades, Turkish only five. So the age group for whom Greek sixth-grade books are designed would in Turkey be in the first grade of junior high school.)
The Contrasting Images of Greeks in Turkish Literature:
Fiction versus Memoirs

Negatively portrayed individuals who belong to a neighbouring nation in texts of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is not a surprising phenomenon. One can even argue that the negatively portrayed national stereotypes of the "other" in textbooks, literary texts etc., are probably the rule. My findings confirm the above. The image of Greeks in Turkish literature and the image of Turks in Greek literature, generally consist of stereotypes. There are exceptions, of course. Some writers, mostly under the influence of Marxist ideology and/or humanism, present a rather balanced picture of the "other". In general though, the "other" is far from being a "normal" or an "average" personality.\(^{18}\)

However, when at a certain point I tried to categorize my findings, I noticed a surprising recurrence. Three Turkish authors presented two completely different and contrasting pictures when dealing with the "other" in two different types of literary texts: in fiction the Greeks were very "bad", in memoirs the Greeks were "good".\(^{19}\)

The three Turkish writers are Ömer Seyfettin, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Halide Edip Adıvar. They are well-known authors in Turkey and representatives of "national literature" (millî edebiyat), a dominant school of the first half of the 20th century. In Turkey the term "national" literature does not mean nationalistic literature (even though there are many nationalistic characteristics in their texts).

There are very few writers who have written both fiction (novels and short stories) and memoirs (reminiscence and autobiographies). Here I will refer to all published texts of the three writers presenting direct or indirect references to Greeks and finally all findings in a general table.\(^{20}\)

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19 In many cases adjectives such as "good" and "bad" do not encompass any doubts; the words used are straightforwardly complimentary or derogatory. In some other cases though, where Greeks were mentioned without any particular value judgement/evaluation, the attributes were classified as "neutral". There are, however, some more complex cases. How should a Greek who runs successfully a tavern be classified? He gives pleasure, but drinking alcoholic beverages is a sinful act in a Muslim society. A Greek, who presented such dubious evaluations or where the value judgement attributed to him was not clear, was classified towards the positive side of the scale; i.e., in case of any doubt between "negative" and "neutral" or "neutral" and "positive", the second case was preferred. In other words, if there is a bias in this article, it is rather towards showing a bigger number of "good" Greeks than "bad" ones.

20 Naturally, many other interesting findings come to light in these texts: the phases of the formation of a national ‘identity; the perception of an east/west or Christian/Muslim controversy; paradigms related to history; ways of rationalization national targets, etc. In this presentation the scope is limited.
Ömer Seyfettin

Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920) lived and produced his short stories during the most turbulent period of the Ottoman Empire: the Ottomans faced the revolution of Crete, the movement of Young Turks, territorial losses in West and East (almost all the Balkans, the last African lands, the Arab lands), the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the defeat, the partition of the Ottoman Empire etc. Ö. Seyfettin was an army officer and had been a prisoner of war in 1913 after being captured by the Greek army. Even though he died very young, he produced 163 short stories. In present day Turkey he is considered as the Maupassant or the Chekhov of Turkey; the Ministry of Education recommends him as an exemplary writer and his short stories appear in almost all reading textbooks.²¹

Greeks are presented in 43 of his short stories (i.e. in 26 % of his short stories). These Greeks are presented basically as enemies of the Turks: they do not like Turks, they hate Turks, they want to extend their land against Ottoman lands and they commit atrocities in order to accomplish that. The Greeks exploit the Turks by establishing disreputable businesses (gambling and whore houses). The Bulgarians are probably even worse. In these short stories there is not a single male or female character that exhibits any positive side. Excluding the "neutral" references, we meet nine women and seven men in some detail in these short stories; they are all negative personalities. The women are either prostitutes or house maids who act extremely "freely".²² There are twelve incidents where in all cases the Greeks (who are not personally named or described but only mentioned in general as Greeks) behave in a negative way.²³

Ö. Seyfettin also wrote some memoirs during the time he was in Greek custody as a prisoner of war. The surprising finding is that, even under these extreme circumstances, almost all the Greeks whom he presents are characterized as gentle, kind and amiable. He praised the way the Greeks treated him and he expressed his sympathy even "for the chief of the hospital, who, poor man, had a son in the army". Of course, this son at that time was fighting the Turks!²⁴

Halide Edip Adıvar

Halide Edip Adıvar (1882-1964) is an authoress who took part in the liberation war against the Greeks. She had an intimate relationship with Mustafa Kemal. She was a member of parliament during the years 1950-1954 and published 21 novels, 2 volumes of short stories, a ²¹ For the complete works of Ö. S. see: "Ömer Seyfettin, Bütün Eserleri", Bilgi yayınları, Ankara, 1988-1990 (volumes 1-14). On the first page of each volume the recommendation of the Ministry of Education appears, dated 1987, where Ö. S. "is recommended to the schools".
²² For Greek women see the following short stories: Ashab-i, Kehfimiz, Efruz Bey, Yüksel Ökçeler, Kışkaçlık, Ay Sonunda, Primo Türk Çocuğun, Harem, Türkçe Reçete, Zeytin Ekmeği, Perili Köşk, Balkon. For Greeks in general the following short stories can be consulted: Primo Türk Çocuğun, Asiller Kulübü, Ashab-i Kehfimiz, Beyaz Lale, Bomba, Mehdi, Bir Çocuk Aleko, Boykotaj Düşmanı, Memlekete Mektub, Lokanta Esrarı, Hürriyete Layık Bir Kahraman, Yaz Geceleri.
²³ Looking at these literary texts from another perspective, different evaluations are also possible: Greeks are bad and harmful for the Turks; but they seem to be "good" to themselves. They act as members of a nation "should". They are not personalities to be despised. There are many instances where the Turks in these short stories decide to follow the exemplary acts of the "nationalist" Greeks. The Greeks in these cases constitute examples to be followed. Actually, the whole West is considered to be barbaric but such a "barbarism" is also considered to be indispensable if national targets are to be accomplished. See for example the article "Edebiyatta Arz ve Talep" ("we will become a nation like the Greeks, the Armenians..."); and the short story "Bir Çocuk Aleko" (where a Turkish boy succeeds in a national mission by acting the way the Greeks do).
play and two volumes of memoirs. The memoirs were originally written in English.\textsuperscript{25} Her novel \textit{Sinekli Bakkal} is considered as a classic of modern Turkish literature.

The case of Halide Edip with respect to the image of Greeks is a complex one. The picture of the neighbouring nation in general is negative: Beyoğlu, vicinity in Istanbul mostly inhabited by Greeks and Christians, is presented as a degenerate place; the Greeks are ruthless during the war and they enjoy killing children and raping women; Greek women are almost all either prostitutes or housemaids who act like prostitutes. In her novels and short stories, there is only one positive Greek who appears in her first novel where a Greek advocates loyalty to the Ottoman State. On the other hand, eighteen Greek women and eight men, and 46 incidents all show the “other” extremely negative.

Nevertheless, the reader is presented with a surprise as he/she reads her memoirs where completely different Greeks appear: they are gentle, kind, humble, amiable. Even the same events are evaluated in diametrically opposite ways in her fiction and in her memoirs. I will limit myself with a few examples.

In her memoirs Helena is a real person who is exalted. This old Greek teacher is presented as a lady who taught her to love life when she was about ten and gave her courage when the authoress had lost her mother. In her memoirs she wrote that she had never forgotten and could never forget Helena. In her novels, however, one meets eight Greek women who are called "Helena" (Eleni), and they are all prostitutes or simple maids. One of them, according to the writer's description is even "disgusting, because she has hairs on her chin".\textsuperscript{26}

In her novels there is not a single Greek soldier who behaves in a humane way; one reads only of barbaric actions.\textsuperscript{27} In her short story titled “Fatma, Stop Hitting!” a Greek officer is lynched. The reader feels a catharsis, a just punishment, since the officer is pictured as a real monster. In her memoirs we read that she is against lynching "under any circumstance". She even criticizes Mustafa Kemal on this topic.\textsuperscript{28} The Greek soldiers in her memoirs are humane, and the reader is moved reading how Greek military physicians risked their lives to help wounded Turkish soldiers, how they fired at their own soldiers to stop atrocities, how Greeks and Turkish soldiers were found dead, having embraced themselves as if making peace at the last moment.\textsuperscript{29} The authoress clearly states that "there are no nations which can be guilty."\textsuperscript{30}

Even Beyoğlu, the vicinity where the Greeks lived, is mentioned in the memoirs, in contrast to her novels, as the place where she had her happiest moments of her life as a child. There her father had bought her a doll and she visited a theatre for the first time in her life.\textsuperscript{31} In her


\textsuperscript{26} For amiable Helena see: "Memoirs of Halide Edip". For negative women (and Helena) see the following novels and short stories (where A stands for Atlas, R for Remzi publishing houses respectively; 2, 3 etc; the edition of the book): "Heyula" (R2, 101-107); "Raik'in Annesi" (A5, p. 132-136); "Sinekli Bakkal" (A44, p. 294 where “the disgusting hairs of Helena” are encountered); "Yolpalas Cinayeti" (A7, p. 230); "Akile Hanım" (A4, p. 136); "Çaresaz" (A3, p. 223), etc.

\textsuperscript{27} Actually, the only positive character encountered in her literary texts is a Greek post official who favoured a multi-national Ottoman state (Yeni Turan, Atlas, 5. addition, p. 81). For negative Greeks see for example: "Ateşten Gömlek", "İzmir'den Bursa'ya (short stories), "Dağ'a Çikan Kurt" (Short stories); "Vurun Kahpeye", etc.

\textsuperscript{28} Compare “Vurma Fatma" (Fatma Stop Hitting!) in “İzmir'den Bursa'ya", on the other hand, and “Turkish Ordeal” (Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı, Atlas, 9. addition, p. 228), on the other, where she is clearly against lynching under all circumstances.

\textsuperscript{29} See for example “Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı", ibid., pages 195, 250, 195.

\textsuperscript{30} See "Türkün Ateşle İmtihanı", ibid., p. 196 where she also adds that exaggerated hysterical texts cause ill feelings in young people hindering peace. (Dünyada suçlu millet olmadığını söylemek isterim... Barışa engel olan şeylerden birinin de, siyasi emeller için isteriye kaçaç abartmalı yazılardır. Böyle bir hareket gençliğe kötü duygular verir").

\textsuperscript{31} See “Mor Salkımlı Ev” A7, 35, 55 (The Turkish translation of "Memoirs").
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu

Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974) does not present a very different case. He, too, participated in the liberation war against the Greeks, he collaborated with H. Edip investigating the damage done by the Greeks during the occupation of West Anatolia, he was close to Mustafa Kemal and a member of the parliament and a diplomat. He published nine novels, two volumes with short stories, one play, and five volumes of memoirs. His novel entitled Yaban (The Stranger) is considered a classic in Turkish literature.

The Greek women whom we meet in his novels and short stories are usually prostitutes (6 out of 9); the other two women sexually excite some Turks. The Greek neighbourhoods are almost always connected with sexual adventures. Beyoğlu, the area in Istanbul inhabited mostly by Christians, is seen as related to unpleasant characters and incidents. The men have a greater variety of occupations: some run ill-famed bars, some have grocery stores etc. However, they are almost invariably portrayed as negative personalities.

The following derogatory adjectives, nouns, verbs and actions are related to Greeks and appear in his texts of fiction: dirty, disgusting, bloodthirsty, contemptuous, pedant, violent, savage, spoiled, enemy, shameless, ungrateful, cunning, barbarous, appalling, "gavur" (infidel), scoundrel, pitiless, degenerate, thief, rapist, ex-servants of ours, ex-slaves of ours, atrocities, treason, torture, killing, massacre, microbe, murder, beast, loot, beating, stealing, sabotage, hate, base ambitions, cadaver, strangler, killing by bayonet, killing by stoning, cutting breasts, nailing up by breasts, spitting in the face of Turks, setting fire to villages, and many other highly insulting expressions which make it difficult to find the corresponding words in translation.

The picture of Greeks is different in his memoirs. There, we find the respectable Greek doctor of Yakup Kadri’s father and some of his nice Greek friends (diplomats). These "positive" characters are few but there is not a single Greek in these memoirs who can be classified as negative.

An assessment

I composed a table out of these findings. The shortcomings of such a table are evident. A persons portrayed in great detail had to be taken on the same status as a person briefly mentioned. Light faults and grave crimes were both grouped as equally negative. Characters

33 "Türkün Ateşle intihani", ibid., p. 191.
had to be grouped out of context. There might have been subjectivity involved in classifying events as negative or positive. Still, presenting the results in a table form is useful. The table presents findings distinctively. Furthermore, the results are so clear and outstanding (not marginal) that any probable distortion does not seem to be decisive.

The table includes all references to Greeks, fiction (novels and short stories) and memoirs of each writer separately shown. "Neutral" references are not shown in order to simplify the presentation. Women, men and incidents are shown separately:

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<th>Women</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SUM</td>
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<td>Halide Edip Adıvar</td>
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<td>Yakup Kadri Karaoğlu</td>
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Looking at the general results presented in numbers, we may conclude the following:
1. In the texts of fiction there is only a single positive woman and 36 negative ones. In contrast to that, there is not a single negative one in memoirs where we find 3 positive women.
2. The ratio of positive/negative for men is 3/33 (more than 90 % "bad" Greeks) in fiction and 14/3 (more than 80 % "good" Greeks) in memoirs.
3. The incidents (or characterizations) which are not directly connected to persons but are more general, show the same tendency but not the same extreme contrast. There are no positive actions in fiction, with more than one hundred negative characterizations; whereas there is a 21/41 ratio for memoirs. This ratio is, of course, determined by the heavily influential 0/30 ratio of Yakup Kadri Karaoğlu. The other two writers have an average ratio of 21/11 which means 64% "good" actions by Greeks in memoirs.

All three writers show a similarity in having negative or "bad" Greeks in their novels and short stories and positive or "good" ones in their memoirs. One may suspect that fiction is the product of war periods and the memoirs of peace periods. This is not the case. Halide Edip wrote her memoirs right after the war and most of her novels much later. Yakup Kadri wrote his novels much after the war, whereas the "good Greeks" of Ömer Seyfettin appear in memoirs written when he was a prisoner of war, under Greek custody. The type of text (novel and short story) by itself cannot be the determinant factor, either. There is nothing intrinsic in literary texts enforcing national stereotypes. There are many examples in world and in Turkish literature where stereotyping is transcended. Coincidence does not seem to be the answer either, since the figures persistently point towards the same direction, showing that there is an apparent differentiation between literary texts and memoirs.

35 Sait Faik, for example, a well-known Turkish writer, portrayed balanced and mostly "positive" Greeks in his short stories. See: Nedim Gürsel, "La Communaute Grecque d'Istanbul Dans L'oeuvre de Sait Faik", in Le Different Greco-Turc, Edited by Semih Vaner, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1988. It is of interest to note that almost all of the characters portrayed by Sait Faik are "real", in the sense that they are recognizable by residents of the Prince Islands of Istanbul, i.e., of the milieu from where this writer selected his heroes.
In one of her novels where she describes two Greek women (prostitutes) Halide Edip wrote this revealing sentence: "These women were realistically representing the local prostitution as if they had just come out of the novels of Hüseyin Rahmi". H. Rahmi (1864-1944) is a novelist. The authoress, naturally (and to her honour), did not have first hand information about local prostitution. She had to rely on preceding novels; and literature for her was a source of "reality", picturing the real world. Stereotyping in literature may be the reproduction of socially existing images. Whereas memoirs, on the other hand, are written based on personal experience. One does not feel the need to refer to general predetermined "truths" and "realities" when she/he narrates personal experience. Memoirs are about "really real" persons.

The writers are conscious of their readers. The changes that Halide Edip made in her memoirs when she translated the English version into Turkish are revealing. In the English version she presents her family close to the royal family of the Ottoman Empire, to the Greeks and to the Christians. She mentions her disagreements (on lynching) with Mustafa Kemal. All these changed when she prepared her text for Turks who had chased away the Sultan and the Greeks and who were governed by a strong military hero, Mustafa Kemal. We may suspect that writers write what they are expected (by their readers) to write. Maybe she wrote the short story defending lynching as a plea for excuse for her initial opposition to this act. The fictitious texts of the authoress were written for the Turkish public, whereas the memoirs were originally written for English speakers. Also the memoirs of Ömer Seyfettin were not originally written for publication and they were published for the first time forty seven years after his death.

A third factor that gives birth to national stereotypes is the nationalistic ideology and its premise that nations are "homogeneous" groups. The three writers that are known in Turkey as representatives of "national literature" are also famous for trying in practice to strengthen the Turkish language, the Turkish state and the Turkish national consciousness. Nationalists do not seem to be interested in "details" and "exceptions" that injure their basic premise. Their "reality" covers all of "us" (as positive), as well as all "others" (as negative). As nationalist writers create – on paper - their ethnocentric world, they present "reality" according to the ideological stereotypes and not in accordance to the "few" incidents in life which may contradict their worldviews. So even though they may have met only "good" Greeks during their life time, their ideology (or their "education" in general) dictates them to portray only negative personalities - not as they may appear and present themselves but as they "really" are.

Memoirs profess an altogether different world. They do not represent, according to the understanding of these writers, the ultimate, the general, the basic "truth" but only some particular or coincidental incidents. In philosophical terms, one may recall the controversy of nominalism: particular occurrences can not constitute a universal reality. A nationalist author feels comfortable when s/he writes about "nice" neighbours since we all know these do exist. However, in a text of fiction we do not record (nominalist) particulars but basically the "ultimate reality", the symbolic expression of what really exists beyond appearances. Nationalist writers therefore reproduce predetermined nationalistic stereotypes, as these have been built up in a nationalistic discourse.

The belief that literary texts present the ‘essence’ (the universals) beyond the ‘facts’ (the singulants) is at least as old as Aristotle. In his Poetics he wrote that (read fiction for "poet" and memoirs for “historian”): “it will be seen that the poet’s function is to describe, not the

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37 The changes that occurred between the English and the Turkish versions of the Memoirs can be seen when the corresponding pages of the Turkish version are compared with the following pages of the English version: 3, 150, 153, 359 of the English version with 22, 300, 376, 574. For changes that occurred with respect to Turkish Ordeal compare pages 22, 300, 359 of the English version with the corresponding Turkish translation.
things that happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e., what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse . . . it consists really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars." 38 Hence, authors of novels in their depiction of the Other seem to voice the “universals”, as these are conceived by them, irrespective of ‘singulars’.

The demarcation line between fiction and memoir becomes apparent. In texts that are heavily influenced by nationalism, the difference is not in the style, nor in the content. It is in the meaning given to the narration, to novels/short stories on the one hand and to memoirs on the other: the first is the essence, the other is the appearance.

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Tourkokratia:
History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature

In this chapter I examine Greek conceptualizations and images of the Turks as they are expressed in literary texts. I observe that the Turks appear as negative personalities whenever they are portrayed as abstract/historical characters and as potentially positive individuals when presented as concrete/experienced persons. This discrepancy is repeated in the period of Tourkokratia, the Ottoman rule, which is depicted negatively as a historical event, but positively in personal memories. I argue that the authors of these literary texts resisted contradiction by compartmentalizing their perceptions of the Turks in parallel domains of experience. In some cases, the friendly Turks in personal memories are transformed into ‘naively positive’ admirers of the Greek Self.

In the conversations of my childhood, especially those with my father, communicating opinions about Turks was a painful topic. I was born into a family of Constantinopolitan Greeks, Turkish citizens and members of the Greek community of Istanbul, known in Turkey as Rum. My father used to refer to the abstract category of the ‘Turks’ in negative terms, frequently claiming that the Turks ‘hated us’ and ‘treated us unfairly’. On such occasions I would remind him of my Turkish classmates and friends, whom he himself liked too and I would argue that we had Turkish neighbours whom we, and indeed our whole family, held in good regard. ‘You contradict yourself,’ I used to argue; ‘you are guilty of exactly the same things that you condemn in our Turkish neighbours.’

My father was born in 1900. He lived through the Balkan Wars, the Greek–Turkish war of 1919–1922 and the two World Wars, in which Greece and Turkey were in different military camps. He was brought up in a period when nationalism was at its peak in both Greece and Turkey and he had been educated to think in nationalistic terms. I only came to understand him better after he passed away and after I completed some studies of my own on Greek–Turkish relations. Now I think that the term ‘contradiction’ was not adequate to explain his attitudes. His identity and his understanding of politics were too complex to be accurately described in simple words; trapped between conflicting nationalist paradigms, he reproduced several stereotypical representations of the undifferentiated Turk as the ethnic Other. In real life, however, he was forced to encounter the Other on a frequent basis, and he sincerely liked some of these actual, concrete people who happened to be the Others, the Turks.

Viewing Others, Positive or Negative

This article is concerned with conceptualizations and images of the Turks in Greek literature. I focus on two aspects of the Greco-Turkish relationship in particular: the Turk as either an abstract or concrete ethnic Other, and, connected to that, the notion of Tourkokratia, i.e. the
period of Ottoman rule in Greek lands. I discuss Greek views and representations of the Turks as these are expressed in novels that refer to the Other in an indirect way, i.e. mostly by composing stories about the ‘Turks’ and narrating situations about ourselves and Others. Special attention is devoted to themes that are silenced and forgotten, as well as some other contradictions inherent in these discourses.

Ethnic stereotypes normally are developed and reproduced in pairs, mutually on both sides of the ‘Us vs. Others’ conceptual divide, but in this article I will concentrate primarily on images the Greeks have about the Turks. Occasionally, I will present some cases from the Turkish side and some Turkish images of Greeks in order to show how widespread some tendencies are. I am particularly concerned with the deconstruction of convictions that are not openly admitted by Greek and Turkish authors, images that usually find their way into the narratives I examine in a rather implicit and unconscious way; the disseminators of the stereotypes, on the conscious level, perceive the images and the stereotypes as ‘knowledge’ and as ‘facts’.

A close examination of Greek novels that refer, in one way or another, to the Turks confirms a recurrent phenomenon: the Turks appear as negative personalities whenever they are portrayed as abstract characters and as potentially positive individuals when they are presented as concrete persons. Abstract personalities are the ones who appear as symbols, as representatives of authority in the Ottoman (and/or Turkish state) apparatus, mostly as historical figures who played a certain role in a framework where Greeks and Turks and their respective nations were in confrontation. These negative personalities are almost always men in their middle age and mostly appear in historical novels or in narrations that examine the past. It is not their names, but their titles, ranks and official positions that are of importance. They could be sultans, officers or dignitaries; in short, persons with authority and power. They might also have nationalist dispositions, and act as agents or instigators of ethnic strife. We learn little about their personal life and feelings, but much about their (negative) behaviour and its effects on the Greek protagonists. They often appear in settings where the ethnic Self and the Other are in controversy, only to act unfavourably, not merely in the political sense, but also in ethical terms. The Turks as abstract personalities are portrayed as cruel, fanatical and perverted, a source of unhappiness and danger for ‘the Greek Self’, which is here uncritically equated with the collectivity of the Greeks.

However, when Turks appear as concrete personalities they are not portrayed so negatively and they may even have positive attributes. These are Turkish characters who appear in the novels of Greek authors who have lived in Ottoman lands, writing about events that they have personally experienced (and not about past ‘historically’ transmitted incidents). Their Turkish protagonists tend to be normal and balanced heroes, who look real (or more real). They might be men or women of any age (including children and old people), practising less authoritative

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39 Some of my findings are presented in detail in my other publications: Türk Romanı ve Öteki (Millas 2000) is based on a study of approximately 500 Greek and Turkish novels; Εικόνες Ελλήνων και Τούρκων (Millas 2001) contains Greek images of the Turks in textbooks and historiography; Do’s & Don’ts (Millas 2002) also deals with mutual images and stereotypes of Greeks and Turks.

40 The demarcation line between ‘fact’ and ‘perception’ (or reality/myth, objectivity/subjectivity) is a complex philosophical issue that will not be dealt with here. It suffices to remind oneself that a stereotype is usually preserved unnoticed or is discarded as such if it is recognized.

41 See Millas (2001) for an analysis of 62 novels of 41 well-known Greek authors, published between 1834 and 1998. See also Demirözü (1999). Demirözü demonstrates that Greek authors, such as Venezis, Theotokas, Mirivilis and Politis, who have lived in Asia Minor and met Turks in person have written about modern times and portrayed the Turks in a balanced way, whereas writers who have lived in Greek lands and not met Turks, such as Ampot, Karagatsis, Petsalis and Prevelakis, have written about historical times, mostly Tourkokratia, in which the Turks appear in general as negative and abstract personalities or symbols of despotism.
occupations, mostly of a humble trade. The reader is allowed to have a glimpse of the inner life of these characters, to share their often unique personal stories. We know them by their names because in most cases they are the people next door. They are not introduced in ethnic terms—as ‘Others’ in conflict with ‘us’—but rather as ordinary human beings. They may have weaknesses, as all human beings do, but they are not distinguished for their political actions. They appear to meet with ‘us’, the Greeks, under ordinary circumstances, not in an atmosphere of war and strife, as is almost always the case with the ‘abstract and historical’ Turks. In short, they look like real persons, not like rude stereotypes, representatives or caricatures of an imaginary ethnic group.

The same tendency—i.e. viewing abstract personalities as negative and concrete ones as positive—is encountered in Turkish texts vis-à-vis the Greeks too. Authors who in their memoirs portrayed those Greeks whom they actually met almost exclusively in positive terms wrote negatively about Greeks in their novels and short stories. Literary texts and memoirs differed in the following respect: the fictional Other that comes normally to the agenda in a ‘national’ context is almost without exception a negatively portrayed person, whereas the actual one, the one really remembered, is almost always a balanced personality. We can see this in the work of Ömer Seyfettin, Halide Edip Adıvar and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu—three well-known Turkish ‘national’ authors, as they are called in Turkey, who published their novels in the years 1910–1960. It is also interesting to note that these writers actually praised all the Greeks whom they had met in their lives, but portrayed the ‘Greeks’, men and women, as enemies and inferior persons in their fictional narration.  

I have been using so far the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ to refer to evaluations used by authors to describe the Other, and there is a danger here of reproducing further generalizations. This is why I want to clarify that the novel protagonists, in several cases, cannot readily be classified as ‘good’ or ‘bad’—and their portrait cannot be easily described as positive or negative. Sometimes the Other is portrayed with positive characteristics, but actually in a neutral and perplexing manner. These are cases where the Other may be presented as close to the ethnic Self, preferring ‘us’ instead of his own ethnic group, ‘confessing’ the ill doings of his or her group, voicing ‘our’ arguments, in short acting as ‘our’ agent. This very particular Other is effectively devoid of the ethnic characteristics of the abstract Other; he or she is practically assimilated into ‘our’ group and is not one of ‘them’ anymore. The author, in effect, uses protagonists like these to make a case against the Other. In this respect, protagonists of this kind seem to be or to act as positive Others, whilst in truth not being exactly representative of most of the (other) Others. I call characters of this kind ‘naively positive’, since they carry a certain naiveté, but also because they present a simplistic approach on behalf of the author. This is a misleading attempt to appear to be acting against nationalistic stereotyping: a supposedly positive Other is created simply to confirm a demonstrable number of expected, stereotypical attributes.

Turks as Abstractions

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42 See Millas (1996). See also Millas (2000) for an analysis of 350 novels of 118 well-established Turkish writers published between the years 1870 and 1998.

43 ‘Naively positive’ Turks are encountered often in Greek literature, where their role is to confirm Greek theses and arguments. A typical example is Selim, who appears in the novelette of Vizitinos, Moskof Selim, as a sane and good person, who confesses that the Turks, as a nation, are not liable to possess the lands they own and that they should leave them to Greeks and go back to Central Asia. ‘Naively positive’ Greeks are encountered often in Turkish literature too; the ‘good’ Greeks in the novels of Halikarnas Balıkçı and Kemal Tahir are almost all of this category.
The negative and/or positive Turk in Greek novels is connected to the worldview of the author and/or recipient society. The ‘Us vs. Them’ polarity is connected to a particular religious and/or ethnic identity; the stereotypes related to this polarity are also closely connected to a certain national history. Most images of the Other in Greek novels reflect a past of diachronic significance, a past that gives meaning to the present, ‘our’ Greek present. Most Greeks locate themselves in a time continuum: a national existence of many centuries. Without this imagined continuum, past incidents would become isolated and coincidental happenings. Within this context, the Turks also obtain a time-enduring entity. The ‘timeless’ existence of the Other (and the interrelation of the Self with this Other) is secured by the name used to define him or her. Greeks often name as ‘Turks’ various states and groups—such as the Seljuks, the Ottomans, even the Albanians (Turkalvanoi)—whereas these groups, in the past, normally used the word ‘Turk’ either pejoratively and/or to denote nomads.

All of the above elements are incorporated and frequently expressed in the Greek discourse on Tourkokratia. Normally Tourkokratia refers to the ‘400 years of bondage’; the expressions ‘invasion’, ‘slavery’ and ‘Turkish yoke’ are also used to refer to the same concept. Tourkokratia is always unfavourable: in school books, in historiography, in literature, in the discourse promoted by politicians representing the whole political spectrum (from the extreme right to the left). In all cases, Tourkokratia is presented as the Dark Age of the Greek nation and everything is assessed as negative in this period: the leading Turkish (Ottoman) dignitaries, the legal system, the economic situation, the daily life of the subjects. The Greeks suffer; they are condemned to ‘darkness’ and backwardness; they are not respected; the Other humiliates them.

There are some illuminating passages in Greek novels related to these ‘terrible’ years of ‘bondage’. The novelist Ilias Venezis (1904–1973), who was born and lived in Anatolia in the earlier part of the twentieth century and had first-hand experiences with Turks, portrayed the Turkish ‘Other’ realistically—and quite often positively—in his novels. In his writing, however, he gives special importance to Tourkokratia:

From old times come the memories, the stories and the tears . . . The [Greek] mothers narrated stories of . . . massacres and hunger to their babies to put them to sleep . . . Everything here exists in order to remind us of the past. We are a nation of memories. This is the source of sorrow and of our pride . . . So we address the other side of the Aegean and we say [to the Turks]: ‘If you expect us to forget our history, our martyrs, we cannot do that.’ (Venezis 1979, pp. 156–157)

And indeed, when he writes about ‘old’ incidents that supposedly took place during the Tourkokratia, the Turks are presented as terrible and cruel invaders. Here again the concrete and ‘positive’ Turks whom the author met are in direct contrast to the historical, abstract negative Other. The same author, who clearly believes in the importance of maintaining

44 It is not very clear how one reaches the ‘400’. Probably 1453 (capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans) is subtracted from 1830 (the year the modern Greek state was founded), which gives 377 years. Both dates are symbolic. Turkish-speaking groups arrived and gradually established themselves in ‘Greek lands’ (that is, Byzantine territory) in the eleventh century (symbolically, from 1071). Thessalonica was ‘liberated’ from Turkish ‘occupation’ in 1912, and, according to some, Turks still occupy Istanbul. So one could as well talk of 800 years of Tourkokratia. In any case these calculations make sense only if one is prepared to see the Ottomans as the Turks, and the Byzantines as the Greeks.

45 There are some rare exceptions. Some religious persons, mostly very opposed to Western (Catholic and Protestant) influences, seem to perceive a less negative East (in comparison with the West). In the writings of Professor Kitsikis and Presbyter Metallinos, for example, the Turks appear to be preferable to the non-Orthodox Westerners. See Kitsikis (1988, pp. 101–111) and Metallinos (1993, pp. 85–89).

good relations with the present-day Turks, explicitly states his position vis-à-vis ‘forgetting’ the past—‘forgetting’ is here synonymous with excusing the Turks who had done so many ‘terrible things’ to the Greeks: ‘Hatred is a matter of ethics. Not to forget is a need. If I forget it is as if I betray my country, my parents’ (Venezis 1988, p. 37).

The necessity and usefulness of remembering and reproducing the ‘old sufferings’ of the nation which were caused by the Other are voiced in a novel by Dimitris Vikelas (1835–1908), Loukis Laras (1879), almost 100 years before Venezis:

The Turks by massacring, distracting and enslaving the male population, women and children, took care to remind us the unity of our nation, even if we would wish to forget it. (1991 [1879], p. 18)

The history of the nation is composed of the history of the persons; and the history of Greek rebirth is not composed only of the achievements of our ancestors on land and at sea, but also of the persecutions, the massacres and the humiliations of the unarmed and of the weak. (pp. 122–123)

There is an additional purpose in reproducing the negative past and the suffering caused by the Turks, as this becomes apparent in the The Sword of Vengeance (1861) by Nikolaos Votiras. It proves to the Westerners that modern Greeks are the descendants of the glorious ancient Hellenes: ‘The hero suffered a terrible death bravely, he was impaled and burned alive (by the Turks), and he did not shed a single tear; he proved thus by his bravery that all those who doubt the authenticity of Greek nation, and who do not accept that the modern Greeks are the grandsons of Leonidas, are wrong’ (Votiras 1994 [1861], p. 59).

The idea of a ‘terrible’ and overtly negative Tourkokratia provides useful images that sustain the ideology of the Greek nation state, nurturing the values that preserve national identity. A negative past, presented as the outcome of a problematic relationship with Others, is required for a number of related reasons: it justifies the revolt against those Others, that is, the Greek Revolution (or War of Independence) in 1821, the existence of a sovereign Greek state, the personal and communal sacrifices made in the past for the nation. It also explains why Greece is not as advanced as other European states or as successful as its ancestors, the ancient Greeks; in other words, through their problematic relationship with the Greeks in the past, the Turks serve as the scapegoats for what is wrong about the Greeks in the present (see Herzfeld 1987).

It would be wrong to interpret this ‘negative’ image of the Turk as a natural outcome of the period in question, that is, the period of Ottoman rule, even though wars, social unrest, revolts, famine and repression did indeed characterize some periods of this era. The appearance of hostile personalities in such a setting is not surprising. It is not, however, the recurrence of the negative Other that creates the stereotypes; it is the striking absence of positive Turks. The Turks in the texts that refer to this period are, in their totality, negative. This stereotypy is accomplished also by avoiding references to women, children and the elderly; their absence aids in the legitimation of hostile actions of the Greeks against ‘negative’ Turks. The readers would otherwise face a profound difficulty in incorporating all of these kinds of different Turks into one single enemy group that is annihilated.

Demirözü (1999) shows that in the novels of Karagatsis, Prevelakis and Petsalis—all writers who lived in Greece and had not actually encountered Turks—the Turks of Tourkokratia consist of middle-aged, ‘negative’ males. Even though Greek women appear in the novels referring to this period (and are most frequently portrayed as mothers, a positive association), Turkish women are rarely encountered, and when this does happen they are never mothers or ordinary personalities, but stereotypical females of pleasure serving the harem. Children appear rarely too, and when they do they do not show characteristics of their
age but are wicked; they are, for instance, arrogant or aggressive, showing by their actions what the Greeks can expect of them. Old people and babies are not part of the Turkish community of Tourkokratia.

This extreme negative image of Tourkokratia comes across in Greek historiography too. For Paparrigopoulos, the most prestigious Greek historian of the nineteenth century, Tourkokratia was a ‘disastrous period for Hellenism’: the Greek population was dramatically diminished and Christians were forcibly Islamized (Paparrigopoulos (1903), p. 495). According to Vakalopoulos (1973), a well-known liberal historian of the twentieth century, during Tourkokratia,

oppression, terror, enlisting in the army and various extra taxes... were enforced. What irritates the Turks is the fact that the Christians are always on the side of their enemies, helping their enemies, always ready to revolt. That is why the Turks are especially against the Greeks. The Greeks are terrified that they will be slaughtered in their churches... The whole Macedonia suffers. Whole areas are deserted and are not cultivated. Many inhabitants chose to become Muslims to avoid these mishaps. This is repeated every time the horizon darkens. (Vakalopoulos 1973, p. 86)

The reader understands, and also feels as he reads this text in the present tense, that the horizon gets darker every time the Turks appear. Marxist historians portray a completely negative Tourkokratia too. In 1957 Kordatos, another historian, writes in his conclusion, ‘When the Turks conquered Asia Minor and the Balkans they neither brought with them a high technology nor did they develop the means of production. On the contrary, they were an underdeveloped people in all aspects of social and political life... So, the non-Muslim peasant had not a single happy day. His life was a misery’ (Kordatos 1957, p. 149). Svoronos (1985), a modern Marxist historian, maintains a similar position: ‘[The Greek] peasant could not enjoy a single day. His life was a misery. Especially when he did not own his own land he was twice a slave. Slave of the Turkish invader and slave of the landowner’ (Svoronos 1985, p. 149).

It is very hard to find any positive, even neutral, attributes of Tourkokratia in these texts. Apart from the context, the language used to describe the period is dramatic and emotion-provoking. In this respect, historiography and literary approaches seem to merge and supplement each other; the demarcation line between writing history and novels becomes blurred. Passion, sentimental involvement, identification with the past generations of ‘Greeks’ and negative feelings against the ‘Turks’, who are presented as the source of all mishaps, are common in both types of texts.

Concrete Experiences with Turks

As with the Turks as novel protagonists, the notion of Tourkokratia in Greek novels is similarly considered in terms of the same corresponding—‘negative’ or ‘positive’—relationship with respect to abstract/historical and concrete/real descriptions. Even though Tourkokratia, Turkish/Ottoman rule, is generally referred to in negative terms in Greek novels, the real and actually experienced Tourkokratia (living in an Ottoman world) is sometimes discussed in a positive manner. The interplay of an imaginary versus a real Other is encountered anew in the case of Tourkokratia. Some novels that appeared only a few years after Greeks had fought to free themselves from ‘Turkish bondage’ present Greek heroes returning to Ottoman lands to find happiness and wealth, as in the following examples. Alexandros Soutsos (1803–63) in his novel The Exile (1834), which was published only five years after the presumed ‘liberation’ of the Greeks from Tourkokratia, narrates how his
protagonist ends up in Istanbul, where he had lived ‘his childhood free of troubles’ (p. 110), and how he buys the house of his father anew, having decided to live there thereafter (Soutsos 1999 [1834], p. 209). Pitzipios (1802–69) in *The Orphan of Chios* (1839) narrates the life of the Greeks of Smyrna and Istanbul. Turks do not appear in these cities, especially Turks who cause problems to the Greeks. Some Turks, when they do appear—for example Aine, a Turkish girl (253)—are introduced in order to help the Greeks. In *The Ape Ksuth* (1848) Turks do not influence the life of the Greeks in Smyrna (Pitzipios 1995a [1839]; 1995b [1848]).

Grigorios Paleologos (1794–1844) was an author who settled in Istanbul right after the liberation of Greece and published his novels there. In *The Painter* (1842), he narrates how his hero, Filaretos, who moves to Istanbul and chooses to live there permanently, ‘will always earn enough money to live in comfort with his beloved Hariklia’ (1995 [1842], p. 296). He also praises the Ottoman government because it can control gambling, and he adds that in the Ottoman state there is more freedom than in many states in Europe (Paleologos 1995 [1842], p. 226). This discourse of a real ‘Turkish rule’ that secures a normal and even a happy life for the Greeks neither seems to cause any reactions on the part of the Greek readers nor suggests a contradiction to them, which needs to be explained. The two faces of *Tourkokratia* are allowed to coexist side by side.

The happy life of Greeks in Turkish lands, i.e. in Anatolia and in Istanbul, are narrated in later novels too, for example in the novels of Venezis, Mirivilis, Politis, Sotiriou, Iordanidou, all authors who lived in Asia Minor and met the ‘Other’. In all of these cases ‘Turkish rule’ is concrete and real; it is experienced by the authors, and the protagonists of their novels, directly and personally. However, this kind of agreeable Turkish government is not called *Tourkokratia*; this name is reserved only for an explicitly negative rule. It is as if rule that is not overtly negative cannot be called *Tourkokratia*.

The novels of the above-mentioned authors were written mostly in the decades of 1920 to 1950, and the Turks appear in them against a turbulent background; the Balkan Wars (1912) and the Greek–Turkish war of 1919 to 1922 are mostly the settings where the Greeks meet the Other, although the ‘memory’ of *Tourkokratia* is not the main subject of these narratives. The generalized Turk is often presented as a nationalist fighting against ‘us’ (the Greeks), but often, next to this Turk, some additional ‘positive’ Others make their presence felt. Most importantly, there are also some Greeks who appear to act like the ‘negative’ Turks; here, the demarcation line is not founded on an ethnic basis and all kinds of personalities appear on both sides.

The Turks in these novels behave unfavourably, but only because of war. A Turk’s cruelty, for example, does not originate from a national characteristic or from the Turk’s nature: the suffering caused by both sides is the result of the circumstances of war. The intended message is that ‘war is the guilty party’, as Dido Sotiriou (1911–2004) points out at the end of her book *Matomena Homata* (Bloodied Soil) (1962). In these novels we meet, maybe for the first time in Greek literature, the ‘ordinary Turk’, the ordinary citizen, who is not the conqueror, a person in the service of the ‘state’. The ordinary Turk, like the ordinary Greek, struggles for his or her own survival and for his or her immediate family. There are even cases where the rich Greeks in Anatolia (during *Tourkokratia*) exploit the poor Turks economically. Turkish women are portrayed as working hard, side by side with their husbands; there are no harems.

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47 The expression ‘ethnic memory’ (in Greek ηθνική μνήμη) is of course misleading. People do not remember a certain past which they did not experience personally; they are taught to remember that past. The term ‘memory of the nation’ infers an imaginary national continuum.

48 Also known in English as *Farewell to Anatolia*.

49 See also Demirözü (1999, pp. 284–287).
These writers who present a balanced approach vis-à-vis Turkish rule may still present the abstract, historical *Tourkokratia* as negative when they refer to ‘the old times’. The work of Venezis is a typical example of this approach; he often relates to his personal experience with the Turks, drawing a portrait of the Other as an ordinary, and even positive, fellow human, who is in some cases superior to the Greek, more just and honest. However, when Venezis returns to narrating the history of old generations in *Tourkokratia*, the Other is demonized and stereotyped (Millas 1998; 2001, pp. 354–359). In fact, a negative personal memory of *Tourkokratia* does exist in the minds of these authors; and when a Turkish rule that has been experienced in actuality appears to be satisfactory, or at least not very negative, it is simply not referred to as *Tourkokratia*.

Surprisingly enough, the abstract, negatively portrayed *Tourkokratia*, on the one hand, and the concrete and positive (or balanced) Ottoman rule, on the other, simultaneously coexist in the narration of many authors. An extreme example of this simultaneity is found in a primary school textbook used in the 1980s, and is an example that shows that the phenomenon of the dual evaluation of Ottoman rule is not limited to literature, but has a social and a national basis. The textbook starts with the suffering that the Turks have imposed upon ‘us’ (the Greeks): ‘The Turks, because they were wild and uncivilised, spread disaster on their way and they did not render any rights to the enslaved nation [of the Greeks].’ Then the misery of the people who are referred to as Greeks is further emphasized: they were forced by threats on their lives to convert to Islam, Turks grabbed children away from their families and enlisted them in the Turkish (Ottoman) army, and there was no justice for the Greeks, who were not allowed to study, or even to speak their own language, and suffered many ills.

Paradoxically, in the same school textbook, an additional chapter, entitled ‘TheWay Enslaved Hellenism Was Organised’, makes mention of the privileges of the Greeks in Ottoman times. It is clearly stated that the Greeks had religious privileges, that the Church had all the rights it enjoyed in the Byzantine period, and that the Patriarch had jurisdiction over the internal affairs of the Greek population. The Turks, it is also mentioned, did not even have the right to arrest a priest without the consent of the Patriarch, and the Greeks had some political privileges too. They were allowed to run their own affairs (e.g. collecting taxes) and organize their schools and the teaching curriculum; indeed, it is stated, the Greeks had many very good schools. As in the novels examined above, these two mutually exclusive representations of the Ottoman rule coexist within the same textbooks without any further explanation (Diamantopoulou & Kyriazopoulou 1984).

*Tourkokratia* and the Resurrection of the State

In addition to the themes discussed in the previous sections, there is a particular historical and cultural theme, very popular in Greek society, that adds meaningfulness to the 'story of the nation', and consequently to the story of *Tourkokratia*. This is the story of Christ, a very legitimate narrative that presents a series of well-known divine and human interventions which, in turn, as in the story of the ‘nation’, influence people’s ideas about their present and future lives, not only in this world, but also in the next one. The story of Christ is associated with metaphysical concerns and a search for immortality; the story of *Tourkokratia* is often narrated and perceived in terms of the metaphorical framework of the story of Christ. Thus, national and religious identities are united in the same story motif.

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50 His short story ‘Lios’ is a typical example of this approach (see Venezis 1967 [1941]). For analysis of this short story, see also Millas (1998; 2001, pp. 354–357).

51 See the related article above.
Life is twofold, the story goes, darkness before Christ and hope after Him. The same
txt seems to apply to the story of the Greek nation: Greeks are presented as living in total
darkness in Tourkokratia from before the Liberation War of 1821 until the day they
established a nation state. In both cases the happy incident is called in Greek ‘Resurrection’
(Anastasi), and there is a similar cyclical story plot: first a fulfilled life in Heaven (as in
glorious ancient Greece), followed by the sin and the punishment (and there are many texts
that show that the Byzantines and the Orthodox Christian-Græcophones of the sixteenth to
nineteenth centuries presented the Ottoman domination as a result of divine will due to the
sins of the community). Then we have the suffering (of Christ and of the Greeks) and
afterwards the sacrifice (of Christ and of the Greek heroes). This is followed by the
Resurrection, of God and of the nation (ethnos). Naturally, life after death is secured, both for
the Christians and for the Greeks (through the ‘eternal’ nature of the nation).

The grand narrative of the Greeks is not a new story. It is based on an older religious motif
that is easily understood by the greater community, the idea that eternal life is secured for all
those who have suffered and persevered (following the example of Christ’s sacrifice). The
martyrs and the heroes of the nation have suffered for the sake of the continuing existence of
the nation, and are thus, like saints, respected on similar grounds. The heroes of the war of
1821 against the Turks are frequently referred to as ethnomartyres, which is Greek for
‘martyrs of the nation’. They have chosen willingly to die for a belief, as did the early
Christian saints, which is why the Church of Greece has officially proclaimed some heroes of
the Liberation War to be martyrs. The myth of the nation cannot adequately fulfil its
‘meaning’ without a negative Tourkokratia; why should one rejoice in the formation of the
Greek nation state if life before the state was pleasant? How else could one justify the
sacrifices made for the nation? Is it possible to have resurrection without suffering, reward for
the many without the sacrifice of the few? The rhetoric of nationalism draws extensively upon
the story of Christ and his suffering.

Greek metaphors that describe national sacrifices borrow themes from religious imagery.
Heroes die ‘on the altar of the home country’ (sto vomo tis patrithas), and historical
developments are often presented as predestined. Those who do not agree with the general
ideology of the state are treated as traitors, who just like Judas, the student of Christ, have
betrayed their benefactor. Furthermore, the Greek War of Independence is officially presented
as having started on 25 March, which according to the Orthodox calendar is the Annunciation
Day (Heralding of Christ). This date is nowadays a national holiday celebrated with devotion,
despite available historical evidence demonstrating that nothing of particular importance
happened on 25 March 1821. But this very date stands for the beginning of a process of
suffering that brought about the end of Tourkokratia, the resurrection of the nation, the end of
suffering and the start of eternal life for the Greek state and its heroes.

52 Anastasi means ‘coming to life anew’, resurrection. It is used both for Christ and for the nation, the
liberation War of 1821 and the establishing of the national state. The phrase ‘anastasi of the nation’ is commonly
used in Greek discourse.

53 See for example Patriki Didaskalia of 1798, which originated from the Orthodox Church.

54 According to Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘nationalism has become an ersatz religion. The nation, as understood by
the nationalists, is a substitute of god; nationalism of this sort might be called ethnolatry’ (Seton-Watson 1977,
p. 465).

55 The poetic verse ‘it was the will of God that Constantinople should fall into the hands of Turks’ (Itan thelima
Theou i Poli na tourkepsi) is well known among the Greeks.
Conclusion

There is no simple gap between experience and stereotypy. Stereotypy is a device for looking at things comfortably; since, however, it feeds on deep-lying unconscious sources, the distortions which occur are not to be corrected merely by taking a real look. Rather, experience itself is predetermined by stereotypy. (Adorno 1982, p. 309)

In my youth, myself an ethnic minority member in a wider Turkish community, trying to come to terms with my immediate environment with respect to the nature of the Turks, I came face to face with contradictory messages: the real Turks I met were ordinary people with their merits and vices, much unlike the stereotypical caricatures of the generalized, singular Turk promoted in the depictions of my elders. This discrepancy, and the constant questioning on my part of the stereotypes that underpin it, triggered lengthy research and a lifelong curiosity.

Were the real people I met simply anomalies in the timeless, imagined community of generalizable ethnic Others? Are we expected to abandon our worldview, and the paradigms or beliefs that sustain it, when confronted with some exceptions or contradictions? How do people deal with real-life experiences that do not conform to nationalist ideologies? Adorno believes that ‘one cannot “correct” stereotypy by experience; one has to reconstitute the capacity for having experiences in order to prevent the growth of ideas which are malignant in the most literal, clinical sense’ (1982, p. 309). The authors examined in this chapter have skilfully avoided reconstituting their understanding of their own experiences. They resisted contradiction by compartmentalizing their perceptions of the Turks in parallel, but not overlapping, domains of experience.

At the level of national experience they reproduced the story of the Greek state, the negative stereotypes of the (abstract) ‘Other’, and an unfavourable portrait of Tourkokratia. At the level of personal experiences they were forced to recognize (or remember) a less dangerous kind of Turk, who could be like the Self: a man, a woman, a child, an elderly person. Whilst writing their novels they kept these two levels of experience sealed from each other, and their world did not topple over in the face of contradiction; it was readapted or diverted around the obstacles posed by the interpretation of the Other. The friendly Turks of their memories were transformed into some ‘naively positive’ characters, agents or admirers of the Self, who occasionally verified the eternal truths of the nation’s timeless reality.

In this respect, not only the abstract but also the concrete Turks of the Greek novelists work as metaphors that sustain and nourish a national identity, as this was understood during a particular historical period and within a given ethnic community. Authors with a well-constructed and circumscribed national identity imagine and ardently maintain a belief in a certain type of Other that adds meaning to their consciousness. When they decide to reproduce the world in a realistic manner they do not prioritize their personal experience (the particulars), but choose to represent reality in abstract and essentialist terms and as this fits better with their ideology. And when they are forced to account for the particular—in our case, the concrete Other who is similar to the Self—they conflate particularity with essentialism. The friendly Turks of real life are good, or good enough, to the degree that they naively reproduce an ideal Greek national existence.

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56 The belief that literary texts present the ‘essence’ (the universals) beyond the ‘facts’ (the singulars), as it is reminded in the previous article, was also shared by Aristotle (Aristotle 1954, p. 234/1451). Hence, the authors of novels in their depiction of the Other seem to voice the ‘universals’, as these are conceived by them, irrespective of ‘singulars’.
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Greek-Turkish Conflict And Arsonist Firemen

The Greek-Turkish political conflict is reflected in a distinctive way in most of the "academic" texts emanating from the two countries. Before the last few decades, the main effort was to demonstrate that "the other side" was wrong and that "our side" was right. This was done in most instances by selectively using historical facts, by overlooking some incidents and exaggerating others, and by introducing interpretations with double standards. However, since the 1980s, a shift in style has occurred. Up to that time, the accusations smacked of racism: "The other" was presented as carrying some historical and irreversible negative characteristics, such as irredentism, aggressiveness, and barbarism. In recent years, this polemic has assumed a "more scientific" appearance-one in which "the other" nation is supposed to be analyzed on a sociological or psychological basis, but "the other" still receives the blame for all the tension.

The study of Dr. Vamık D. Volkan and Dr. Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict* (The Eothen Press, 1994) gives us the opportunity not only to present an example of the "scientific" Manichaean approach but also to comment on some features of the Greek-Turkish controversy. This book shows that the "scientific" argument is also being mastered and utilized by the Turkish side. Absent from most Greek and Turkish academic treatises are empathy, self-criticism, and the willingness to understand "the other," and especially to accept the role of "our part" in the conflict - in short, the introspective approach. This does not mean that these kinds of studies are completely absent in the two countries, but they are the exception. As is the case with all zealous polemical argumentation, the Volkan-Itzkowitz approach can be challenged on two levels: the methodological and the factual. These two levels will be addressed here together and alternatively, following the approach of the two authors, who sometimes select the "facts" arbitrarily and other times legitimize this selective use of the "facts" with an arbitrary evaluation of incidents.

Psyche and History

Psychoanalyst Dr. Volkan analyzes the Turkish-Greek conflict from a psychological (and particularly a psychoanalytic) perspective. In similar cases, the psychological approach is not only useful but also necessary. However, in Dr. Volkan's explication, the two nations are

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57 For these kinds of "accusations" in Greek and Turkish textbooks, see (in the attached References) Millas 1989, pp. 34-47; 1991. For Turkish historiography on Greeks, see Millas 1994, pp. 201-43; 1998c.

58 Page numbers refer to this book by Drs. Volkan and Itzkowitz.

59 In the preface of his study, "senior author" Dr. Volkan reminds the readers of his Turkish origin and states that his study should be perceived as a "Turkish one," even though it is jointly written with Dr. Itzkowitz. Naturally, "scientific" Manichaean studies on Turks are encountered in Greece too. See, for example, P. Hidiroglou, who asserts that his studies are "systematically scientific, distanced from any nationalistic rhetoric" (Hidiroglou, p. 33), whereas Hugh Poulton perceives them as "lines reminiscent of Nazi Germany's" (Poulton, p. 296).

60 As examples of studies in which "our weaknesses" are presented, see (in References) Frangoudaki, Koulouri, and Pesmazoglou.
endowed with anthropomorphic dimensions, and Greeks and Turks appear as stereotypes with permanent, centuries-old obsessions. The Greeks are shown repeatedly as being "obsessed" with the Turks, after many traumatic face-offs, whereas the "average Turk ... is not obsessed with the Greeks" (p. 166), since he is rather balanced. Also, historically, the bilateral relationship is shown to have started in 1071. Neither of these theoretical frames - i.e., the psychoanalytic and the nationalist perception of unchanging, thousand-year-old "nations" - is convincing.

Dr. Volkan's main argument is that the Greeks could not manage to "mourn" for their historical losses to the Turks and therefore they project all their own negatives - such as expansionism, irredentism, and aggression - onto the Turkish side (p. 180). An easy refutation of such a thesis would be to challenge the psychoanalytic method in its totality on a Popperian ground as an approach where the claims cannot be tested or proved or disproved. Actually, a very short criticism of this kind could have sufficed. However, it is of interest to study this book more closely in order to come to grips with and gain insight into the Greek-Turkish conflict and its discourse.

The authors present history with references to Greek writers and others who have produced their works in English, such as A. Alexandris, R. Clogg, M. Herzfeld, P. Kitromilides, Th. Veremis. However, these studies reflect the contemporary notion that nations are a relatively modern phenomenon and that national "identity" and "history" are understood and reproduced on an "imaginary" base (following Benedict Anderson). It is well known in historiography that the "Greeks" never existed as such for centuries; they were groups of people who spoke different dialects of Greek and had different identities. Therefore, there have not been "Greeks living with an identity called Rum or Roman" (p. 85) but only self-identified Rums within the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, and much later "Hellenes" - to the extent that they shared this identity.

Consequently, there is no rationale for including in the analysis of the Greek-Turkish conflict the ancient Greeks of 1200 BC (p. 14), Ionians (p. 15), and Turks and Huns of Central Asia (p. 27). No national psyche endures eternity. Besides, Dr. Volkan accepts that the Greeks of Byzantium created a common heritage "without any affinity with ancient Greeks" (p. 24). It is well known to students of Greek history that the modern "Hellenes," in the process of ethnogenesis (building an ethnic identity), have reinterpreted history and only recently created their national myths. Any possible grudge about past incidents is not the result of a personal trauma as occurs with individuals, but rather the outcome of a subsequently "imagined" past, as is the case with the nations. Also, the repeated theme that the Greeks lived for centuries and still live with the Megali Idea (Great Idea, the irredentist dream of capturing "Turkish" lands) is simply not true. Megali Idea, as articulated in the studies of the historians mentioned above and quoted by Dr. Volkan, is a creation of the recent nationalist era. It appeared in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century and withered away as a national ideology after 1922.

The Image of Greeks in Turkish Discourse

The irredentist Megali Idea, as presented by Dr. Volkan, reflects the image of the Greeks cherished by the Turkish side. The image is that of a historical enemy who retains terrible traumas from the captures of Istanbul and Anatolia and who, from then on, has dreamt of

61 For a similar approach against psychoanalytic "science," see Gellner.
recapturing the Ionic and Byzantine lands that are presently Turkish. These irredentist Greeks consider the Turkish possessions "illegitimate" (p. 181).

This "Greek trauma" is endowed with sexual connotations by Dr. Volkan (but not by other Turkish historians): "The seizure of Constantinople by the 'youthful and virile Turkish sultan after he opened a hole in the city wall was perceived as a rape and the Turks as lustful.'" According to Dr. Volkan, the Greeks perceived the cannon that the Turks used in 1453 as a phallic symbol that raped them (p. 43). The book is full of sexual and Oedipal "explanations" in which the Greeks seem to be the ones feeling inferior.

The "facts," however, do not confirm this "Greek trauma." First of all, why should the fall of Istanbul be traumatic to Grecophones of the fifteenth century, when, according to the Turkish thesis of the "magnanimous Ottoman state" (repeated in Dr. Volkan's study), the Greeks "felt Turkish rule to be an improvement in their lives," and the Turks "inflicted no blow to Greek national pride" (p. 72)? Second, a study of more than five hundred novels with Turkish and Greek authors showed no sign of such an interpretation of the Greek-Turkish relationship (Millas 1998b). On the contrary, the sexual discourse on both sides, as described by the interethnic "love affairs" produced by nationalist authors, showed that the most prevalent understanding and self-image is one in which "our" man is dominant over the woman of "the other." In other words, the dominant syndrome is not one of "you-raped-me" but rather one of "I-raped-you" (Millas 1999). Dr. Volkan's perception of the "hole" and of the role of the cannon of 1453 seems to confirm this syndrome.

On the other hand, many Turks are quite "obsessed" with the idea that the "Christian West" - in its totality as well as in a general abstract sense - is poised against the Turks. Dr. Volkan writes: "The loss [of Istanbul in 1453] belonged to the entire Christian world ... The Turkish victory was experienced as a knife plunged into the heart of Christianity" (p. 36). "The fall of Constantinople to the Turks [not to the "Ottomans"-H.M.] became the major chosen trauma for the Christian world" (p. 37). "Anti-Turkish sentiment lay, at least unconsciously, at the central core of the developing European nation-state in the nineteenth century" (p. 63).

So it becomes altogether too easy to explain why "European powers" in the past helped the Greeks with their initial independence and their gradual aggrandizement, and why they destroyed the Ottoman Empire (pp. 65, 78); why today the European Union is "against" Turkey; why the West sides with Greece and does not recognize the "just Turkish cause" in the Cyprus issue (pp. 125-45); and other matters. "The Turks became the unconsciously selected targets of a stubborn, systematic, negative stereotyping by Europeans and therefore, by Western historians. These scholars ... never stereotyped other people who are "strangers" to Europeans ... as much as they stereotyped the Turks" (p. 38). This West is behind aggressive Greece: "[O]nce again the European powers pressured the Ottomans in favor of Greece" (p. 203).

The bias of the "West" against the "East" is well presented; what is missing in Dr. Volkan's study is the slightest hint that acknowledges a bias in the reverse direction, the xenophobic perceptions of some Turks. (What is not known is that Greek nationalists have developed a long list of historic events "demonstrating" that the Great Powers always favored Turkey against Greece.) What is also absent is the acknowledgment of Turkish "traumas" with respect to Greeks. What are the effects of Turkish losses, which are mentioned in the book but not analyzed: the secession of Greeks in 1821, the loss of Crete in 1908 and 1913, the loss incurred as a result of Balkan Wars and the loss of Western Thrace in 1912 (pp. 84, 98, 100), the blocking of Turkey's accession to the EU (p. 124)? According to Dr. Volkan, Turks miraculously "postponed mourning over losing an empire" (p. 117). Hence, Turks do not have traumas!

Actually, behind this discourse rests an excessive fear - almost a phobia - that the Greeks constitute a potential threat to Turkish territorial integrity. This worry is expressed in various
ways, one of which is the theme of the *Megali Idea*. In Turkish textbooks, but also in many other studies, the Ionians are presented not as Greeks but rather as "Anatolians" who spoke an unspecified language, and the Byzantines are either absent from the history of Anatolia or presented as "Romans" (Millas 1998a). It is of interest that Dr. Volkan ends his book stating that the Christian Europeans, apparently siding blatantly with the *Megali Idea*, say to the Turks: "As long as Constantinople is Istanbul, you don't belong to our kind!" (p. 191). And the book wraps up with the jolly proposition that all of us sing, "Istanbul, not Constantinople" (p. 196). This discourse and these perceptions seem to be enough to demonstrate that the Greek-Turkish conflict, and the related phobias and possible signs of obsession, are not one-sided.

Silence, Semiology, Double Standard, Etc.

The Greek-Turkish conflict is marked with a distinct approach *vis-à-vis* the past. Events judged as susceptible to be used "against us" have been systematically silenced. In Dr. Volkan's book, for example, the real or imaginary traumas of the Greeks do not appear at all or are interpreted without empathy. Violence in recent history - such as forced migrations, religious conversions of people and sanctuaries, massacres, executions of religious leaders, forced Islamization, the impoverishment of Greeks in 1942 and their enlistment en masse, their expulsion from Istanbul in 1964 - are swept under the carpet. We read, for example, that "some jumped into the water" (p. 106) when the Turkish army liberated Izmir in 1922, but we never find out if those who jumped were good swimmers and if they ever managed to reach a safe shore and what happened to those who did not jump.

One example of the single-sided evaluation of the past is the notion that "the Christians" of the Ottoman Empire entered the prestigious military caste through the devşirme system (p. 74), whereas in fact some were promoted only after they changed their religion and stopped being "Christians." Creating fictitious traumas instead of addressing the actual national traumas of the Greeks seems to be an easy way to ridicule "the other" as obsessed.

In addition, the words used tend to function efficiently as an advertising mechanism, targeting the subconscious. The Turks "conquer" (p. 64), the Greeks "invade" (p. 102), the Greeks purify their language to "reject" Turkish words (p. 88), the Turks simply initiate "language reforms" (p. 114). The Greeks grow "against" Turkish territories (p. 77), the Turks simply expand "against Anatolia" (p. 28); the identity discussions among Greeks show their "confusion" (p. 87), but Turkey's recent "identity crisis" is simply a process of "searching [for] a newer identity" (pp. 186, 188). Crete is "absorbed" by Greece (p. 203), Turkey "conquers" Cyprus or "triumphs" in Cyprus in the sixteenth century and "intervenes" in 1974 (p. 131); the Turks were "humiliated" by "the other" in Cyprus (p. 142), but the Greeks "thought" that they were insulted by "the other" (p. 204). The word *self-determination* is used only once, as a right of the Turks (p. 101). When innocent people are killed, they are "massacred" if the dead are "ours" (p. 78) and they "lose their lives" if they belong to "the other" (p. 67). The examples can be extended ad infinitum.

Selective memory, wishful thinking, and bias are other obstacles that prevent researchers from facing facts. For example, Dr. Volkan mentions the only existing serious poll on the feelings of Turks and Greeks for each other, conducted in Greece and Turkey (by PIAR and ICAP in 1989), but he refrains from evaluating the findings (p. 167) - probably because in this research, contrary to Dr. Volkan's thesis, the Turks appear to be slightly more biased (shall we say "obsessed"?) toward the Greeks than the reverse. He also mentions a study about the image of Greeks in Turkish literature (Millas 1991b), but he fails to notice two things (p.
First, the study shows that this particular Turkish author (Yakup Kadri) is really "obsessed" with the Greeks, and second, this author is not at all "very comfortable in comparing Atatürk to ancient Greeks"; on the contrary, the ancient Greeks are presented as Turks in accordance with the new Turkish identity theory of modern Turkey, which was very popular in the 1930s (see also Millas 1996c).

The Greek-Turkish Conflict

The Turkish-Greek conflict is heavily loaded psychologically, but not with one-sided Freudian and sexual "obsessions." It is mostly stamped with the feelings associated with the development of nationalism in the Balkans. The negative image of "the other" is not as old as it is supposed to be, and as persistently claimed by the nationalists of the two countries. Nor was the image of "the other" always negative (Millas and Balta 1996). The Greeks started to imagine a negative Turk in about 1810 and the Turks conjured up a negative Greek almost a hundred years later. Before this period, "the other" was not negative -or, more precisely, "the other" did not exist; he had not been imagined or created (Millas 1994, pp. 187-89, and 1998d).

The conflict is being kept alive and reinforced partly by the daily repetition of the negative "other." And the worst trait that one can attribute to "the other" is that of mental deficiency. Not only does this aggravate the relationship and the already existing tension, since it degrades "the other," but it also relieves "us" from "our" responsibilities; The blame rests only on the "obsessed other." In the last few years, it has come to my attention that the Turkish side (especially some Turkish politicians and diplomats) uses this argument of "obsessed Greeks." I suspect this must be Dr. Volkan's contribution to the Turkish-Greek dispute.

Does all this mean that the Greeks are not biased against the Turks? Quite the contrary. As I have tried to demonstrate, anti-Turkishness is part of the Greek national identity (Millas 1997b, 1997c, 1998, 1998b, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). However, this nationally perceived negative "other" is neither an obsession shared by all Grecophones from 1453 to the present, nor is it necessarily connected with an irredentist ideology (i.e., Megali Idea) based on capturing Turkish lands. This particular "Greek image" is the typical Turkish perception of its neighbor. The "irredentist Greek who threatens Turkey" (served with a garniture of "with the encouragement of the West" is the bias of some Turks, and it is seen in almost all Turkish-origin books on Greek-Turkish relations.

The anti-Turkishness of Greeks is contingent, a negative feeling against "the other" and an outcome of the nationalistic interpretation of history very common among neighboring nations. It reaches a climax when political crises appear and retreats with peace or reduced tension.62 Naturally, some romantic and/or ultranationalist Greeks still dream of the Megali Idea. These kinds of citizens exist within all European nations (and beyond). In Turkey too, there are ultranationalists who try to keep alive the pan-Turkic ideology and/or the Ottoman dream of a "Big Turkey." Some Greeks are "obsessed" with this pan-Turkic discourse, and it is generally the ultranationalist Greeks who perceive the "other" as a uniform body, and almost always as a threat.

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62 These lines were written before the earthquake of 17 August 1999, which marked the beginning of a much better period for Greek-Turkish relations. The subsequent developments demonstrated that there are no insuperable obstacles in the psyches of the two nations and that the Greek-Turkish conflict is contingent, albeit heavily influenced by nationalist historical evaluations.
An Asymmetric Conflict

I do not want to imply that there is perfect symmetry between Greeks and Turks with respect to national prejudice, portrayal of "the other," self-image, fields of insecurity, discourse of accusations, etc. There are some similarities and many differences that cannot be enumerated here. Two differences, however, are of special importance. Greek and Turkish nationalism came into being under different circumstances - the latter a century later than the former. According to the models of a historian (Seton-Watson 1988, p. 10), it can be argued that the Greeks followed the historical path where first a feeling of national identity was formed within a group of people and then this "nation" tried to establish a "national state." In the Turkish case, as has been widely repeated and demonstrated in Turkey, the efforts to save the "state" created the ideology of nationalism and hence the need for a Turkish nation.

As a consequence of these two distinct routes to the creation of nation-states, "the nation"(i.e., the citizenry) plays a major role in policymaking in Greece, whereas "the state" is more important in Turkey. Greek-Turkish conflict is an issue of the "people" in Greece and of the "state" in Turkey. This creates an additional problem: Some Greeks believe that the conflict cannot be resolved because there is no democracy in Turkey, and some Turks see "too much" democracy in Greece. The Greeks regard the Turks as "prisoners" of a state apparatus; the Turks regard Greek governments as "prisoners" of the fanatic and obsessed public. Dr. Volkan notes Greece's lack of a "charismatic leader like Atatürk" to lead the masses (pp. 107-19).

In this conflict, the asymmetry lies in the groups involved: mostly the public in one case, mostly the state dignitaries in the other. This serves to explain why the Greek press gives so much publicity to this conflict, whereas the Turkish public is less interested (p. 167). Dr. Volkan missed noting, however, that in spite of the limited references to the Greek-Turkish conflict in Turkish mass media, when Greece comes on the agenda, the content is not any different from that of the "Turkish state," and it is at least as one-sided and biased as that of Greece.

The second area of asymmetry lies with the national identity of each side. The Greek national myth presents the "Turk" as the historic enemy who enslaved the Greeks for many centuries. That period, the Tourkokratia, is preserved as a negative one, together with the negative "historic" Turks, in order to justify the national liberation war of 1821 and the new independent national state. The Turks may be presented contingently as a future threat of a new assault, but the Greeks do not have any insecurity with respect to their "rights" on matters of sovereignty.

On the Turkish side, the perception of the "other" is not a mirror image of the above. Turkish national myth would be legitimized if Greeks accepted that the Turks of the Ottoman period, and Tourkokratia, were magnanimous or at least relatively "just." The absence of this recognition, and the negative image of Turks in Greece, is a direct attack on the Turkish self-image. Turks feel the Greeks have treated them rather unjustly, and this is expressed with the motto "The Greeks (and the West) are prejudiced against us." The Greeks have not developed an equally widespread discourse of "prejudiced other." This second asymmetry rests with the

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63 See Millas 1998d.
64 The issue is more complex. The frequency of the appearance of "the other" in mass media is also inversely proportional to other problems a country faces. When Greeks feel there are more serious issues, "the Turks" appear less frequently in the press (Millas 1998g).
insecurity regarding the rights vis-à-vis sovereign territories. The Turkish side feels more insecure - not in relation to the balance of powers but on the basis of "historical claims."

Surely the inter-ethnic relationships are much more complex than my simplistic scheme. Still, this model seems closer to "reality" - a reality that is not very flattering for either party. At present, neither side seems sincerely willing to respect the sensitivities, fears, worries, and feelings of "the other" and to help "the other" to overcome its prejudices.

I was brought up in Turkey as a member of the Greek community. Probably Dr. Volkan also lived in Cyprus in an environment where the two ethnic groups confronted each other. In my youth, I had so many reciprocal accusations that I ended up trying to understand "the other" and myself, and I tried not to perceive "the other" as a sick patient on my psychiatric couch. The conflict is not between an observer and a patient; two observers with different case histories are involved. I believe such a frame of analysis is more constructive in any inter-ethnic conflict when "we" are part of it.

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History Writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other

Introduction

The dynamics of nation-building in Greece and in Turkey were different. The Greeks first developed a national identity, then went through a fierce nine-year war of independence (1821-1829) against the Ottoman Empire, and finally established their national state. Meanwhile the political leaders of the Ottoman Empire, which was threatened with disintegration, tried to create a citizenship identity (‘Ottomanism’) that would secure the loyalty of all its subjects, Muslims and Christians alike. As the Greeks, Serbians and Bulgarians rejected this option and established their own nation-states, the Ottomans next tried ‘Islamism’ as a reference of unity. But an alliance of all the Muslim populations could not be secured either, and the Albanians and later the Arabs seceded. ‘Turkism’, that is, a national identity, was initiated as a political project, promoted by the state, starting with the Young Turks (1908). Finally, decisive battles in Anatolia won against the Greek irredentist forces were the highlight of a successful war of independence (1922) that gave a new impetus in creating ‘the nation’ and its state: The modern Turkish republic.

There are other differences too. Greece is a small country in terms of its population and its area with respect to its neighbour. Turkey has a heritage of a sophisticated state apparatus, whereas the Greek state is relatively new. The Turks believe that they have an uninterrupted presence in history, having established various states at various times and places, whereas the Greeks believe that they have an uninterrupted presence in history in one place, in spite of the ‘loss’ of their state and independence for four centuries, succumbing to the ‘invasion’ of the Other. The Greeks were the first in the Balkans to establish a ‘national consciousness’ and a national state, whereas the Turks were among the last. The Greeks have a sense that in the last two hundred years they have extended their boarders, ‘liberating’ traditional Greek lands (but not all), whereas the Turks have the grievance that they have lost ‘lands’ that were originally Ottoman, in other words, theirs. The Greeks are mostly Christians, the Turks mostly Muslims, and for some, this religious difference is of significance: many (Greeks, Turks and third parties) identify the Christians with the ‘West’ and the Muslims with the ‘East’.

There are similarities too. Each side fought its ‘war of liberation’ against the other in order to establish its nation-state (in 1829 and 1922). Because of this unique coincidence both communities perceive the other as the historical enemy, and the other operates as a constituent of a modern national identity. Grievances and insecurity with respect to sovereignty (or historical) rights are expressed mostly between the lines in both national historiographies. Greeks claim the heritage of the ancient Greeks and of the Byzantines, whereas the Turks insist that there is no connection between modern Greeks and ancient civilizations. A perception of being ‘autochthons’ on the Greek side and ‘a new-comer’ on the Turkish side is felt in the respective historical narratives. Some Turks still call Central Asia their ‘home’ (ana yurt), whereas others propose historical theses to promote the idea of a homeland within the

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65 For these typical models in creating national-states (first the state or first the nation) see Hugh Seaton-Watson, ‘On Trying to be a Historian of Eastern Europe’ in D. Delatant & H. Hanak (eds), Historians as Nation Builders, London, 1988.
boarders of present-day Turkey. The controversies on claims and ‘legitimacy’ are still alive (expressed as phobias vis-à-vis the Other), but both sides declare that they do not experience any insecurity on issues of sovereignty.

Greek historiography and the perception of the nation (ethnos)

During the age of revolutions and on the eve of the Greek war of independence, that is, in the years 1780-1830, some Grecophone intellectuals of the Diaspora who lived in various cities of Western Europe and who were influenced by the French Revolution and the ideological controversies of the time spread republican ideas within their ethnic communities and proposed radical actions against ‘the tyrant’, the Ottoman ruler. Others, such as those close to the conservative patriarchate of Constantinople, who lived within the Ottoman state anathematized them as ‘atheists’ and advised prudence and adherence to ‘paternal ideals’. For the latter, the Ottoman rule was God’s will, probably a punishment for not being pious enough. It was during this period that questions related to national/ethnic identity were posed for the first time: are we Romeoi (Romans, in the sense of Byzantines), Grekoi (Greeks, ‘as the westerners call us’), Hellen (as the ‘Ancients’) or Orthodox Christians? There were serious political, ideological and identity disagreements among the Grecophone intellectuals of that time, but still all shared a sense of belonging to a common genos (in the sense of a community/race).

The Grecophone Orthodox Christian community living in the Ottoman empire under the official status of a millet (religious community), and which in modern times could be identified as an ‘ethnic group’, perceived itself as a genos. Genos is a Greek word etymologically originating from Sanskrit, meaning a group of the same origin (genus in Latin, gen/gene in English). During the years of nation-building the word genos was gradually replaced by ethnos, and the latter was and is still used in Greek in the sense of ‘nation’. There is no other word for ‘nation’ and the ethnic/national distinction does not exist among the Greeks in general, but only among a small group of historians who are aware of the latest trends in historiography.66 ‘Ethnic’ (ethnicos) is used for ‘national’. In other words, in the Greek historiography ‘Greekness’ and Greek nationhood are heavily loaded with a sense of ‘ethnicity’ and not with citizenship and/or loyalty to a state. This may be due to the historical fact that the Grecophones did not directly associate ‘identity’ and ‘state’, since a communal identity (as genos, characterized by a consciousness of a religious difference vis-à-vis the Muslim Ottoman state) was widespread and established among them long before the existence of a state with which the community identified itself.

Therefore those who do not possess the basic ‘national’ prerequisite of Greekness, namely Greek Orthodox belief, were almost completely absent from Greek historiography. Groups that ethnically would have been defined as minority groups were perceived to belong to another nation/ethnos. As a popular belief that is encountered in historiography too, ‘Greekness’ is associated with a common language, a common origin and a common religion, in other words with an ethnicity. The notion of ‘citizenship’ (or loyalty to a state) is not fashionable in the Greek discourse. On the other hand, Orthodox Christian Grekophones are seen as ‘Greeks’ irrespective of their citizenship and self-identification.

The forerunner of republicanism among the Grecophones was the Jacobin-type intellectual Rigas Velestinlis (1757-97), who planned a revolution against the Ottoman monarchs. His sense of history was one of class controversy, the people being on one side and the

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66 The prestigious Babiniotis dictionary (G. Babiniotis, Lexiko tis neas ellinikis glossas [Dictionary of the Modern Greek Language], Athens, 1998) defines ‘ethnic/ethnos’ the same way as one would defined ‘nation’; it adds that ‘foreigners’ use the Greek word ‘ethnic’ to denote national groups and minorities.
dominating aristocrats on the other. For Velestinlis all ethnic groups, irrespective of religion, origin and language, ought to unite against the tyrants. He foresaw a state where all (‘Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Wallachians, Armenians, Turks and all other kinds of peoples’, as Article 7 in his ‘constitution’ stated) would be equal and sovereign. Religion is not even mentioned in his writings. Apparently he was – if his vision is expressed in modern terminology – in favour of a strictly secular state where class privileges would not exist. He was executed by the Ottomans in 1797 and his ideals were soon silenced. He was reclaimed twice much later and ‘appropriated’: first, at the beginning of the 19th century, by nationalists who presented him as a national hero fighting for a Greek state and ‘the nation’, and, a century later, by socialists, as an ‘internationalist’. Actually he can be envisaged as a proto-nationalist republican, who had not yet aligned himself wholly with the Greek nationalist/ethnic movement.

67 The ideals of Greek intellectuals who were for an ethnically/nationally independent state can be traced in the political pamphlets of Adamantios Korais (1748-1833), who lived in Paris, as well as in the historical analysis entitled Hellenic Nomarchy (in the sense of ‘reign of law’) which was published anonymously in 1806. These texts were clearly anticlerical, even sceptical, on issues of religion, and they were attacked by the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Istanbul as anti-religious. Their discourse was ethnic/national, in the sense of an identity that was defined as a historical continuum based on language and culture. A class controversy was indirectly voiced in these texts, since it was pointed out that some (e.g. religious dignitaries and wealthy farmers) lived in luxury, whereas the laymen suffered. In fact, during this pre-revolutionary period a contention prevailed between middle-class/secular intellectuals on one hand and the religious/conservative groups on the other, even though both sides tried to prove that their visions were not in opposition to communal traditions and values.

The Greek state and Helleno-Christianity

The republican discourse was silenced before the termination of the uprising for independence and even forgotten after the founding of the new Greek nation-state. The founding of the Holy Alliance (of throne and altar) in 1815 and Metternich’s determination to discourage popular class and anti-royalist revolutions should have played a decisive role in this. Instead, a simple national myth dominated historiography during the 19th century: The Greeks, the descendants of the glorious ancient Greeks, after many centuries under the tyrannical ‘Turkish yoke’ staged a national revolt and won their independence anew.68 Greek-Orthodox Christianity, that constituted the basic belief of most of the Grecophones, was dexterously integrated into the ancient heritage. According to this ideological construction, the ancient Greeks were somehow the heralds of the new ‘light’, of Christianity. The term ‘Helleno-Christianity’ was invented (by S. Zambelios in mid-nineteenth century) to express this national harmony, and religion was thus ‘ethniced’ during this nation-building phase.69 Greekness was closely associated with a religion, and even with a part of it: with the Greek Orthodox Church and its legacy. The class dimension of the Greek revolution was completely silenced in the nineteenth century.

67 See A. B. Daskalakis, To Politeuma tou Riga Belestinli [The Polity of Rigas Velestinlis], (Athens, 1976).
68 See, for example S. Trikoupis (1788-1873), I istoria tis Ellnikis Epanastaseos [The History of Greek Revolution], vols olumes 1-4 (London, 1853-1957); I. Philimon (1798-1873), Dokimion istorikon peri tis Ellnikis epanastaseos [Historical Essay on the Greek Revolution], vols. 1-4 (Athens, 1859-61); A. Frantzis (1778-1851), Istoría tis anagenithisis Ellados [The History of Greek Rebirth], vols 1-4 (Athens, 1839-1841).
69 S. Zambelios, Asmata dimotika tis Ellados [Folk Poems of Greece], Athens, 1852.
The sense of ‘being the offspring of a glorious past’ was initiated and encouraged to a great extent by the European republican intellectuals. The Romantic movement also gave momentum to this (modern) Greek revival. The Greeks themselves, on the other hand, promoted the idea of their resurrection because it was to their political advantage to appear as a nation that was heir to a glorious past but which had suffered and had been unfairly treated by the (Muslim) Other. In fact, the national enterprise was presented basically as ‘religious liberation’. In the Greek national iconography Greece was represented as a suffering woman mostly dressed in a torn ancient Greek robe. This image accorded with the grammatically feminine ‘definite article’ that defines in Greek the word ‘Greece’ (η Ελλάς).

It was during the nineteenth century that the Other – the Ottoman Turk - was constructed in Greek historiography as the absolute negative Other: despotic, barbaric, backward, uncivilized, cruel, corrupt, perverted, exploitative, and so on. This image in general was not different from the one prevalent in the West. The more the Other was negative, the more the Greek revolution and the new state were justified and legitimised. The Ottoman period was described in almost all historical texts of the nineteenth century as a period of darkness, of the death of the nation; on the other hand, the successful Greek revolution was named – and it is still known as – the ‘Resurrection of the Nation’. The story of the nation is narrated in terms of the familiar story of Jesus Christ: death, resurrection and eternal life thereafter. The fighters of the revolution and of the subsequent wars are called ‘ethno-martyrs’. The losses in this war are ‘sacrifices made on the altar of the homeland’. Even the patriarch of Constantinople, who opposed and condemned the Greek revolutionaries of 1821 - but who was still hanged by the Sultan for his inability to control his ‘flock’ - is metamorphosed into a ‘martyr of the Greek nation’. This grand narrative presents all Greeks, the nation, being united and in harmony, and consistently against the Other. Class differences and skirmishes are redundant in this narration, as the Orthodox affiliation was considered the pillar of the nation.

A major ‘addition’ to this historical narrative was initiated after an unexpected challenge. In the 1830s the German historian Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861) made public his views: modern Greeks could not be the descendants of ancient people because there was a great gap between the ancient and modern Greeks. According to him, modern Greeks are ‘Hellenized’ Slavs and Albanians who moved to Greece during the eighth century. Racially, the modern Greeks were not the continuation of the old civilisations. The glorious ancient civilisation had perished without leaving any heirs.70

This thesis was perceived as a direct threat to the modern Greek identity based on the belief in the revival of the ancient nation. The confusion and the agony were overcome by the discovering (for some, by the invention) of the Byzantine empire. The immediate reaction was culminated in the publication in 1852-3 of the studies of the best-known Greek historian, K. Paparrigopoulos (1815-91).71 With his History of the Hellenic Nation he cut the Gordian knot by demonstrating that the Byzantine empire was ‘Greek’, thus securing the ‘uninterrupted continuation’ of the Greek nation from antiquity to the present. Paparrigopoulos is still very popular among Greeks: his thesis, which is the most official interpretation of the national historiography, is welcomed as common sense, and his general approach is followed by many Greek historians. His work is the closest to what could be called a master narrative.

Today we are in a position to suspect that there were also political considerations behind this thesis of ‘Greek Byzantium’: it legitimised the Greek claims to Ottoman lands. The

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decades 1850-1920 became the years of a national ideal known as the *Megali Idea* (‘Great Idea’), according to which the Greeks could and should ‘liberate’ all of their lost and enslaved lands and populations. Greek historiography was marked for a few decades by this irredentist historical interpretation. This idea, that was first voiced in the Greek parliament in 1844, proved unrealistic and was finally abandoned when the Greek armies were decidedly defeated in Anatolia in 1922.

In the second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth Greek historiography turned to the study of the Greeks of Byzantium, as well as of the Greeks living outside the national boarders of Greece and especially in Anatolia (Asia Minor). The prominent historian Pavlos Karolidis (1849-1930) is remembered mainly for this enterprise.\(^{72}\) The general tendency was to portray the Greeks as a great nation that created superior civilisations but had to face the menace of the Turks, who dominated ‘our’ lands and who retained them, enslaving part of ‘our nation’. The ‘Greek lands’ were perceived to extend beyond the boarders of the new state. What legitimized the unity of the nation (the *ethnos*) was not the state but an historical ‘essence’ or ‘Greek culture’, defined by an enduring language and a religious affiliation expressed as Christian Orthodoxy.

**Alternative approaches: class analysis and religion**

The Greek national/nationalistic historiography was challenged from the first quarter of the twentieth century. Following the Russian revolution of 1917, the Marxist movement in Greece developed relatively rapidly as an alternative worldview. The Greek Communist Party of the time opposed the expedition against the Ottoman state that was defeated in the First World War, not only because it was in general against irredentism but also because it was against the British policy and in favour of the Turkish Kemalist resistance which had friendly relations with the Bolshevik regime.

Yanis Kordatos (1891-1961), the former secretary of the Greek Communist Party, a young lawyer who dedicated his life to history writing, in 1924 challenged the taboo of the Greek Revolution, claiming that it was not a national uprising against the Turks, but a class struggle of the oppressed masses against the oppressors who happened to be both Turkish and Greek dignitaries and landlords.\(^{73}\) Starting with his first book, he showed that not only the Sublime Porte but also the patriarchate of Istanbul was against the revolution. He published his studies in a hostile social environment, facing fierce opposition and threats, but insisted on claiming that modern Greeks were a new nation and not the ‘continuation’ of ancient people. He was the first to use the term *ethnotita* (‘ethnic group’) to describe the Grecophone communities of the Middle Ages, distinguishing them qualitatively from the modern Greek nation.

The approach of Yanis Kordatos, who was apparently influenced by Marxist historiography, was a negation of traditional national paradigm. He published studies on ancient Greece, the Byzantine period and modern Greece, as well as works on such topics as the life of Christ, Greek philosophy and Greek literature. It is interesting to note that, even though he negated the ‘diachronic’ existence of a Greek nation, all his work covers the cultures and the people that the traditional Greek national historiography considered as Greek. A more careful analysis of this work may show that his approach is a combination of class analysis not completely disconnected with the national paradigm.

This blending of the two paradigms becomes apparent when the portrait of the Other vis-à-vis ‘us’ is examined. The Turks, even though they were not presented with permanently

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72 P. Karolidis, *Sygkhronos istoria ton Ellinon kai lipon laon tis Anatolis apo to 1821 mehri to 1921* [Modern History of Greeks and Other Nations of Anatolia from 1821 to 1921], vol. 1-7 (Athens, 1922-6).

73 See, for example, Y. Kordatos, *Istoria tis neoteris Elladas*, vols 1-4 (Athens, 1957-8).
negative racial characteristics, still appeared as backward and generally negative, for ‘historical’ reasons. This controversial approach is also found in subsequent Marxist historians who followed Kordatos. Nikos Svoronos (1911-1990), for example, who stated in the 1970s that the modern Greek national consciousness appeared for the first time in the thirteenth century (and not in ancient Greece), did not express a very different opinion about the Other either. In fact, Greek Marxist historiography did not revise the traditional image and ‘role’ of the Turks, even though these historians did not reproduce extreme nationalist stereotypes.  

A number of religious researchers constituted a small group of historians that were relatively distant from the national paradigm and seemed closer to the Marxist approach. Trying to negate the ethnic/national understanding that set barriers between groups of people based on ethnic characteristics – language, race, colour, and so on - and appropriating a more universal approach (a more ‘ecumenical’ approach, as they would say), they developed an all-inclusive discourse. They voiced, mostly in encyclopedias financed and published by the Greek Orthodox Church and in personal publications, a comprehensively different historiography, distant from the nationalist one, evaluating correctly both the contingent character of the ‘nation’ but also its limitation in envisaging a reconciliation of the ‘human race of the Creator’.  

However, in their enthusiasm to stress the importance and the contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church they seemed to reproduce the old demarcation lines that were set between East and West, between believers and unbelievers, or between the Greek Orthodox communities and the Others. At times when they criticized the intellectuals of the ‘Greek Enlightenment’ – of the period when the Greek intelligentsia was under the spell of the developments in Western Europe – they sounded like the Marxists who opposed some Western ideals (capitalism, exploitation, imperialism); when they expressed their reservations about the Other opposing Catholicism, Protestantism, and so on, they were reminiscent of the Manichaeism of the nationalists and the barriers set between nations.

The recent decades a considerable number of Greek liberal historians, following the professionalisation of historians and having come into contact with the latest trends, have produced texts that are distanced from the nationalist paradigm. This modern approach which typically presents its methodology and interpretation as ‘academic’, uses a language special to a field of interest and voices a new paradigm, but it is not readily deciphered and understood by the public. This anti-nationalist historiography manages to coexist with the popular understanding of (national) history without creating serious conflicts and clashes, exactly because of its specialized covert discourse. In practice it neither publicly challenges national taboos nor blatantly contradicts traditional interpretations. It operates protected against probable attacks within a specialised group of academics.

This school of thought has gained momentum. A series of studies that question nationalistic and semi-nationalistic interpretations related to Greek history have been published in book form or in specialist periodicals. The historians concerned are inclined to investigate ignored fields, such as the Greek case of nation-building and the history of marginalized ethnic groups, such as the Jews, the Albanians and the Turks of Greece. Various ethnographic studies and local histories by professional historians and of historically minded intellectuals have also been published in recent years. However, the phenomenon of Rigas Velestinlis of the 1790s, the ‘Greek national hero’ as is characterised by Greek

75 See, for example, Thriskeftiki kai ithiki egkiklopedia [Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics], vol. 5 (Athens, 1964); G. Metallinos, Tourkokratia [Turkish Rule], (Nea Smyrni, 1988).
76 For examples of history journals published in Athens, see Ta Istorika, Istor and Historein which is published in English.
The political conjuncture and the rise of Turkish ethnic nationalism

During the last decades of the Ottoman empire the authorities initiated various desperate efforts to save the state. Parallel to economic and administrative reforms, the ‘identity’ of the citizens became a major issue. As happened with the Greeks, discussions took place as to what this ‘identity’ ought to be. The agents during these debates, however, were different on the two sides: in the Greek case the state was still nonexistent and intellectuals initiated the discussion, whereas in the Turkish case the state itself and its dignitaries played a major role in trying to determine under what umbrella the loyalty of subjects of the empire could be secured.

The crisis of successive ‘secessions’ in the Ottoman empire started with the Greek revolution of 1821. Up to that time the empire had lost lands as a result of attack by foreign countries (Russia, Austria, France), but not because of its subjects wanting their own state. With the Tanzimat reforms in 1839, nine years after the establishment of the modern Greek state, the state policy known as ‘Ottomanism’, intended to secure equality and peace among all citizens, was introduced. However, Bulgarians seceded and Armenians were next in line. Islamism was supposed to secure at least the loyalty of the Muslim population of the empire. But there was unrest among the Arabs, and the Muslim Albanians seceded too. ‘Turkishness’ seemed an alternative to accomplish a unitary state by combining citizenship and ethnicity.

In the Ottoman period history writing in the modern sense developed during these turbulent years. The traditional Ottoman historians, who exceeded 500 in number and were known as vakanüvisler (‘recorders of incidents’), had been mostly concerned with the political affairs of the empire. The ‘modern’ historians differed mostly in being much better informed about developments in the West and about the kind of history that was produced there, but most importantly in being the bearers of a new identity, Turkishness, that was in the ascendant. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha (1822-95), with his 12-volume History of Cevdet, was a high-ranking civil servant. He was influenced by the Arab historian and philosopher Ibn-Khaldoon (1332-1406), who believed in the eventual demise of any state. Cevdet’s influence on the subsequent generations looking for rather more optimistic worldviews, however, was limited.

Two historians of the Western world inspired Turkish ‘consciousness’ and Turkish historiography. The French historian David Léon Cahun (1841-1900) and the Hungarian philologist Ármin Vámbéry (1832-1913) were both renowned among Ottoman intellectuals, the first for his book Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie, les Turks et les Mongoles (1896), and the second for his studies on the Turkish language which he started publishing from 1858. These western sources gave an impetus to Turkish nationalism, to ‘Turkishness’, then known as Pan-Turkism and/or Turanism/Pan-Turanism, and which among the Young Turks was conceived as an ideal which would unite all Turkic people, of the Balkans as well as of Asia. This unity was understood as an ethnic and cultural unity, which found expression above all in a common language. Interestingly Vámbéry tried to develop a Hungarian national historical interpretation of an ‘Asiatic past’, but in practice he inspired the Turkish nationalists and an ‘Asian’ ideal in a distant country.

The Ottoman/Turkish historians of this period did not develop systematic contact with historians of other countries; their sources were rather erratic and few historians produced

78 A. Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet [History of Cevdet], 12 vol (Istanbul, 1853-91).
prominent works during this period. Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), who was influenced by the teachings of Emile Durkheim, and Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), a Turk from Russia who was influenced by the nationalist movements of the Tatars, were the most influential historians of the period prior to the founding of the modern Turkish democratic state. The Romantic understanding of the ‘people’ and the views of Herder, the original, ‘very old’ cultural past of the nation, the positivism of Comte, social Darwinism and the teachings of Gobineau were some of the main ideas that dominated the understanding of their texts.

Islam, the religion of the nation-to-be, was mentioned and even stressed by these historians, not so much as a characteristic of the nation but as a reference in demarcating the Self and the Other, the enemy of the state and of the country. The idea that was highlighted was nationalism (milliyetçilik), which was not very clearly defined, but understood as union on a cultural/ethnic/racist basis. The main concern was to demonstrate the historical importance of the Turkish nation. Issues of the Turkish language were widely discussed, and literary texts played an important role in spreading the idea of the nation. During this initial period of nation-building the nation was understood as the union of the Turks, where the Turks were perceived as a group with certain ethnic characteristics: a common language, culture, religion, history and ideals. As in Greece, during this period there is no clear distinction between nationhood and ethnicity. Turkish nationalists perceived the citizens of the country that were not Muslims and spoke a language different from Turkish as members of another nation, though they also preserved the notion of citizenship and loyalty to the state as a means of legitimizing membership of the nation.

The modern Turkish state and secular nationalism

With the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War the country was occupied by the Allies. The Greek army occupied western Anatolia, the ancient Ionian lands, taking a step towards the 'Great Idea', that is, in the direction of establishing the 'Greek' Byzantine state anew. The Turkish liberation war followed and was won - and this is the self-image of many Turks - against the biggest powers of the world (the United Kingdom, Italy and France). But it was only the Greeks who had come to stay, and the critical battles and the associated military victories were won in practice against the Greeks (1922).

Turkish nation-building gained new momentum with the systematic fostering of national identity in the newly established modern Turkish state, the Republic of Turkey (1923). The bases of Turkish national ideology and national narratives were founded by intellectuals who were mostly literary authors and poets. In many cases the historians followed. Even prominent Turkish historians and spokesmen of Turkish national ideology, such as Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) and Fuat Köprülü (1890-1966), started their political activities in literary journals together with the nationally influential short-story writer Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920). In the Turkish case there has not been an historian who attained the social recognition of, say, the Greek Paparrigopoulos, nor a corresponding oeuvre of indisputable validity to be considered a master narrative. The historiography is more diversified, probably because society has not yet attained a consensus on some issues.

As was the case with the Greeks, there is no clear distinction in the Turkish language between the meanings of the words 'national' and 'ethnic'. Millet, an old Arabic word that


81 For a detailed account of the role of the ‘Greek’ in the formation of Turkish nationalism, see H. Millas, ‘Milli Türk Kimliği ve Öteki (Yunan)’ [‘The National Turkish Identity and the Other/the Greek’], in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol. 4, Milliyetçilik (Istanbul, 2002).
once had various meanings, was eventually used to denote the nation. *Milli* and *milliyetçilik* mean 'national' and 'nationalist', and both have a very positive meaning since they denote the 'modern' ideology that is distanced from the refuted 'Ottoman understanding' characterised as conservative and backward, basically because it lacked the 'Turkish 'national consciousness', that is, nationalism. Many Turks identify themselves as nationalists, but this is not understood in the Western sense. In fact, 'Atatürk nationalism' is a constitutional requirement. The word 'ethnic' (*etnik*) has recently been used by the new generation of academics mostly in connection with existing local minority and ethnic (Kurdish) issues that Turkey faces. However, unlike Greece, where the concept of a common origin of the nation is very strong, and probably the legacy of an empire, the notion of 'citizenship' (*vatandaşlık*, being a subject of a state) is also encountered.

The main issue of concern to history writing during the first years of the Turkish republic was the legitimisation of initiatives taken by the new republic. Notions such as 'modernisation', 'westernisation', 'equality of the genders' and 'positivism' (actually the word 'science' was used) were presented as positive axioms, and the past evaluated anew accordingly. The ancient regime of the Ottomans was criticised as backward and conservative, even though it was not rejected in its totality. Great effort was exerted to demonstrate that the Turks had been a great nation throughout history, having established many states and founded an important civilisation.

In the 1930s a great historical project was initiated with the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leading figure of the modern Turkish nation-state. The project was called the 'Turkish History Thesis' (THT) and its main purpose was to create a grand national narrative that would assist Turkish nation-building. According to this thesis, the Turks were the oldest people on earth and originally lived in Central Asia; they then migrated and founded almost all the major civilisations (Mesopotamian, Ionian, ancient Greek, and so on). They had come 'very early' to Anatolia. All ancient people were actually Turks - even Homer was presented as a Turk whose real name was Omer. Related to this, a second thesis, the 'Sun Language Theory', propagated the idea that all languages were derived from Turkish.

These extreme views were popularised mostly through textbooks published by the state apparatus, and it is in these books that one can find their most systematic presentation. Almost all professional historians in the country were mobilised to find the historical 'facts' that would prove the above ethnocentric understanding. This thesis was the main 'history' that was read and taught in Turkey for about two decades. The thesis approached racism at the end of the 1930s as Dr Afet İnän (1908-85), a protege of Atatürk, investigated the origin of the Turkish people by taking measurements of their skulls. Eventually the Western view that the Turks belong to the 'yellow race' was refuted. During the Second World War some of the Turkish intelligentsia briefly flirted with racist ideals that were popular in many countries in Europe, and this was indirectly reflected in historiography, too. At this time neither class analysis nor religious historical interpretations were welcomed by the authoritarian Turkish regime, which censored all views that did not endorse the dominant secular and nationalist interpretations of history.

**Legitimising identities and sovereignty rights**

During the first decades of the modern Turkish nation-state, Turkish historiography was marked by two concerns: 1) deciding on and establishing a national identity, and 2) founding
a basis for legitimising the modern state, in other words, the newly secured sovereignty rights. Both concerns were directly connected with the main political and cultural issues that shook the Balkans and caused a series of wars and suffering related to ethnic cleansing.

The identity issue was expressed as a question of the kind 'Who are we that want to create a nation? Who is included and who excluded in our enterprise?' The answer had to satisfy the citizens that were supposed to form a social union with considerable cohesion. Sovereignty, on the other hand, was threatened by the real or imaginary enemies that had claims on the lands of this new country. Both issues were directly connected to 'history' and had to be dealt with by this discipline. A third concern, which was only indirectly connected with 'history', was the legitimacy of the leading cadre of the new state and more precisely with the governing Kemalist elite. This was mostly done by denigrating the Ottoman past (and its leaders) and presenting the present (and its leaders) as the hope for the future.

Most of the Turkish historiography of the twentieth century developed around these parameters. The Turkish history thesis proposed a Turkish identity that had its sources in Central Asia, and mostly for that reason it incorporated serious shortcomings in legitimising the historical rights of existing borders. It tried to solve the dilemma by constructing a 'history' where all autochthonous nations in the area were 'Turkish'.

The highly secular THT did not prove very effective. It satisfied neither the masses who felt themselves in alliance with traditional Islam - which was pushed aside by the positivist leading elite, together with the Ottoman legacy, in favour of an imagined 'pagan' Central Asia - nor the intellectuals and people of common sense who could not tolerate the idea that all neighbouring communities and countries throughout history were actually Turks (in which case why all these wars?). The THT was never officially refuted, but gradually, and especially after 1970, it was abandoned, even though its spirit is still felt in some textbooks. Two other grand theories were proposed in the 1950s/1960s and 1970s/1980s that dealt with the above-mentioned national concerns. The first was initiated by a historian who spread his ideas publishing mostly literary texts such as novels and 'narrations', Cevat Şakir (1886-1973), and by Kemal Tahir (1910-73), an author who published historical novels and influenced a number of historians that mostly propagated the idea that the Turkish historical case can be best explained by the Marxist model of the 'Asian mode of production'. Turkish historians who developed related theories to define the history of Anatolia are İdris Küçükömer (1925-1987) and Sencer Divitçoğlu (b. 1927). According to these historians, the class and religious conflicts that shaped the Western world did not take place in Anatolia. This school, which I will call 'Anatolianism', did not appear as an organised movement but rather as an understanding that is still popular among intellectuals sympathetic to the Western way of life and having 'leftist' tendencies. The second grand narrative, known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), was initiated by intellectuals of more conservative tendencies.

Anatolianism and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

Anatolianism, as expressed in a series of publications by various intellectuals, has been a major theme in Turkish historiography. It is an unofficial and non-systematic historical thesis that proposes an 'identity' and a scheme to legitimise the new Turkish state. Contrary to the THT, which locates Turkishness in Central Asia, this new theory presented all the people who once lived in Anatolia (mainland Turkey) as 'our' ancestors and the present Turks as their descendants. As a consequence, the present Turks were not seen as the people that once came

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from the East but were considered 'autochthons'. The history of Anatolia was mostly perceived as a unique case, justified as an outcome of a different course of development, and rather superior to the Western model where class prevailed, definitely more just and humane, often theoretically legitimised as the 'Asian mode of production'.

Accordingly, the ancient Greeks were no longer presented as Turks, but the Greeks and especially the Ionians who once lived in Anatolia were presented as the ancestors of the Turks. This theory, like the THT, is also basically secular, downgrading the Islamic tradition. However, it propagated the idea that the Turkish state (the Ottoman and the present) was a special case in history. It was presented as benevolent, just and caring for its subjects. Therefore all subjects were very happy and loyal to this (Turkish) state. The subsequent revolts of the various ethnic populations are either ignored or explained as 'foreign intrigues'. Deconstructing this understanding, one concludes that in Ottoman society there was no class struggle, but the state operated for the benefit of all. It was the West and its imported feudalism and capitalism that caused the economic and social problems in the Ottoman empire and consequently in modern Turkey. In the 1960s and 1970s mostly young historians published studies along these lines.

This theory, which has many variations and is popular still among Turkish intellectuals even today, had the advantage of being capable of endorsing the Turks as an autochthonous people and at the same time legitimising the existing state: it is legitimate because it has been lawful, benevolent and 'accepted' by all. The question of identity, however, still presented difficulties because it posed a dilemma. Islam was not considered a necessary constituent of the Turkish identity because in such a case the previous pagan and Christian people who lived in Anatolia had to be considered the Other. Religion, language and even culture and civilisation were therefore silenced in this theory, and the 'geographical' aspect of identity, as well as biological continuity, was predominant: the subordination of all to Anatolian geography thus secured 'an ethnic/national unity'. This approach, however, was not in harmony with the religious sentiments of the majority of Turks.

The role of the Other (the Greek) is unique in the texts of the 'Anatolianists'. He appears as an historical witness testifying to the righteousness, moral superiority, magnanimity, and so on of the Turkish state. This Other is developed as an antithesis to Greek accusations that the historical Turk is all-negative. This Turkish myth perceived the Greeks as being happy with the political dominance of the Turks. The Other in the case of the Anatolianists is one who is not from the local area, but the West in general. This Western world is invariably portrayed as imperialistic and/or nationalist, with strong prejudices against the Turks and the East. The self-image of the Anatolianists is quite comforting: they conceive of themselves as 'humanitarians', anti-nationalists, modern, progressive and secular. Closer analysis reveals a special 'class' relationship: within the 'community' (the state and/or nation) there is no class strife, but the relationship with the West is marked by class conflicts, expressed in terms of 'exploitation' and 'imperialism'.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) is one of the most recent national historical interpretations. According to this theory, which reached maturity in the 1980s, the present-day Turks are the people who came to Anatolia from the East in the twelfth century having accepted Islam. Thus, Islam is considered part of the national identity as well as the Asian heritage. The followers of the TIS accord importance also to the Ottoman heritage, which they consider significant and superior. The legitimacy of the 'state' is based rather on historical victories and the balance of power in the geographical environment. This theory is popular among political groups that see themselves as nationalists, a word that means in this context

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84 The prime minister of Turkey used this theory in his book addressed to European readers when he tried to advance the idea that Turkey should be accepted as a member of the European Community. See T. Özal, La Turquie en Europe, (Paris, 1988).
'loving their country and the Turks', whereas others identify them as the 'extreme right'. Ibrahim Kafesoglu is one of the most esteemed historians of this school, which propagates its ideas through extensive publications, numerous journals and newspapers.

The Other in the case of the TIS is almost everyone who differs from the 'Turks', both ethnically and religiously. The tendency to perceive minorities or ethnic groups of non-Turkic origin as foreign is typical. The non-Muslim minorities are very often perceived on a class basis and are described as wealthy communities involved in trade and industrial production (avoiding the word 'capitalists' to distance themselves from Marxism), in close cultural and/or economic contact with the West, and taking advantage of the Turks economically. The Other in this case encompasses different religion, ethnicity and class (he is from the upper class and exploitative).

Alternative Turkish historiographies

The various historical theses mentioned above form the main trends in the Turkish historiography developed after the founding of the Turkish nation-state. Hence a Turkish national master narrative is deeply contested both among professional historians and among the various political groups that espouse one of these interpretations. History became a weapon of diverse ideological camps in Turkey all struggling to mobilise their supporters and defeat their opponents. In the process of all this contestation Turkish nation-building (ethnogenesis) took place.

A radical challenge to the above historical interpretations came, as happened with the case of Greece, first from the Marxist intellectuals and later from liberal academics who followed the trends of a more international, and sometimes even anti-national approach. The Marxists, who operated more as intellectuals than as historians, challenged the ethnic, 'black and white' approach whereby the Turkish side always appeared in a good light and the Other the reverse. This tendency was expressed mostly in literary texts such as novels or newspapers, and in many cases seriously challenged old and established historical 'truths'. Kemal Tahir, a novelist who introduced the Marxist 'Asiatic mode of production' to the Turkish historiography in order to stress the peculiarity of his national history, was mentioned above. Of the earliest Turkish Marxist historians, Mete Tuncay (b. 1936) has played a major role in questioning national narratives, such as the THT and later the TIS.

After 1980 in particular, a group of historians appeared, conscious of a Marxist tradition and organised around the Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey and the publishing house İletişim, which published a series of journals and books in line with modern developments in historiography. They dealt with local history and with taboo issues, such as the past and present of the ethnic and minority groups of Turkey and the population exchange of 1923 (see below). They also reviewed the Turkish historiography critically. This group keeps a deliberate distance from nationalist discourse, and is highly critical of ethnocentric approaches. They have been aware of new developments in the field of historiography, and ready to study and discuss new approaches in history. Zafer Toprak and Şevket Pamuk, who

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85 It is interesting that the TIS is reminiscent of the Greek understanding of 'Helleno-Christianity'. They both search for national identity and their national historical origin in two components: ethnicity and religion.

86 See: İ. Kafesoglu, Türk İslam Sentezi [Turkish-Islamic Synthesis], (İstanbul, 1999).

87 The title of the book of Salahi Sonyel is typical of how the non-Muslim minorities are perceived: Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, (Ankara, 1993).
mostly deal with the economic history of Turkey, and Çağlar Keyder, who shows an interest in Ottoman history, can be mentioned as examples of this trend. 88

Class and economic analysis predominate in their works. For some (Keyder, for example), Christian minority groups are not seen as 'foreign' bodies within the Ottoman state but an economically productive (positive) power. Societal events such as ethnic cleansing are explained on the basis of economic turmoil. When the relationship of states is on the agenda the model becomes rather Leninist where imperialist motifs are used to explain the intentions of the Western powers.

This group of historians, who are politically mostly uncommitted, is also characterised by its zeal in cooperating with the Other. Probably what is new and most important in Greek and Turkish historiography is what has been initiated by the historians of the two countries since 1995, and especially since 2000. Both sides have shown a willingness to study issues that are of interest to both and have jointly produced historical texts. There are a few projects of this kind running at present.

This is not only an indication of the widening of the spectrum of research in history writing but also of a change of philosophy and state of mind, surpassing ethnocentric approaches. These historians seem to believe that one-sided national interpretation may not be enough to produce historical narratives that bear international validity. Definitely they are more 'cosmopolitan' in their understandings as well as more relaxed in their communication with the Other and in being exposed to contact with the views of the Other.

An assessment

Both the modern Greek and Turkish states were founded through a proclaimed process of negating the Ottoman empire and traditional social formations: Greece by rejecting the Ottoman legacy altogether, Turkey by transforming it and by re-evaluating it. Irrespective of the degree of success of this rejection and transformation, the national founding myths of the two countries, which were used to legitimise their new political formations, differ and in some respects are almost opposed to each other. The national myths are so deeply rooted that it is difficult to use a lexicon that is not nationally biased. The term 'the two societies', the Greeks and the Turks, is a modern invention. In the Ottoman milieu there were not clear-cut distinct communities with established 'ethnic' characteristics. For example, there were Turkophone Orthodox Christian and Grecophone Muslim communities which in 1923 were forcefully exchanged as Greeks and as Turks respectively. The criterion for nationality/ethnicity was in practice their religious beliefs. The exchange included about two million people.

Even though the religious bias was quite distinctive in both the Greek and the Turkish cases, the legitimacy of the new identity was based mostly on a discourse of 'nation', with an imagined ethnic uniformity. In other words, declarations of secularism and ethnic/national approaches should be considered with caution, since religious background and identity seem to have influenced perceptions and behaviour, both of the individuals and of the states. In other words, religion either played a direct role within the said states, for example as

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88 See, for example, Z. Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat [National Economy in Turkey], (Istanbul, 1982); Ş. Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türk İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914 [Economic History of Ottoman State-Turkey 1500-1914] (Istanbul, 1988; Ç. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London, 1987). The number of historians in the last decade who employ a “critical” approach is so great that to mention only some do injustice to the forgotten ones. Still as an indication I mention Cemal Kaftad, Şükrü Hanioğlu and Cemil Koçak.
expressed with Helleno-Christianity and TIS, or was used indirectly to describe the 'national' aspect of the citizens - mostly the Self and the Other as well as the minorities in each state.

Political confrontations between Greeks and Turks (or Greek Orthodox and Muslim populations) were often the result of coincidence. The conflicting parties then chose different constructed identities (Greekness vs. Turkishness) in order to legitimise and explain the struggles with each other. Class analysis and/or Marxist explanations were developed to highlight economic power relationships; 'exploitation' and 'imperialism' were developed to justify historical enmities and/or current personal or communal interests. In this case, too, a distinction should be made between 'genuine' class analysis that transcends nationalism and sets the basis for a new paradigm, and a class analysis that in fact explains and consequently legitimises national histories. In some of the cases mentioned above, analytical tools such as 'imperialism', 'capitalists' and 'exploitation', mostly directly borrowed from Marxist literature, are utilised to 'explain' nationalistic behaviour.

The historiography that was developed in Greece and Turkey following the establishment of the two nation-states can be seen as a kind of a Greek-Turkish dialogue (or quarrel) on history where the Greeks first posed their arguments and then the Turks developed their counter-arguments. The main concerns seem to be the 'identity of the nation' and the sovereignty rights of the countries, something that is understandable taking into consideration the political strife of recent decades. Anderson defines a nation as a 'political community imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. By 'limited' it is meant that beyond national boundaries lie other nations. By 'sovereignty', but also by other sacred principles voiced by all nation states such as 'liberty' and 'independence', is meant the subduing of the imaginable rivals, the enemies, the Other. The Other, as the one beyond our living space, is a sine qua non of every nation.

A premise not clearly stated but always insinuated in both Greek and Turkish historiography is that the Other had been harmful and/or a threat since it caused, among other ills, economic difficulties and 'our exploitation'. This negative aspect of the Other has, in other words, a class dimension in the consciousness of each nation. The Other is sketched as the appropriator of the nation's means of survival. The Greek historiography described the dominating Ottomans as a kind of upper class that exploited the Greeks; conversely, the Turkish one described the Greeks and the Greek minorities as exploiters and 'rich', too. The religious difference is suggested directly or indirectly every time the Other is described as negative or different. Among the ills of the Other the destruction of 'our sacred places' is quite often called to mind. Interestingly, the national flags of both countries each carry a different religious symbol that had been in a contention for many centuries in Europe: a cross and a crescent. Religion and class analysis are in most cases subordinated to and mostly used to legitimise an ethnic/national narrative.

Even if there are a number of historians who do not agree with this view, the dominant narrative in both countries presents the 'West' as siding with the nation's Other. The West in this case is shown as 'imperialistic', 'biased owing to religious differences' (the West is 'Christian' for the Turkish side, 'Catholic' and/or 'Protestant' for the Greek side), or simply as the aggressive Other. The cases where Greece and Turkey had been favoured and/or assisted by the West are also 'forgotten' in the respective nationalist historiographies. This approach

89 Consider, for example, the following Greek-Turkish 'historical' grand narratives and arguments / counter-arguments: 1) We the Greeks are the descendants of the glorious ancients. No, you are not, Greeks are actually Turks. 2) The Ottomans were barbarians. No, they were magnanimous and tolerant. 3) The Ancient Greek and Byzantine lands are ours. No, modern Greeks are a different race from the ancient Greeks and Byzantines. 4) You as a nation behaved as invaders in recent centuries. No, you had the Megali Idea and you were the invaders in recent decades. And so on.

the role of the West shows how historical religious controversies are used in modern times. It should be added that both historiographies infer that 'their country' is located between the East and the West, in other words, in the centre of the world.

Gender, in fact 'women', plays a supplementary role in both historiographies. The national issue seems to bear a masculine importance. In both cases 'our' women (and to a lesser degree children and old people) are presented as the part of the population that must be protected from the ill intentions of the Other. The Other is shown threatening the honour of 'our' women - a metaphor that is often used, especially in literary texts. There is a renowned story in Greek history where Greek women (the Souliots) jumped to their death from a high cliff, dancing a national dance, rather than be captured by the Ottomans. There are many women heroines fighting against the Other, participating in a 'men's war'. These women do not symbolise any particularities of 'women' but live and fight like men. This participation operates as an indication that the people act as a whole.

In the Turkish historiography women are also portrayed as assisting the men: psychologically supporting their husbands who are fighting at the front; carrying ammunition; being involved in the fighting themselves and tending the wounded. Turkish women, contrary to Greek heroines, rarely participate in actual fighting. In the republican national discourse the Turkish woman is the main criterion for the 'modernisation' of the country: her dress, her role in the society, her legal status, and so on are of special importance.

In general the Greek historiography seems to be characterised by a greater uniformity in describing both the past of the nation as well as the Other. The Turkish historiography presents greater diversity. This should be related to the relatively late formation of nation-building in the Turkish case, as well as to the multi-ethnic/national heritage of the Ottoman Empire (the millet system) and to its legacy.

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Ethnic Identity and Nation Building:  
On Byzantine and Ottoman Historical Legacy

We often attribute different meanings to the same words. Sometimes we have at the back of our minds references and relationships that are not shared by our interlocutors. When these occur we do not achieve a real communication. I would like to distinguish two different meanings that I have in mind when I use the word ‘legacy’:

A- By legacy one may mean what is actually handed down from the past (as from ancestors or predecessors), or
B- what people believe (or imagine) that is handed down from the past.

What is really handed down from the past, as many sociologists, historians, anthropologists and folklorists would say, is what sometimes is called culture, tradition, civilization, etc. This historical legacy can be traced and many influences of our ancestors can be detected in our everyday life. As personalities we are mostly passive in this kind of legacy. To express ‘legacy’ with a simile one can say that it operates like DNA or destiny: we are programmed to act in a certain way, to follow a code of behavior and a set of ethical and esthetical values. Most importantly, we are not aware of this legacy; its outcome is seen as a ‘normal’, ‘logical’ and self-understood fact, as life itself.

The second case, in which we have people (communities and nations) believing that they have a certain legacy, is a quite different situation. Especially during the modern period of nations and nationalism, ‘historical legacy’ is not experienced as a passive acceptance. Through nation-building (‘ethnic engineering’) a wide spectrum of intellectuals actually ‘creates’ a certain historical past. The past is invented, rather than discovered. The modern states with their central educational system contribute too in this process. In this case, experts (historians, folklorists, etc) play an important role in publicizing what is called ‘our tradition’. In modern societies it is mostly this known (conscious) legacy that is esteemed and preserved.

In this article, these two different ‘legacies’ will be discussed concentrating on two Balkan countries, Greece and Turkey. A great number of Greeks and Turks claim to be the ‘heirs’ of two empires, respectively of the Byzantine and of the Ottoman, which both once covered the whole of the Balkans (among many other areas). Greece is a member of the EU and Turkey a candidate member. The constructed (believed) legacy, the related identity issues and their repercussions vis a vis the EU are the main issues of this article.

The Actual versus the Believed Legacy

The handed down actual legacy and the believed one rarely operate complementarily. In fact, they are in a relationship of tense controversy. The reason is not hard to see. Life is much more complex than the simplistic historical framework that the nationalist paradigm tries to propagate. With the dawn of nationalism, communities that consisted of a wide range of heterogeneous cultural and ethnic compositions had to be converted into homogeneous nations. Complexity had to be changed to homogeneity, but also the past had to be explained by simple schemata so that the myriads of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups would be reduced and evaluated as a finite number of ‘nations’.

This process of nation-building was accompanied by the construction of grand national narratives and historiographies. The believed legacy is a product of this process. On the other hand the actual legacy still persists in the daily life of the modern citizens, irrespective whether this is acknowledged or not.

The actual and the believed legacies are in constant rivalry; sometimes openly confessed but mostly indirectly inferred. This controversy is a basic element in all kinds of discussions related to national identities and consequently to the “other”. Furthermore, the relationship with the “other”, as well as the image of the “other” are associated with the perception of the ‘self’. A question such as ‘what are the cultural and historical legacies in the Balkan states and the expected relations with the EU?’ can be better approached when ‘legacy’ is viewed in its duality, distinguishing the actual and the believed one, and probing into the dynamics that the controversy initiates. The actual heritage in the Balkans and among the Greeks and the Turks is not the subject of this article, however, a few examples on this legacy may prove useful to understand the controversy between the two different kinds of legacy.

Both Greece and Turkey made and still make great efforts to “improve” the national language in each country. By this, actually two things are meant: first, to cleanse the local language of “foreign” words and influences and second, to publicize the cleansed language among the citizens. The purpose of these campaigns has been to show that there is a national language which originated in antiquity and that it can and should exist and prosper remaining pure and “clean”, not being influenced by foreign (and consequently harmful) infiltrations. What is systematically avoided is to mention – let alone to teach – that the Greek and Turkish languages share a lot. Even though the two languages belong to two different language families and they vary structurally, they share two aspects: they contain thousands of words and hundreds of expressions and proverbs which are identical in both languages.

In spite of thousand of words that were purposely “excluded” from Greek and Turkish the last decades, thousands still remain that are common in the two languages. A recent publication shows that about five thousand words are shared. Some of these may be of Greek origin (e.g. αγίασµα/ayazma), or of Turkish (αγάς/ağa) or of some other language (αβαντάζ/avantaj). More important is the case with the expressions and the proverbs which in

92 The words ‘imagined’ and ‘constructed’ can be used instead of ‘believed’ to express the same. Here these words will be used alternatively even though they have different origins.

93 As will be shown below both Greeks and Turks, right after the founding of their nation state, tried with great fervor to ‘clean’ their language by exorcising the words that belonged to the Other, to change toponyms and family names by choosing ones closer to the imagined national past, to demolish architectural marvels so that they will not remind the past coexistence and most importantly to write new textbooks that teach a new nationalist history. All these efforts were praised as a ‘return to national roots’.

94 Greek is an Indo-European language whereas Turkish an Altaic one.

95 Η. Μιλλας, Κατάλογος Κοινών Ελληνικών και Τουρικών Λέξεων, Εκφράσεων και Παροιμιών, (Catalogue of common Greek and Turkish words, expressions and proverbs), Papazisi Publisher, Athens, 2008.
fact show how close the two communities have been in the past and how they shared and
together; they express some notions. Taking the word “eye” as an example we see that they are aboutorty expressions that are shared: δεν χορταίνει το µάτι µου / gözüm doymuyor (“my eye is
hungry” meaning something like “I can’t keep my eye from… because I like it so much”); µε
κλειστά µάτια / gözü kapalı (“with closed eyes”, i.e., with great trust) etc. Many common
proverbs, too, show the close interaction between the two communities. Both sides ignore this
proximity: όποιος κοιµάται µε στραβό το πρωί αλληθωρίζει / körle yatan şaşı kalkar (whoever
sleeps with a blind man wakes up cross-eyed).

This kind of a legacy is not reminded and taught. Instead the notion that words, food,
music, ethical principles, rituals of beliefs, etc., “cannot be shared” (and should not be
shared) between the Greeks and the Turks is directly and/or indirectly propagated. The
Turkish coffee case is notorious. The Greeks started calling it “Greek”. Some other common
foodstuff is also an issue of dispute. Döner/gyros, baklava and other “Ottoman” (or are they
“Byzantine”?) food cannot be shared.

The traces of coexistence are systematically concealed. Thousand of toponyms have been
changed in both countries the last decades replacing them with “national” ones. The traces
of the “other” are wiped away by purposely demolishing or leaving to decay monuments such
as holy places (mosques and churches respectively), cemeteries, monuments, etc. All these
were accompanied with a discourse of “returning to national roots”. In history books and
especially in textbooks the “other” is absent to a scandalous extent: it is as if the “other” has
never existed. Even the ethnic minorities in Greece and Turkey – the Turks in Greece and the
Greeks in Turkey - are called “Muslim” and “Rum/Roman” respectively. Very few people
know that once the Greeks and the Turks (actually the Grekophones and the Tourkophones)
lived very close to each other, in the same geographic areas sharing belief and practices.

Actually many cultural characteristics are not “ethnic” and/or “national” but local, i.e.,
geographically determined. Music and food are especially so. There are hundreds of folksongs
and food recipes that are identical in the two communities. This situation is not reminded; on
the contrary it is silenced. In each country the schooling is programmed to teach that there is a
“national” essence in all of the traditional and/or cultural patterns. Cultural habits may prove
very close if examined with the intention to locate similarities. This does not mean there are
no differences in many other areas of public and private life. It means however, that there is a
shared legacy which is ignored due to ideological reasons.

Even the ethnic categories such as “Greek” and “Turk” are problematic in themselves.
There are Turks who used to speak only Greek (the Turks of Crete) and Greeks who spoke
only Turkish (the Karamanlis). These populations were exchanged in 1923-1925 and later
integrated (or assimilated) in the new format of nationhood. Naturally these categories are
systematically silenced in official historiography and in everyday discourse.

Both Greece and Turkey tried to orient an educational program which was supported by
the press and later by the media, by the museums of the country, by the men of letters and art,
etc., as soon as they have been established as nation-states, This cultural enterprise was the
cultural aspect of nation-building. Some call this effort acquiring “a national consciousness”,
others “a national identity”; others may call the same endeavor social engineering,
construction of a national identity, propaganda or brain-washing.

The construction of “Legacies” in Greece and Turkey

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96 See: Kerem Öktem “Ulus, zaman ve mekan: Türkiye ve Yunanistan’da toponomik politikalar” in Söze
Greeks presently believe that they are the heirs of the Byzantine Empire which was as large as the Ottoman Empire. In practice Grecophone Christians and Tourcophone Muslims lived for four to ten centuries (depending on the area) on the same Ottoman lands and quite often in the same villages and cities. However, Greeks (prefer to) believe that they are the heirs of the preceding Byzantine legacy and not of the more recent Ottoman one.

Actually the Greeks claim to be the direct heirs of Ancient Greece as well as of the Byzantine legacy. This belief, however, is a relatively recent one and its evolution can be quite clearly traced. During the ‘age of revolutions’ and on the eve of the Greek war of independence in the years 1780-1830, some Grecophone intellectuals of the ‘diaspora’ who lived in various cities of western Europe and were influenced by the French Revolution and the ideological controversies of the time, spread ‘republican’ ideas among their ethnic communities and proposed radical actions against the ‘tyrant’, the Ottoman Ruler. Others, who were close to the conservative Patriarchate of Constantinople and lived within the Ottoman State, anathematized them as ‘atheists’ and advised prudence and adherence to ‘paternal ideals’. It was during this period that questions related to national/ethnic identity were posed for the first time: are we ‘Romeoi’ (Romans, in the sense of Byzantines), ‘Grekoi’ (Greeks, ‘as the westerners call us’), Hellens (as the ‘Ancients’) or ‘Orthodox Christians’? There were serious political, ideological and identity disagreements among the Grecophone intellectuals of that time but all still shared a sense of belonging to a common ‘genos’ (in the sense of a ‘community/race’).

A simple national myth dominated the Greek historiography during the 19th century: The Greeks, who were the grandchildren of the glorious Ancient Greeks, after many centuries of tyrannical ‘Turkish yoke’ revolted as a nation and won their independence anew. Greek-Orthodox Christianity, that constituted the basic belief of most of the Grecophones, was dexterously integrated into the ancient heritage. The term ‘Helleno-Christianity’ was invented in the mid 19th century to express this national harmony and religion was thus ethniced during this nation-building phase.

Turkish national identity, on the other hand, was first expressed by the Young Turks in the first decade of the 20th century. The Turkish nationalism which was originally expressed as Turkishness, as Pan-Turkism and/or as Turanism/Pan-Turanism was conceived as an ideal unity of all the Turkic people, of the Balkans as well as of Asia. This unity was understood on an ethnic/cultural base, mainly identified by language. The romantic understanding of the “people” and the views of G. Herder, the imagined “very old” cultural past of the “nation”, the positivism of Auguste Comte, the social Darwinism and the teachings of A. Gobineau were some of the main ideas that dominated the understanding of the nationalist intellectuals. Islam, the religion of the nation to be, was reminded by these historians, not so much as a characteristic of the nation but as a reference in demarcating the “Self” from the “other”.

Among the main issues of concern in history writing during the first years of the Turkish Republic were the issues of “identity”. The “ancient regime” of the Ottomans was criticized as “backward” and “conservative” and its legacy was ignored and looked down on or condemned. Great effort was exerted to demonstrate that the Turks had been a great nation with some enduring merits all through history, having established many states and an important civilization. The “other” in this case, who was supposed to differ from the ‘Turks’, both ethnically and religiously posed a problem. The tendency to perceive the old non-Muslim millets or the new ethnic minorities and/or the ethnically different neighboring

97 For a more detail account see above the article titled “History writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other”.
98 For a more detailed account see above the article titled “History writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other”.

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nations as foreign bodies was unavoidable. Their affinity to “us” and “our” common legacy were systematically ignored and silenced.

An Assessment

When ‘legacy’ (tradition, culture, national history) is envisaged as two different components, as actual and as believed (imagined, constructed), the following can be said in light with the above:

1. The actual legacy is a reality that humans do not have control over. On the other hand, modern nations ‘invent’ ideological frameworks which operate as believed legacies, too. This kind of a legacy is no less influential than the actual one. On the contrary, quite often it operates as an ideological drive that moves the masses and shapes social developments.

2. The nations in the Balkans, as in the case of the Greeks and the Turks, developed such an imagined legacy under the influence of the ideology of nationalism which was dominant during the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries in Europe and especially Western Europe. The history of Greece and Turkey can be understood best not by looking at the actual legacy of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, but rather by understanding in what the nations believed as a legacy and what the ideological concepts and ideals were at various periods.

3. The believed legacy in the two countries can be summarized as a Darwinist ideology of struggle, highly xenophobic, not only bilaterally, but also towards the outer world in general, in short, a nationalistic perception with the general meaning of the word.

4. The dissimilarity that exists between the national and believed legacies, on the one hand, and the actual one, on the other, can be better understood when the actual legacy of the Ottoman practice is taken into consideration. The Ottoman social practice was, as is the case with most multi-national and multi-religious empires, one of co-existence of various ethnic and religious groups. This practice was characterized by its tolerance vis a vis the religious and ethnic diversity and multiplicity. I offer a paragraph written by a ‘westerner’, an Italian traveller who was surprised when he visited the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul in 1788. It gives a vivid picture of the all-inclusive empire:

A stranger, who has beheld the intolerance of London and Paris, must be much surprised to see a church here between a mosque and a synagogue, and a dervise [sic] by the side of a capuchin friar. I know not how this government can have admitted into its bosom religions so opposite to its own. It must be from degeneracy of Mahommedanism, that this happy contrast can be produced. What is still more astonishing is to find that this spirit of toleration is generally prevalent among the people; for here you see Turks, Jews, Catholics, Armenians, Greeks and Protestants conversing together, on subjects of business or pleasure, with as much harmony and good will as if they were of the same country and religion.

99 Hobsbawm distinguished between three types of invented traditions which each have a distinctive function: a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion and collective identities, b) those establishing or legitimating institutions and social hierarchies, and c) those socializing people into particular social contexts; the first type has been most commonly referred to and often taken to imply the two other functions as well. (Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.)

5- This actual legacy was negated and the believed one taken on. The believed legacy is dominant in the Balkan countries, as referred to above and as shaped through the modern ideology of nationalism.

6- Therefore the issue of ‘legacy’ should not be approached as an entity that reaches us from the past but mainly as an ideological construction of the present. The believed legacy is not an event of the past that has been terminated and is not interfered with. On the contrary, as it is demonstrated above, it is still a lively process in operation.

7- In consequence, attention should be paid to what lies ahead and not so much to what the parties are supposed to have inherited from the past. ‘Legacy’ is not a real issue of the far-distanted past but rather of a believed very recent past and of the present, of the era in which ideologies are born and mature. The actual heritage is not so negative after all; the believed one is the problematic one.

8- The final believed legacy in the Balkans will be shaped according to the developments in Europe and in pace with the integration of the Balkan states in the EU. The integration of the Balkan states in the EU will reinforce the political influence of the forces that are in tune with the ideals of the EU. In fact the integration in the EU will create a European ‘believed legacy’ in the Balkans. ‘Legacy’ in the Balkans is not a completed historical process and its course depends heavily on the relations with the EU. The forgotten and silenced ‘actual legacy’ (coexistence, multi-ethnic past, etc.) in the Balkans on the other hand will operate as an asset in this process.

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Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in each other’s mirrors

The Greek-Turkish controversy has been approached from a variety of perspectives over the last few decades. While innumerable articles and books have been written on the conflict itself, there are no historical studies on the literature and discourses employed by the parties in question. Such a review would shed light on the historical dimension of the controversy, and more specifically, on the ways in which the parties perceived, experienced, and administered the conflict. It would also contribute to an evaluation of prevalent tendencies today, and to forecasting future developments.

This paper will begin by charting the phases through which perceptions of the ‘conflict’ have passed, before considering the images and role-conceptions of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ employed by the agents. There are three main identifiable phases in the history of agents’ perceptions about the past. During the first period, the trend was to place the blame entirely on the “other”. In the next phase, and over the last two decades, the controversy was being ‘explained’ mostly by making references to the (negative) role played by certain institutions and administrative practices, rather than that of parties. In the third stage, mostly in academic circles over the last few years, the causes of the conflict have been sought in the societies themselves.

Of course, these phases do not constitute neat sequences in which each successive phase totally eradicates the previous one. Indeed, all three kinds of views continue to find expression among Greeks, Turks, and third parties involved today. The aim of this paper, then, is to investigate these diverse ways in which the parties conceptualize the bilateral conflict, and to evaluate the consequent dynamics of this conflict.

First phase: Nation-states and the imagined history of a conflict

The Greek-Turkish conflict is one with clear ethnic connotations: such a conflict could not have existed before the era of nationalism. Indeed, it should be emphasized that there was no Greek-Turkish controversy before the nineteenth century, as ‘the Greeks’ and ‘the Turks’ did not even exist as national entities then. There were of course different tensions at the time—and probably even worse—between the Christians and Muslims, the Byzantines and the Ottomans. However, the so-called ‘historical Greek-Turkish enmity’ is a relatively late product of nationalism of the two nation states. The notorious hatred between Greeks and Turks is less a ‘historical’ phenomenon and more an outcome of recent national constructions. It was during the nineteenth century that the ‘Other’ – the Ottoman ‘Turk’ – was constructed in Greek historiography as the ultimate negative figure: despotic, barbaric, backward, uncivilized, cruel, corrupt, perverted, exploitative, and so on. In general, this image was not different from the one prevalent in the ‘West’ vis-à-vis the ‘Turk’. Before the establishment of the Greek nation-state, the image of the ‘Other’ was either a relatively ‘balanced’ one, or else the concept of an ‘enemy of the nation’ was not a prominent one. This is discernible in the memoirs of the Phanariots (the high class Greeks of Istanbul), and even in the memoirs of

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the fighters of the Greek Revolution of 1821-1830. In these memoirs, the Ottomans and the Turks, and especially the dignitaries of the state, are not characterized as cruel barbarians, but rather as wise people and/or decent opponents. In the same period, and on the other side of the Aegean, the word ‘Turk’ had not even acquired a positive meaning among the Ottomans. Their world was one of ‘states’ and religious communities, and not yet one of ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘nations’.

The establishment of the two nation states, Greece in 1830 and Turkey in 1923, brought on the first phase in conflict perceptions identified here: this involved demonizing the ‘Other’ and exalting ‘our nation’. In this changed political and ideological atmosphere, new dynamics appeared: a) the citizens began to perceive themselves as members of a national group, b) they began to perceive other groups as nations in turn, c) a discourse of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ was constructed, within which permanent national characteristics were attributed to each, uniformly positive and negative respectively. This discourse can be detected in all nationalist texts produced in the two ‘nation-states’.

A study of Greek and Turkish novels, for example, sheds light on these different ‘Self-Other’ perceptions in nationalist discourses, and how they appeared during a certain period manifesting a new understanding of the past and present. In general, the emergence of modern Greek and Turkish literature was generally in step with the process of nation building and the search for a national identity. In the first Greek novels which appeared after the founding of the new Greek state, the ‘Turks’ are presented as (meaning that they were perceived as) a nation with common negative characteristics, as the historical enemy, as a source of problems, and as a threat.

On the other hand, in the first Turcophone novels of the Ottoman period and especially before nationalism was spread within Ottoman society, the Greeks do not appear as the ‘Other’. They are certainly not portrayed as ethnically negative stereotypes. With the appearance of the Young Turks the ‘Ottomanists’ stopped publishing their works around 1912, and a new generation of authors appeared. From then on, nationalism existed not only as an ideology and political movement, but also as a rhetoric that ran through all texts: historiography, textbooks, literature, newspapers, and so on. In the era of nation states, depictions of the ‘Other’ in Greek and Turkish texts were almost identical, but always as a mirror image of each other: the enemy, a source of political problems and a threat to ‘our’ freedom, was juxtaposed with ‘us’, and the corresponding positive connotations.

The political situation and wars between the two countries (i.e., the war of 1897, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1914, and the Greek-Turkish clash of 1919-1922) do not suffice to explain such negative imagery of the ‘Other’. The literary texts did not depict the actual environment of the writers but rather sketched the ‘Other’ in accordance with a nationalist ideology and a constructed past, indifferent to personal experiences.

103 Only forty years before, the image of the ‘Turk’ in Grecophone literature was not negative, as is readily noticeable in the politically oriented poems (and other writings) of Rigas Velestinlis, and other Greek intellectuals (Millas: 1994, pp. 87-122, 257-294). After 1834, literary authors such as I. Pitsipios, Gr. Palaiologos, St. Ksenos, D. Vikelas, and A. Papadiamantis portray an unsavory Turk who is in confrontation with ‘us’. This tendency persists in the 20th century.
104 Millas, 2005.
105 For a more detailed account see the following articles in this volume: “Non-Muslim Minorities in the Historiography of Republican Turkey” and “Constructing Memories of Multiculturalism and Identities in the Turkish Novels”.

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congruent with images of the ‘Other’ found in the textbooks and historiography of each country. A study on textbooks from the late 1980s in the two countries showed that both sides had developed a simplistic narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’, lacking any positive references to the ‘Other’. All the blame for past incidents was attributed to the ‘other side’, while any notion of ‘our mistakes’ was absent.

Second phase: Blaming certain agents and institutions

Parallel to this black and white nationalist approach, alternative explanations of the Greek-Turkish controversy emerged and hesitantly advanced by some marginalized groups. This occurred particularly after 1920 in Greece and after 1950 in Turkey. The initiators of this approach were mainly the Marxists of both sides, as well as a few adherents of ecumenical or universal religious views. These small groups produced texts that were mostly critical of their ‘own side’, and generally directed their criticisms at the choices of the state and its policies. For example, they critiqued nationalist textbooks, or protested against actions taken against the ethnic minorities. The Marxists blamed ‘capitalism’, ‘imperialism’, ‘nationalism’ and the ‘dominant’ classes for the precarious relations between the two countries, while the ‘religious’ writers advocated closer ties, and traditional values.

In the field of literature, the adherents of Marxism or Socialism would self-identify as internationalists. Examples in the Greek case are Dido Sotiriou and Kosmas Politis, and in the Turkish case, Nazım Hikmet and Orhan Kemal. In many cases, these writers present class consciousness and the class struggle as more important than ethnic ideals and perceptions. The ‘religious’ group made a more limited contribution to literature because, traditionally, they did not choose modern literary genres to express their views. In Turkish literature, the novels of Samiha Ayverdi (1906-1993), and in the Greek case, the writings of Ph. Kontoglou (1895-1965) represent examples of this category.

In the field of historiography, the ‘critical’ historians resemble the authors mentioned above: there are no clear dividing lines between historians and literary writers as regards their worldviews. The ‘stories’ narrated in the literary texts do not always develop in parallel with the prevailing historiography in each particular period and/or ideological field. Indeed, in many instances, it is the novel that introduces new historical concepts and interpretations, and the historiography that picks up the trend. In all cases, the two ‘genres’ have complemented each other. In the 1860s in the Greek case, and the 1910s in the Turkish case, it was the literary narrative – novels, short stories, poetry and literary criticism – that established the main ethnic interpretations and themes of ethnogenesis in these countries. In later years, it was again Marxist literary writers who first introduced the class oriented historical interpretations that historians would later use. Over the last few decades too, young novelists in both countries have dared to criticize practices of ‘our’ recent history, in line with young historians.

This approach not only indicates a widening of the spectrum of research in history writing, but also a change of philosophy and mindset, transcending ethnocentric approaches. These historians seem to believe that one-sided ‘national interpretations’ are inadequate when it comes to producing historical narratives of international validity. They are certainly more ‘cosmopolitan’ in their understanding of the ‘Other’, as well as more relaxed in their exchanges with the ‘Other’.

107 See the article above: “History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey”.
109 For a more detailed account of these developments see the article above: “History Writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other”.

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Today there are many young historians and academics, as well as columnists and other intellectuals – though not yet politicians – who write in a similar vein. They tend to place the blame for the tensions in Greek-Turkish relations on external actors, referring to past or present ‘mistakes’ made by ‘agents’ such as the state, the mass media, the education system, or politicians. This is what distinguishes this phase in conflict perception from the previous one.

A further implication is that once the ‘reason’ for the conflict is determined in this way, the future is visualized with relative optimism: if these agents are merely controlled, the situation will improve. When the blame is placed on more abstract phenomena such as ‘nationalism’, ‘imperialism’, ‘racism’, ‘fanaticism’, or ‘prejudice’, these concepts are again evaluated as the outcome of actions by the above-mentioned concrete agents, generating the same semi-optimistic prospect.

Third phase: a critical view of society and national identity

The third shift in perceptions of the Greek-Turkish conflict to be examined here originates in the attention it has attracted among third parties over the years. There are some interesting studies on the Greek and Turkish communities by anthropologists, social psychologists, and experts of conflict resolution. These studies approach the communities in conflict as their main field of interest. They do not assume any ‘agents’ and/or ‘external forces’ who act to destroy an assumed ‘normal’ state that would have existed otherwise. This kind of a study presupposes an impartial approach.

The parties involved in the Greek-Turkish conflict have long made simplistic or ‘pseudo-academic’ references to the ‘psychology’ of their opposite parties. These mostly exhibited the same shortcoming, however: each party tried to show the ‘other side’ as ‘sick’. This method was not used as an explanatory tool, however. It rather represents a variant of the approach classified as ‘the first phase’ above. The Greeks, for example, used the argument that the (barbarian) ‘other side’ were jealous of Greek civilization, while Turkish ‘analysts’ argued that their ‘Other’ could never overcome the ill-feeling that came with being ruled by the Turks – of being ‘our recent slave’. Eventually, substantial efforts to look deeper into the ‘psychology’ of the parties involved were initiated by third parties, and by people who did not identify themselves ‘very strongly’ with either national identity of the parties in conflict.

In Ours Once More (1982), Michael Herzfeld tried to ‘understand’ the making of modern Greece through the process of the creation of a canon of folkloric treasure. His study explores the way in which ideology and identity assume a role in forming the foundations for a modern nation. The Greek-Turkish conflict is not the main issue in this book, but national identity is still seen to be in a constant dynamic with the ‘Other’. Benjamin Broom’s Exploring the Greek Mosaic (1996), which covers national images as well as his conflict resolution work in the field of Greek-Turkish relations, is a ground-breaking effort. Broom has tried to identify what lies behind the accusatory discourse of the parties: fear, insecurity, and shame.

Lately, in a new approach to the Greek-Turkish ‘phenomenon’, Greeks and Turks have themselves begun to develop critical stances on their societies that do not involve ‘external agents’ as an explanation. Instead, they see the society itself, with its predetermined identity, as creating many of the fears, and consequently the tension. Alexis Heraclides, in Greece and

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110 See for example the article above – “Greek-Turkish Conflict and Arsonist Firemen”.
112 See: Benjamin Broom.
the Danger from the East\textsuperscript{113} criticizes Greek prejudices and certain irrational policies towards Turkey. In Echoes From The Dead Zone (2005), the Cypriot social anthropologist Yiannis Papadakis, describes the prejudices with which the Greeks and Turks operate, based on his own personal experience.\textsuperscript{114} Studies have also been published recently that question historical discourses and taboos that have applied for decades. For example, Our Undesired Citizens by Giorgos Margaritis tells the story of the killing and expulsion of Greece’s Albanians, and of the Jews whose extermination by the Nazis went unhindered. On the Turkish side too, many articles and books have been written in the same vein. Self-criticism with reference to society as a whole, past and present, is widespread, particularly in the mass media. The question of the ‘character of our society’ is not an academic issue in Turkey but a political and ideological one, fiercely debated by journalists and academics on a daily basis. In approaching the question, references are made to ‘facing our history’, dealing with ‘our identity’ – whether to self-identify as Turks or citizens of Turkey –and to the historical dimension – the Kurdish, Armenian, and general ‘minorities’ issues. Greeks come to the agenda through the minorities debate and the Cyprus issue. Such publications about Turkish identity and the ‘Other’ are numerous.\textsuperscript{115}

The most novel characteristic of this ‘third phase’ in ‘explanations’ of the Greek-Turkish conflict is the two-fold shift in the focus of attention that has occurred. Firstly, there has been a change from interest in the ‘Other’ and his ‘shortcomings’, to interest in ‘our side’, and its shortcomings. Secondly, the source of tension is no longer identified as the ‘agents’ (textbooks, nationalism, politicians etc.) and ‘external factors’ at work, but rather the national identity itself. In other words, the existence as a nation of those involved is being examined. Even though a clearly declared common interest of study is not in evidence, both societies seem to be simultaneously preoccupied with the national identity that shaped the consciousness of the two nations, and particularly their images of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. In this latest phase of perception, the perceptions of the nations themselves have been recognized as a decisive factor in shaping the environment in which Greek-Turkish relations evolve.

The Content of such Perceptions: National identity and the ‘Other’

Having analyzed perceptions among Greeks and Turks in terms of phases, it is useful to consider their content. A relatively reliable source of information is the body of surveys and opinion polls conducted in both countries. Their results, notwithstanding certain reasonable reservations, remain far more trustworthy than the personal opinions, and ‘feelings’ of individuals. The limited results available demonstrate that images of the ‘Other’ have not changed substantially, even though ‘behavior’ has done. This is a paradox that requires explanation.

After the earthquakes of 1999, a rapprochement followed in Greek-Turkish relations, but the same cannot be said of each party’s images, perceptions and expectations of the ‘Other’. A comparison of two opinion polls evidences this: the first was conducted jointly by ICAP in Greece and by PIAR in Turkey, and was published in both countries in 1989; the second was conducted by Kappa Research in the Balkans in 2003, and published in 2004 in Greece. According to the first poll, in 1989, 73% of Turks did not trust Greeks, while 81% of Greeks distrusted Turks. According to this poll, the Greeks and Turks trusted each other much less.

\textsuperscript{113} Alex Heraclides, Η Ελλάδα και ο 'Εξ Ανατολών Κίνδυνος, 2001. Turkish version: 2002.

\textsuperscript{114} See: Papadakis, Yannis

\textsuperscript{115} See for example Akçam, Aktar, Behmoaras, Deringil, Kızılyürek, Mahçupyan, Millas 2002, Neyzi - shown in the bibliography below.
than they did other countries such as Great Britain, the US, the Soviet Union, West Germany, France, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Fifteen years on, the second opinion poll showed that only 18% of Turks believed that Greece was supporting Turkey’s bid for EU membership, whereas this percentage varies from 23% to 63% in countries like Albania, Bulgaria, FYR and Macedonia. Moreover, 90% of Turks perceived Greece as a threat, while 96% perceived Greek Cyprus as such. The next country the Turks identified as a regional threat was Bulgaria, but only by 48%. According to the same poll, 91% of Greeks perceived Turkey as a threat.

This does not mean, however, that the policy shift after 1999 has had no effect on the opinions of both parties: it has done on the political level. An opinion poll conducted by Strategy Mori\(^{116}\) showed that 71% of Turks did not see a Greek-Turkish war as probable. A poll by Kappa Research\(^{117}\) showed that 66% of Greeks advocated good relations with Turkey, but only 40% wanted to see Turkey join the EU. Thus it seems that the political climate has improved, but that ill feelings persist. A clue to this discrepancy was seen in a study conducted by academics on students of primary and intermediary education\(^{118}\). The reason why students had a negative image of the Turks did not relate so much to what they are today, but rather to what they are believed to have done in the distant past.

These results support this chapter’s earlier conclusions: they demonstrate that these nations’ perceptions about the past are influenced by their identities and ‘grand narratives’, i.e. the story in which they place themselves and their nation. The ‘Other’ is needed, to set the imaginary boundary according to which the ‘Self’ can be defined. The Greek national identity ‘needs’ a negative ‘Other’, more specifically, a negative ‘Turk’, in order to be at peace with the Greek national ‘grand narrative’ and national identity. One historical and cultural theme, Tourkokratia, is particularly popular in the Greek society, adding meaning to the ‘story of the nation’, connecting the story of the nation to the “negative other”, to the “Turk” by using religious symbols, too.\(^{119}\)

The Turkish national identity was similarly founded in a dynamic with an entity that can be seen as the ‘Other’, an imagined Greek. Yet Turkish nationalists imitated many Greek practices and much Greek discourse as they developed their theses and practices. They perceived the ‘Greek’ both as a threat against Turkish sovereign rights and as an example to be followed. Thus the Greek Revolution of 1821 gave an impetus to Turkish national revival: foreign affairs started to be managed by Muslim dignitaries (Tercüme Odası), the Janissary was dismantled (1826), and the army modernized, because the revolution was perceived as a signal of the impending destruction of the Ottoman Empire. These concerns can still be found in abundance in Turkish historiography and textbooks.\(^{120}\) The subsequent Greek territorial and irredentist expansions, such as the war of 1897, the revolt in Crete and its annexation to Greece, the Balkan Wars and finally the Greek invasion of Anatolia (1919-1922), further stimulated Turkish nationalism. Starting with the Young Turks, a major project of ‘nationalizing’ (Türkleştirme) was launched and continued for decades.

The imitation of Greek nationalism is apparent, though not recognized by Turkish nationalists. Economic boycotts and the ‘cleansing’ of minorities were first practised by the Greeks in 1904-1905 in Macedonia. The first massacres of the ‘undesired’ started in 1821 in Tripolis (Treblice) in the Peloponnnesus. The policy of uniting all of ‘our nation’ became known as Megali Idea (1844) by the Greeks, and as Büyük Mefküre among the Turks about fifty years later, in both cases meaning the ‘Great Ideal’. The Greeks claimed they were the

\(^{116}\) See To Vima, 13\(^{th}\) March 2001.
\(^{117}\) See To Vima, 5\(^{th}\) January 2007.
\(^{118}\) See To Vima, 9\(^{th}\) December 2001.
\(^{119}\) See for example the article above: “Tourkokratia: History and Image of Turks in Greek Literature”.
\(^{120}\) Millas, 2002.
heirs of ancient Greek glory, while the Turkish History Thesis (1933) claimed the same. The image of the negative Greek is closely associated with the nationalist grand narrative on the Turkish side. The silencing and distortion of the history of the Ionian and Byzantine civilizations in mainstream Turkish historiography is only one of the indications of the above processes; textbooks which reflect the official view provide another. The ‘national’ literary texts leave no doubt about the persistence of feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis the ‘Other’.121

Perhaps the greatest similarity in the content of perceptions on both sides is their uneaseness regarding their sovereign rights. The Greeks perceive a threat from a powerful neighbor who had once occupied their land for centuries. The Turkish side perceives a potential threat originating from a neighbor who makes ‘historical’ claims on its lands.122

Greek and Turks today – an assessment

What can these trends in ‘Self-Other’ perceptions tell us about present-day Greek-Turkish relations and future expectations? Before this can be understood, it is necessary to analyze the contexts or ‘spheres’ in which these perceptions form.

A study on the images of Turkey in the Greek press has revealed a general understanding of ‘Turkey’, reflecting a sort of national consensus on the one hand, but also a set of fluctuating opinions, influenced by the political atmosphere of the period in question. The first trend operates within the sphere of (what I call) consensual nationalism, i.e., the manifestation of the minimum national consensus that creates the group called ‘the Greeks’. The second may be seen as contingent nationalism,123 and is mainly political, liable to change according to local and international realities. Thus there may be different opinions within a nation-state about the ‘Other’, but these do not challenge the first ‘sphere’. Contingent nationalism may elicit sudden and/or frequent changes, whereas consensual nationalism displays durability. Analyzing Greek-Turkish relations from this perspective, the crucial area becomes this latter sphere, and any changes that occur in national identity, secured by national consensus.

This differentiation enables us to interpret the changes within the contingent sphere – the three ‘phases’ of perceptions of Greek-Turkish relations mentioned above – as compared with the relative endurance of the consensual sphere, i.e., of national identity. This ‘difference’ between the two is expressed in language in various ways. Some people make a distinction between ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’, (εθνικισµός/πατριωτισµός – milliyetçilik/yurtseverlik); others speak of ‘nationalism in the good sense’ (εθνικισµός µε την καλή έννοια - pozitif milliyetçilik) versus ‘racism’ or ‘chauvinism’. Yet it is more constructive to see national identity as a belief that can generate various political programs. With this differentiation in mind, it becomes possible to understand how and why nations change their political targets, while at the same time preserving their identity. It also becomes possible to explain how a nation (or a country) can change its political position vis-à-vis another nation, but keep intact its myths and all related feelings towards the ‘Other’. These occurrences take place in different spheres.

National identity is associated with national myths about the ‘Self’ as well as the ‘Other’. These myths and images operate within the sphere of consensual nationalism. In this sense, the ‘Other’ also obtains a diachronic character. This is why stereotypes about the ‘Other’ persist, even though people declare that they do not feel ill-will towards the

122 See the article below: “The Imagined Other as National Identity – Greeks and Turks”.
123 Millas, 1999.
The specific ‘Other’ does not change the character of the ‘historical/imagined/abstract’ ‘Other’, who forms the basis of consensual nationalism. These clarifications are indispensable in order to understand what has changed lately in Greek-Turkish relations and in the related perceptions and images.

This study’s findings highlight that ‘nations’ – in this case, the great majority of Greeks and Turks – are far from having transcended their historical prejudices. Their concerns are about a (real or imagined) negative past that presupposes a fearful future. In short, despite the many different opinions that may exist among individuals on such matters, it is as if in general the Greeks regret that the past five centuries were the way they were, and hold the ‘Other’ responsible. Meanwhile, the Turks regret that the ‘Other’ thinks this way about the past, and about the ‘Turk’ today.

Furthermore, there is no symmetry in the complaints and prospects of the two sides. For example, the Greek identity is associated with a ‘lost’ grandeur (expressed as history) – due to the ‘Other’. It is irretrievable, ‘irreversible’, ‘non-reimbursable’. It is a story of mourning and distress. The Turks believe that they have a ‘misinterpreted’ grandeur – the Ottoman past. This can be retrieved through the ‘testimony’ of the ‘Other’; and they ask for this. It is a matter of self-image, hence their persistent discourse about ‘friendship’ and ‘resemblance’.

Almost all complaints voiced by each side seem to be associated with one main concern: sovereignty rights. Historical and current grievances, as well as future concerns are connected directly or by way of insinuation to this ‘national’ issue par excellence. Even questions of images and interpretations of the past are seen as factors that may eventually create a climate that will endanger ‘our’ national integrity, and ‘our’ liberty.

Transcending national prejudices and developing a ‘neutral’ attitude towards the ‘Other’ are complex processes that are related to national identity and to the founding myths of each nation. Indeed, the entire enterprise is usually presented as an effort in which, on the one hand, the ‘Other’ would be stripped of its negative characteristics, while on the other, ‘our’ national identity and ‘our’ related myths would be preserved. This sounds like a contradiction, an oxymoron. In reality, the negative ‘Other’ is a constituent of national identity. The revision of this historical ‘Other’ presupposes a revision of ‘our’ history.

Meanwhile, the political programs of Greece and Turkey could still be changed relatively easily for the better, as occurred after 1999, without a decisive step being taken to revise historiography. In this case, however, national myths and images of the ‘Other’ might remain active or ‘dormant in the subconsciousness’, ready to materialize at the first political crisis.

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Non-Muslim Minorities in the Historiography of Republican Turkey: The Greek Case

Among the different ethnic groups resident in the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were one of the last to develop a 'national consciousness'. Yet with the breakaway of more and more provinces in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, an emerging nationalist intelligentsia developed a project of asserting the Turkish presence within what was still a multi-ethnic empire. After 1908, measures were taken to promote the use of Turkish even in the local administration of areas inhabited by non-Turks. This gave rise to some dissatisfaction, particularly among the Albanians, and non-Muslims resident in the Empire frequently reacted by refusing to learn Turkish at all. On the economic level, representatives of the Committee for Union and Progress also adumbrated projects to create a Turkish bourgeoisie.

All these plans really came to fruition after the Ottoman defeat in World War I, when the Empire finally collapsed. After a major war, in which Greece and the Turkish nationalist forces centered in Ankara were the principal opponents, the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. During the following years, the formative stage of the Republic, establishing a unitary national state on the territories still in Ottoman hands at the time of the Mudros armistice (1918) came to be the avowed aim of the new state's government. Quite a few of the nation-building projects which originally had been developed during the last years of the Empire were taken up once again at this time, including a reform of the alphabet and the written language.

All manner of nation-building projects were facilitated by the exchange of populations decided in Lausanne (1923), by which, with certain exceptions, the Greek—Orthodox population of Turkey and the Muslim population of Greece were forced to leave their respective homelands. These population movements further reinforced the 'national' character of the new Turkish state. After 1923, only the Greeks of the former Ottoman capital were allowed to remain in Turkey. As for the Armenians, many had been victims of fighting and state repression during World War I; those who survived generally emigrated after the war.

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125 A. L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire* (Harlow/Essex, 1998), 61
127 For the reforms of the Kemalists and their antecedents under die Committee of Union and Progress, see Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History* (London, 1994), 181 and elsewhere.
128 The same thing applied to Greece, where only the Muslims of western Thrace were permitted to remain.
129 According to the Lausanne treaty of 1923, the existence of the non-Muslim minorities inhabiting Turkey at that time was acknowledged. The Turkish government accepted the obligation to protect all
In the Republic of Turkey, the non-Muslim presence largely was limited to Istanbul. Salonica with its sizeable Jewish and Christian populations had been lost to the Empire already in 1912 and thus remained outside the borders of the Republic. The former Ottoman capital constituted a possible place of emigration for those Jews who did not wish to become Greek subjects. In addition, the Armenians resident in Istanbul largely had escaped deportation. Moreover, while the Catholic Assyro-Chaldean and the Orthodox Assyrian communities were originally resident in eastern Anatolia, many of their members migrated to Istanbul in the course of time. In consequence, during the 1920s and 1930s, Pera/Beyoğlu retained some of its cosmopolitan atmosphere.

Yet the capital levy of 1942-1943, known as the Varlık Vergisi (Tax on Wealth), caused great losses to many non-Muslim businessmen, and this fact contributed to the 'Turkification' of Istanbul's business life. Moreover, in 1965 a series of measures against Greeks who lived in Turkey without possessing Turkish passports obliged a large number of Greek families to leave the country. This included numerous citizens of Turkey married or otherwise related to the expellees. As a result, after the mid-1960s the number of Greek speakers in Istanbul dwindled to almost nil.

'Turkification' also meant that the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the new national state were Muslims. Even though the constitution and the laws of the Republic do not permit discrimination against any citizen on the basis of his/her religion, the belief that Islam is a prerequisite of 'Turkishness' was and is widespread. This applied even in the late 1950s, when Istanbul still housed a compact group of Greek speakers. Moreover, with the virtual disappearance of Christians and Jews, this identification of 'being Turkish' and 'being Muslim' became even more convincing on an empirical level. Forty years ago, Bernard Lewis put this situation in a nutshell when he wrote that "a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk".

**Nation-building, historiography and non-Muslims**

Historiography had a significant role to play in the Turkish nation-building project, as was true in almost every national state forged during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Turkish historiography of the republican period recognized a special link to the Ottoman past. Thus, the Turkish-speaking Muslims of the defunct polity were cast as the 'imagined community', which after the establishment of the Republic continued to live on as the 'Turkish nation'.
Furthermore, historians who supported the early Republic were placed in the uncomfortable position of having to explain why the new state had limited the role of Islam in public life by defining itself as 'secular'. After all, for the mass of the citizenry, Islam continued to determine the parameters of their world. In addition, the new regime needed to alleviate the odium of having deposed not merely an individual sultan-caliph - that had happened many times previously - but the dynasty as a whole. After all, for over five hundred years, the loyalties of Ottoman subjects had focused on the house of Osman. This meant that historians had to confront the recent past, including the end of the sultanate and the establishment of the Republic. They could not possibly avoid such a discussion as a methodologically unwholesome mixture of 'scientific' history and 'politicized' current affairs.

Now in the 1930s and even 1940s, the very recent past did hold a major war between Greece and Turkey. The Turkish national state had been forged in the course of this extremely bitter and destructive sequence of campaigns. In consequence, the events of the period between 1919 and 1923 were crucial in defining the identity not only of the new state itself, but also the identities of many individual people inhabiting this polity. As a result, the relationship between 'the' Greeks, on the one hand, and the Ottoman (and later Turkish republican) state, on the other, was drawn into the vortex of nationalist polemics. The millets of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the non-Muslims of republican times, were and often still are viewed as 'parts' of some foreign nation. That Ottoman millets were defined on the basis of religion and not of ethnicity was conveniently forgotten. Similarly, the fact that the Greeks under discussion might be subjects of Greece, the Ottoman Empire or later the Republic of Turkey, and that these different 'passports' might condition their attitudes, was not given due consideration by many such polemicists. However, even in these writings, there did appear some gradations of 'foreign-ness'. For instance, the situation of the Jews was somewhat special; even though Jewish immigration into Palestine had constituted a bone of contention in the late Ottoman period, the loss of Syria in 1917 made this a non-issue as far as the Republic of Turkey was concerned.

With no possible or actual territorial conflict involved in the Jewish case, Turkish nationalist authors generally are inclined to reserve most of their polemics for Greeks and Armenians. This development also is linked to the fiercely contentious Greek and Armenian national historiographies, which have no parallel among Jewish historians in Israel or elsewhere. Quite a few Greek and Armenian authors base their entire view of history on the notion that 'their' community in the course of its existence has been confronted with a 'national enemy'. This enemy is identified first with a 'Turkish' Ottoman Empire and later with its 'continuation', the Republic of Turkey. Greek

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135 As the work by Johann Strauss “Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on Some Local Greek Chronicles of the Tourkokratios” in The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography, (Edit) Fikret Adanır & Suraiya Faroqhi, Brill, 2002, shows, in the seventeenth century, this also applied to many provincial Greeks.

136 By the term millet we mean the officially recognized organizations of die different non-Muslim religious groups, which mediated the relations of their members with the Ottoman state. To what extent these organizations formed part of the 'classical' Ottoman state system, and to what extent they were a nineteenth-century innovation, still is a contentious matter among Ottomanists. For some pertinent studies see Bernard Lewis and Benjamin Braude eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, 2 vols. (New York, London, 1982).

In the present paper, we will use the term millet when dealing with the non-Muslim groups of the Ottoman period. The term 'minority' will be reserved for the republican years.

historians, for instance, often will depict the Ottoman history of this or that province of modern Greece as a constant retrogression of trade and crafts to 'primitive' levels. Therefore, the very few 'bright spots' in an otherwise bleak picture will be those activities which Greeks were able to establish or maintain without major involvement on the part of the Ottoman state. As examples, one might mention the maritime trade of eighteenth-century Hydra and Psara, or the relatively autonomous community organization set up especially on the Greek islands.

On a different level, the accusatory stance typical of these historiographies has impelled the Turkish side to devise a propagandistic counteroffensive. Thus in his recent book *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, Salahi Sonyel does not deal with Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians or Christian Arabs. Yet it is undeniable that all these groups, alone or, in the Arab case, together with their Muslim neighbors, at one time or another broke away from the Ottoman Empire. One might assume that Sonyel selected the Greeks and Armenians because they waged war against the Turkish nationalist forces in 1919-1923. Moreover, political rivalries and, due to the Cyprus conflict, even military confrontation occasionally occurred in the post-1923 period as well. Presumably Sonyel has included the Jews, normally of less importance in the context of Turkish nationalist polemics, because the post-World War II Arab-Israeli conflict had conferred a retrospective importance on the political aims of Ottoman Jewry.

**Defining the aims of our study**

To keep the present paper within manageable limits, I have selected only one case, namely the Greeks, from among the Ottoman millets, and republican minorities. Since the Greek minority, or *millet* as the case may be, typically is accorded more space than other non-Muslim ethnic and/or religious groups in Turkish historiography, this seems a rational choice. The following factors could account for the special attention Turkish authors pay to the Greeks: To begin with, in the Ottoman realm certain members of the Rum *millet* were permitted access to positions of power. Not only the official translators of the Sultan's council, the *tercümans* or dragomans, but also the *hospodars* of Wallachia and Moldavia occupied places in the state hierarchy which were not normally accessible to other non-Muslims. Secondly, apart from the Serbs, the Greeks were the first ethnic group to mutate into a nation and stage an uprising with the aim of setting up a sovereign state (1821). Although the revolt was defeated, the Greeks, with the help of European states, ultimately were able to secede from the Ottoman Empire. Turkish historians therefore have tended to regard the Greeks as responsible for starting the ethnic turmoil in the Balkans, which within less than a century resulted in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. As a third point, the Greek state formed in 1830 repeatedly extended its frontiers by waging war against the Ottoman Empire (1881, 1908, 1912-1913). In addition, there were numerous attacks.

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139 On this debate compare Eleni Gara, "In Search of Communities in Seventeenth-century Ottoman Sources: the Case of the Kara Ferye District", *Turcica* 30 (1998), 135-162.
141 Yet this explanation does not account for the fact that the Bulgarians are omitted from Sonyel's account. After all, Bulgarian activity in Macedonia, to say nothing of the early twentieth-century Balkan wars and the post-World War II mistreatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, combine to make for rather a conflictual history.
by irredentist bands on Ottoman territory which occurred frequently throughout the
nineteenth century, even in times of peace.\(^{142}\) In the perspective of Turkish scholars, 
these attacks appear as directed against 'Turkish lands', to cite a frequently used phrase. A fourth reason for viewing the Greeks with special, suspicious attention is
doubtless the memory of the bitter war years (1919-1923) which we already have
referred to. A fifth point is linked to the fact that Greece and Turkey even today have
not resolved their political differences, which include a dispute related to sovereign
rights in the Aegean shelf and, more acutely, the Cyprus affair. Last but not least, to
pass from the realm of events remembered to that of more explicit ideology, certain
Turkish scholars passionately negate the view, espoused with equal passion by Greek
national historiography, that the Greeks as the former inhabitants of much of Anatolia
constitute the autochthonous inhabitants of the region. For within the nationalist
paradigm, such 'anteriority' somehow conveys special 'rights'. All these considerations
have colored much of what is being written on Greeks and Greek history in the
Republic of Turkey.

The sources for my study consist of primary and secondary school textbooks, in
addition to historical accounts directed at the non-specialist reader which, for the sake
of brevity, sometimes will be referred to as 'popular' literature. Furthermore, I will
focus on academic works of history in which Greeks occur, often merely as one issue
among others. According to the styles of argument and writing which, in my
perspective, characterize these different publications, I have grouped them into four
categories, one of which has been further divided into three sub-categories. First there
are the textbooks written for the purpose of imparting an account of Ottoman and
Turkish history to schoolchildren. In recent years, various competing versions have
come into existence. Yet given the fact that these textbooks, mostly on history and
civics must be accepted by the Ministry of Education, I assume that they reflect the
official view of the government under which they were admitted for use in schools.\(^{143}\)
Secondly, there are books written for the general reader with little historical
background beyond what he/she may remember of his/her school textbooks, and
maybe from movies and comics dealing with more or less historical topics. As these
books are produced for sale, they reflect what their authors assume to be the
predilections of the 'ordinary' literate man/woman.

In the third category, I place those studies which I would view as reflecting a
'traditional' academic outlook. Given the very small number of Turkish academics
with a knowledge of Greek, the books in this category usually are written on the basis
of Turkish sources, with or without an interlacing of source texts in English and
French. According to the style of argument involved, I distinguish between three sub-
categories, which I call 'confrontationist', 'moderate' and 'liberal'. As we will see, these
categories, based on the style of debate, have very little connection to the place which
the relevant author may occupy in the political spectrum. Authors in the first sub-
category tend to not only emphasize the conflicts between 'Greeks' and 'Turks' to the
exclusion of anything else, they also will assume some kind of 'hereditary enmity' of
the type we have already encountered among Greek nationalist historians. As to the
'moderates', they also will side with the Ottoman or republican Turkish state through
thick and thin, but they normally have a broader worldview than their 'con-
frontationist' colleagues, and are less inclined to see the world in terms of 'black and

\(^{142}\) John S. Koliopoulos, Brigands with a Cause. Brigandage and Irredentism in Modem Greece, 1821-

\(^{143}\) For a list of the textbooks examined see Herkül Millas, "Türk ders kitaplarında 'Yunanlılar':
white'. Thus their arguments will normally be more finely crafted and less emotional. To an even greater extent this applies to the 'liberals', whose inclination to 'defend the state' is less marked as well and who in addition pay greater attention to historical change. Last but not least, there is a category which I have named 'critical'. Again these people may profoundly disagree among themselves on many questions of political import, but many of these historians and social scientists do share the assumption that nations are not eternal, that they have come into being, often in the fairly recent past, and that having emerged, presumably they also can disappear. Moreover, these people also will assume that encouraging hatreds of people of differing religions, nationalities or ethnicities is profoundly dangerous politically, for such feelings easily can be mobilized by would-be dictators, as the example of Nazi Germany, among others, has clearly demonstrated.\footnote{Ian Kershaw, \textit{The 'Hitler Myth': Image and Reality in the Third Reich} (Oxford, 1987), 229-40.}

'It for tat': refuting Greek claims in Turkish textbooks

In the Turkish context, the teaching of history recently has been subjected to a considerable amount of criticism. Thus Salih Özbaran, who practices history apart from reflecting on the methodology of teaching this discipline, has asked himself:

Is history a means of inciting to bitter rivalries, by foregrounding Reagan's wish that the XXI. century should be an American century, or, as Turkish nationalists rather would have it, the 'century of the Turks'? [Is history] a means of producing enemies where none existed before, of using the tensions inherent in racism and religious fanaticism in order to prepare for future wars?\footnote{Salih Özbaran, \textit{Tarih, tarihçi ve toplum} (İstanbul, 1996), 9.}

A critical view of the role of history teaching, of course, involves criticism of the existing textbooks. Or maybe it would be better to say that once the principle was accepted that more than one set of history textbooks might be available for school directors, teachers and possibly even parents to choose from, the criticism of history textbooks, which long had remained private, became part of public discussion. In another work, originally published as a separate essay, Özbaran pointed out the weaknesses of history teaching which ensured that children and young people, mildly speaking, generally disliked history classes.\footnote{Salih Özbaran, “Öğrenci Değerlendirilmesiyle tarih öğretimi,” in idem, \textit{Tarih ve öğretimi} (İstanbul, 1992), 205-20.} Two congresses totally dedicated to the teaching of history and the role of schoolbooks followed. In both instances, the proceedings were published soon after. In these two volumes, history teachers on the secondary level as well as academics expressed their frustration with the current teaching of history.\footnote{Salih Özbaran (ed.), \textit{Tarih öğretmeni ve ders kitapları}. Buca Sempozyumu 29 Eylül - 1 Ekim 1994 (İstanbul, 1995); Editor anonymous, \textit{Tarih eğitimi ve tarihte "Öteki" sorunu}. 2. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, 8-10 Haziran 1995, İstanbul (İstanbul, 1998).} In addition, the social scientist and regional planner İlhan Tekeli published an empirical study, in which the historical consciousness of European and Turkish students was investigated in a comparative perspective.\footnote{İlhan Tekeli, \textit{Tarih bilinci ve gençlik} (İstanbul, 1998).} At a congress dedicated to the image of 'the other' in Turkish school-books, and in a separate volume as well, the present author, moreover, has tackled the thorny question
of how the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey have fared in modern Turkish schoolbooks.\textsuperscript{149}

Among the criticisms directed at these textbooks, accusations of 'conservative nationalism' are quite widespread. Throughout, the textbook accounts given of Greeks and Greek affairs reflect the tense relations between Greece and Turkey. Often the claims concerning the Greeks which are made in Turkish schoolbooks seem to have been conceived as responses to the claims which originate, or are thought by the textbook authors to have originated, in Greek nationalist historiography. This implicit attempt at refutation is one possible reason why children or juveniles, normally unfamiliar with the preceding polemics, often find their textbooks quite simply difficult to believe. Thus as we have seen, there exist Greek claims to historical priority on Anatolian soil and therefore to a 'right' to these lands. In Turkish schoolbooks, this claim will be countered by a variety of argumentative devices. At least until 1993, many textbook authors still liked to state that all creators of the great civilizations of antiquity were of Turkish stock.\textsuperscript{150} Or the Achaeans, Dorians and Ionians were all subsumed under a single catchall phrase, namely the 'Ionians'. The latter, as the creators of the western Anatolian towns and pre-Socratic philosophy, were positively evaluated by Turkish textbook authors. But supposedly these people had nothing in common with the Greeks. As one primary school textbook put it:

the name 'Ionians' belonged to the grandfathers of the native people who lived for a long time on the western coast of Anatolia. This name had no connection whatsoever with the 'Greek' tribes.\textsuperscript{151}

Ignoring 'uncomfortable' periods also forms a common response; thus, for example, Turkish schoolbooks reserve at most a few sentences for the entire Byzantine period. Yet the latter lasted for almost a thousand years and at the time of its apogee, the Byzantine Empire controlled most of the territories forming the present-day Turkish Republic. Nor does the student receive much of an introduction to the major buildings of the Byzantine period, such as Aya Sofya, Aya Irini or the city walls of Istanbul, to say nothing of provincial structures such as the churches of St John in Selçuk or St Nicholas in Kale (Demre) near Finike.

When history textbooks 'reach' the nineteenth century, we witness a more obvious attempt to counter the claims of Greek national historiography. Here the Greek interpretation states that the uprising of 1821 and the events which followed it down to the foundation of an independent state in 1830 constituted an authentic revolution and a war of national liberation. In the Turkish schoolbooks I have analyzed, this subject is approached in an oblique fashion. As we have seen, the Greeks are passed over in silence throughout almost the entire account of Ottoman history, only

\textsuperscript{149} Herkül Millas, \textit{Yunan ulusu nun doğuşu} (Istanbul, 1994) and \textit{idem}, "Türk ders kitaplarında 'Yunanhlar'".

\textsuperscript{150} The new textbooks published after 1993 no longer contain many of the negative stereotypes previously attributed to the Greeks. On these improvements compare Millas, "Türk Ders Kitaplarında 'Yunanhlar'" and \textit{idem}, \textit{Türk-Yunan ilişkilerine bir önsöz} (Istanbul, 1995).

Since however there seems to be no silver lining without a cloud, these new textbooks all but exclude the ancient civilizations of Anatolia: Recep Yıldırım, "Tarih ders kitaplarında Anadolu uygurklıkları", in Özbaran ed., Tarih öğretimi ve ders kitapları, 161-66.

\textsuperscript{151} Ferruh Sanır, Tarık Asal, Niyazi Akşit, \textit{ İlkokul Sosyal Bilgiler -4}, p. 192 (İstanbul, 1986). For details see Millas, "Türk Ders Kitaplarında 'Yunanhlar'". Amusingly enough, from an etymological point of view the word 'Yunan', an ancient term which in modern Turkish denotes the Greek citizens of Greece, is actually derived from the term 'Ionian' (Ottoman subjects and citizens of the Republic of Turkey with a Greek ethnic affiliation are known as 'Rum').
surfacing in 1821, when they were in armed confrontation with the Ottoman government. However, there is no attempt to explain the conditions which had led up to the events of 1821. According to the textbook authors, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, a 'happy millet', had no reason whatsoever for discontent. Not only were the Ottoman authorities tolerant, permitting the Orthodox Christians freedom of religion, the latter even enjoyed a kind of self-government under the Istanbul Patriarchs. By contrast, the students learn nothing about the century-long conflicts in the eighteenth-century Peloponnese or the expansion of the Greek trading diaspora of that period, which in its wake brought about the prosperity of merchants and ship captains, as well as a broadening of political and intellectual horizons. As to the impact of the French Revolution, it is viewed in entirely negative terms, and the students are given no information at all about Romantic nationalism and its vogue in Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe.

As no internal reasons are acknowledged which explain the Greek revolt, the entire blame comes to rest upon the foreign powers and their Philhellenism. As a result of the latter movement, so the version relayed to Turkish students runs, foreigners encouraged the Ottoman 'Rum' to believe that they were descendents of the ancient Greeks.\textsuperscript{152} Thus it was the foreigners who originally conceived the idea of a Greek state. Admittedly such statements, while hyperbolic in form, do have some basis in the scholarly literature. Thus the account given of the Greek uprising and the subsequent war by the American historian Barbara Jelavich also stresses the role of the Great Powers of Europe, especially England, in securing statehood for Greece after the uprising itself had been put down by Muhammad Ali Pasha's troops.\textsuperscript{153} In the same context we must view the destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet at Navarino (1827) by a detachment of ships belonging to countries with whose government Sultan Mahmud II was not even at war.\textsuperscript{154} Thus in terms of historical accuracy, it is only fair to admit that Greece came into being in 1830 as a result of Great Power intervention. Yet neither from a scholarly nor from a pedagogical viewpoint does it make sense to leave the students with the impression that the Greeks of the Peloponnese and elsewhere had no grievances and did not fight for their statehood. Nor is it a good idea to leave the readers ignorant of the reasons which prompted many but by no means all Greeks to struggle for an independent state. The textbooks generally will limit themselves to the assertion that the Greeks attempted to reestablish the Byzantine Empire under the banner of an expansionist policy called the 'Megali Idea'.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} Here we can discern an echo of the claims of the German-language scholar Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer (1790-1861), author of a history of the 'empire' of Trapezunt. Fallmerayer, who had traveled extensively in the Ottoman lands, defended the thesis that Slav and later Albanian immigration virtually had swamped the Greek population of medieval Greece. It was therefore meaningless to claim that the Greeks of his own time were descended from the Greeks of antiquity.

Of course Fallmerayer's claims, whatever their historical accuracy, are important only if national or racial 'purity' are important considerations. This seems to apply to certain authors of Turkish textbooks, who, in a derogatory sense, call the Greeks 'half-cast' (\textit{melez}).


\textsuperscript{154} Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 226.

\textsuperscript{155} The 'Great Idea' as proclaimed by expansionist circles in the Greek state apparatus did in fact involve the conquest of an empire encompassing both the western and the eastern coastlands of the Aegean and of course Istanbul itself. For details see Michael Llewelyn Smith, \textit{Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor 1919—1922} (London, 2nd ed., 1998), 3-7.
The intellectual background of textbook writers: a few notes

One major avenue toward the refutation of the Greek claims, which occurs quite readily to the 'post-nationalist' political intellectual, remains closed to the authors of Turkish history textbooks. For regardless of the ethnicity of the Ionians, Dorians and Achaeans, and admitting without hesitation the long Byzantine implantation in much of Asia Minor, it is in no way necessary to assume that these facts de-legitimize the present-day Turkish position. After all, it is perfectly possible to view nations in the modern sense as emerging in a process which began in the late eighteenth century. It is likewise an obvious fact that, the 1921-1922 episode apart, the Greek nation state never controlled any part of Anatolia. But this argument is convincing only if we assume that most nations have had a short history, and that is exactly the opposite of what Turkish textbook authors claim for their own nation. When, however, a perennial Turkish nation is assumed, then it makes sense that its 'ungrateful' opponent, the Greek nation, also has had a long existence. When and how the latter came into being the Turkish textbooks do not tell us, they only insinuate that the origins of the Greeks were rather less than glorious.

This rather simplistic discourse has, however, fairly complicated antecedents. One is the 'official thesis' concerning Turkish history, which assumes a perennial Turkish nation, part of the 'white race', some of whose members migrated from Central Asia to Anatolia and later to the Balkans as well. Wherever they went, the Turks acted as bringers of civilization, and most of the peoples who founded the ancient civilizations of Anatolia were assumed to have been Turks. This thesis was soon abandoned in scholarly discourse, but traces survived in school textbooks down to 1993.

More long-lived was a second factor, which for the sake of convenience we may call 'Anatolianism'. One version stems from the novelist Kemal Tahir (1910-1973) who in 1967 published a novel named Devlet Ana. Its story is set in fourteenth-century Bithynia, at a time when the Ottomans had just formed a minor principality, and conveys the author's conviction that in the Ottoman state, justice and tolerance reigned. The Ottomans had no truck with the violence and injustice of European feudalism. To the contrary, their state and society formed a prime example of the Asiatic 'mode of production', where land was not private property, but lay in the hands of the state. While much less satisfying from a literary viewpoint than many of the author's other works, Devlet Ana highlights the integration (and ultimate Islamization) of a local Greek warrior into the emerging Ottoman state. This figure, perhaps loosely patterned on the semi-mythical ancestors of the Evrenos- or Mihalogullan, is depicted in a very positive light, and so are the early Ottomans. On the other hand, those considered 'outsiders' to Anatolia, Mongols and Crusaders alike, are cast as the villains of the story.

Widely read during the 1970s, Kemal Tahir is not, however, the inventor of 'Anatolianism'. This notion previously had been promoted by the novelist Cevat Şakir...

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156 For further details, see the article by Büşra Ersanlı “The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: a Theory of Fatal Decline” in The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography, (Edit) Fikret Adanır & Suraiya Faroqhi, Brill, 2002. For the racialist implications of this theory, compare Afet Inan, L'Anatolie, le pays de la 'race' turque (Geneva, 1941). Publication was sponsored by the Republic of Turkey.

157 For information on the writers and works mentioned in this section, compare Atilla Özkırmılı, Türk edebiyati ansiklopedisi (İstanbul, 1982). Herkül Millas, Türk romanı ve "Öleki"—Ulusal kimlikte Yunan imaji (İstanbul, 2000). On Azra Erhat, see also the relevant entry in the Büyük Larousse sözlük ve ansiklopedisi (İstanbul, 1986).

Kabaağaçlı (1886—1973), who from his exile in Bodrum, first imposed and later voluntary, wrote books which celebrate the beauties of the Aegean coast. Cevat Şakir gained literary fame under the pen name of Halikarnas Balıkçısı (the fisherman of Halikarnassos). Along with his younger associates the critic, essayist and one-time official Sabahettin Eyüboğlu (1908—1973) and the classical scholar Azra Erhat (1915—1982), Halikarnas Balıkçısı popularized the notion that the Turks were heirs to the peoples and civilizations which had nourished in Anatolia before the great migrations of the eleventh century and after. With their emphasis on the multi-cultural history of Anatolia, the members of this group for a long time were highly suspect in official circles, and both Eyüboğlu and Erhat lost their university and other official positions. Moreover, with their emphasis on the peaceful joys of exploring the beauties of landscape and experiencing the magic of extinct civilizations, these writers appealed to a left-wing, pacifist segment of the Turkish readership.

But even so, there were significant omissions. In her travel guide to southwestern Anatolia, for instance, Erhat gives prominence to the Greeks of the classical period, even acquainting the reader with Homeric verses in her own translation. Yet the Byzantine remains of the area are mentioned very briefly, if at all. It is worth noting that after the authors in question were safely dead, their views were appropriated by the Turkish prime minister and later president Turgut Özal, who in 1988 defended the 'European' character of Turkey because it had inherited the 'Ionian' civilization.  

Change-resistant textbooks

On a more mundane plane, however, the considerations of writers, historians and social scientists are only of very minor importance in determining the contents of textbooks. As is well known, the Turkish political scene is characterized by serious dissensions. The best known of these conflicts is the split between secularists and those who feel that a greater role should be given to organized Islam in public life. On the foreign policy level, we observe a serious division between those who think that Turkey should make great efforts to join the European Union, and those who assume that Turkey's 'natural' allies are to be found in other Islamic states. Lately, the majority of the Islamists is in favor of joining the European Union, because they believe they will be better protected within this community. The contenders in these two disputes do not necessarily coincide; thus among secularists, there exists a current of opinion whose adherents opt not for integration into Europe, but view themselves as representatives of an 'anti-imperialist' tradition. On the foreign policy level, these people would appear to favor strict neutrality. In addition, the Kurdish rebellions also have given rise to a split between those who opt for a 'political' settlement and those who rely mainly on military repression. To further complicate the situation, the recent elections have shown that a party of extreme rightist leanings has captured significant sections of the electorate. In consequence of these deep divisions, the political equilibrium is quite unstable, and anything increasing stability and consensus will be welcomed by the political class.

History textbooks provide just such a possibility. Of particular relevance to our study, the tendency to denigrate the Greeks, even if the most obvious instances now have been removed from the textbooks, will satisfy nationalists with a strong anti-

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159 In 1971 Eyüboğlu was imprisoned under the accusation of having formed a secret organization. The charges were finally dropped.
western slant. 'Anatolianism', on the other hand, will appeal to people whose sympathies are, to a degree, with Europe, and, in the present-day context, Kemalist intellectuals and left-wingers also will assent, albeit with qualifications. A strong anti-western stance, as we have seen, can make both nationalists with Islamicist leanings and militant secularists happy, and the same thing applies to the neglect of the Byzantines, who have found few defenders.

All these views compete and conflict within a tension-ridden search for national identity; every group will oppose all suggestions which it interprets as running counter to its own aims and ideologies. By objections and delaying tactics, [each group] tries to ensure the victory of its own ideas.161

'Popular' historiography

Given the rarity of scholarly works on Greece and the Greeks in Turkey, the public must gain information almost exclusively from books and articles of no particular academic standing. For such publications, we have decided to use the expression 'popular'. They strike the eye for their crude and sometimes even vulgar language, and at first glance, one is tempted to ignore these writings as unworthy of serious academic consideration. This, however, would be a mistake. Firstly, at some stage of their careers, some of these authors do gain academic positions. Moreover, quite a few intellectuals and public figures seem to gain their notions about Greece and the Greeks from literature of this type. And because the public is used to reading the epitheta 'ungrateful' or even 'our ex-slaves', some politicians will adopt them in their public speeches, especially at election time. The same thing applies to journalists, who, when in need of 'background information' in a hurry, also will turn to sources of this type.

As an example, let us take a brief look at an older work concerning Greco-Turkish relations.162 Here we find quite a florilegium of derogatory expressions to designate Greeks, which even includes 'plunderers and murderers'.163 Racially speaking, the modern Greeks are depicted as being of Slavic origin; as to the ancient Greeks, from Homer to Heraclitos, they are all supposed to be Turks.164 Unsurprisingly, the Greek millet has owed its survival to Turkish tolerance.165 Yet the most remarkable feature about this work is probably the fact that in 1967 it was recommended by the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Ministry of Defense as constituting a 'serious study'.166

Quite a few of the 'popular' writings have been produced by military and secret service personnel, both on active duty and retired. Thus, General Faruk Güventürk published a book on the political aims of the Greek government, insofar as they were directed against the state of Turkey.167 In a seminar on Greco-Turkish relations, whose proceedings later were published, many of the views characteristic of the 'popular'

161 Millas, "Türk ders kitaplarında 'Yunanlılar'", 261.
162 S. Salışık, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri tarihi ve Etniki Eterya (İstanbul, 1968).
163 Salışık, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, 11.
164 Salışık, Türk-Tunan ilişkileri, 300.
165 Ibid., 139.
166 Ibid., 7.
literature were voiced, even though academic participation was substantial. This volume has since become an important work of reference for students writing papers on Greco-Turkish relations.\textsuperscript{168}

To summarize, the statements found most often in the 'popular' literature, when combined, form a reasonably coherent account. Among the supposedly immutable characteristics of the Greek millet or minority, the following are given special prominence: the Rum milleti, that is, Ottoman subjects or republican Turkish citizens of Greek ethnicity, all form part of the 'Greek nation'. The tolerant Ottoman State had granted this millet all kinds of liberties. Thus the Greeks were able to practice their religion, build their own educational institutions, and enrich themselves through commerce.

In consequence, this millet has lived a richer and more agreeable life than the average member of the 'in-group', that is, the Muslim Turks. These advantages, however, have been gained by 'unfair' means, that is, the Greeks have joined the foreign powers in exploiting the Muslim Turks. While the attitude of the Ottoman government to its Greek subjects never wavered, the latter did change their earlier and presumably more loyal attitudes. At one point in time, they revolted and tried to appropriate lands which by right belonged to the Ottoman state, that is, the Muslim-Turkish 'in-group'. As 'the West' supported this policy, 'our' Ottoman Empire collapsed. Even today, the modern Greek nation continues the same irredentist policies against 'us', keeping alive the expansionist Megali Idea.

Given this scenario, there are certain permanent - and negative - characteristics which, according to the authors of 'popular' writings, may be attributed to the Greek nation. Throughout, these authors seem to take the following approach: the Greeks are ungrateful, traitors to and aggressors of the Ottoman Empire and, at least potentially, the Republic of Turkey as well. Moreover, they are slavish, having willingly played the role of puppets to the western powers. To put it in a nutshell, 'they' are on a lower moral level than 'us'.

\textbf{‘Confrontationists’, ‘moderates’ and ‘liberals’: ‘traditional’ academic views}

A systematic discussion of the views of Turkish academics concerning the Greek uprising of 1821 has been undertaken in a previous study.\textsuperscript{169} In the present paper, I hope to present rather broader, more encompassing observations in a much more succinct form. Unfortunately, the requirements of brevity frequently do not permit me to present the finer nuances and subtle differences of opinion which exist especially among those scholars who have worked extensively on topics related to Ottoman Greeks or the Greeks of independent Greece. All cases presented here are only intended as examples, and I do not claim to have identified the 'principal' representatives of any given trend.

As stated already in the introductory paragraphs of this paper, I have divided the 'traditional' historians into three sub-categories, namely the 'confrontationists', the 'moderates' and the 'liberals'. Of course these categories are in no way absolutes, but denote positions on a continuous spectrum of attitudes. Thus certain authors of a 'confrontationist' bent have a good deal in common with the 'popular' historiography, while the opinions of some of the authors classed here as 'liberal' shade off into the


\textsuperscript{169} Millas, \textit{Yunan ulusunun doğuşu}, 201—243.
'critical' section of our attitudinal spectrum. Between 'moderates' and 'liberals', there are also no hard and fast limits. Yet to a greater or lesser extent, 'confrontationists', 'moderates' and 'liberals' all aim at defending the Ottoman state and/or the Turkish Republic. However, it is noteworthy that the degree often differs according to the audience envisaged. When texts are published in Turkish, the apologetics are more obvious, while in many instances, they are considerably toned down when the author addresses an international audience.

This combination of scholarly and apologetic concerns is typical for nationalist historiography in general, and our observations with respect to the Turkish case thus form part of a much larger pattern. As we have already noted in the case of the textbooks, some of the apologetics in the scholarly realm should equally be regarded as 'reactive'. In European historiography, there exists a long tradition of denigrating the Ottoman Empire as an outmoded organization dominated by religion, as a land whose socio-political system impeded economic growth and political centralization. In a sense of course, the anti-Ottoman criticism of early republican intellectuals took up some of these motifs. But at the same time, Turkish republican authors viewed the Ottoman Empire's conquests and 'just' administration as a major source of legitimation of the Republic, or, as they often put it, 'the state' tout court. As a result, they were much inclined toward defending the Ottoman achievement against all comers, and for many of them, this meant a denigration of the non-Muslim millets.

Almost none of the historians under discussion here reads Greek; therefore they are able to study only that part of the Greek secondary literature which has been published in French or English. Moreover quite a few scholars limit themselves even further and use only Ottoman or Turkish primary sources. However, researchers such as Salahi Sonyel, Guni nihil Bozkurt and Ali Ilhan Bagis have worked extensively in the Public Record Office in London. This limitation in the use of sources makes it


171 As an example of this tendency one might mention an article by Omer Lutfi Barkan, which was published as the author's contribution to a Festschrift celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the Tanzimat. Here Barkan discusses the land law of 1858, which, under certain conditions, sanctioned private property in land. Barkan was profoundly skeptical of the commercial sector of the economy in general, which he tended to regard as a potential enemy of the peasant and, more importantly still, of 'the state'. Barkan thus viewed the right to purchase land, which the 1858 law granted to anybody with the requisite means, "Greek and Armenian money changers" included, as "one of our unpardonable errors of neglect and one of the sad necessities to which we have bowed": Omer Lutfi Barkan, "Türk toprak hukuku tarihinde Tanzimat ve 1274 (1858) tarihli Arazi Kanunnamesi", reprinted in Türkiyede toprak meselesi, Istanbul, 1980, 349. For a criticism of Barkan's 'statism' see Halil Berktay, "Der Aufstieg und die gegenwartige Krise der nationalistischen Geschichtsschreibung in der Türkei", Periplus, 1 (1991), 102—125.

172 Moreover Barkan was not unique. Thus for example the influential nationalist historian and publicist Yusuf Akcura, and also the historian Ismail Hakki Uzunarsli, blamed the oppressive and dishonest Ottoman-Phanariot rule in Wallachia and Moldavia solely on the Phanariots, and not at all on the Ottoman administration which had appointed these governors. Compare Yusuf Akcura, Osmanlı DEVLETİNİN dáGMa devisi (reprint of 1940 ed., Ankara, 1988), p. 13 and Ismail Hakki Uzunarsli, Osmanlı tarih (reprint Ankara, 1988), vol. IV, 2, p. 108.

173 Among the rare Turkish historians reading modern Greek, the Byzantinist Melek Delibaşi is a pioneer. Modern Greek was first taught at a Turkish university in 1990, when a program in Modern Greek language and literature was instituted at Ankara University's Faculty of Languages, History and Geography. Among the younger generation knowledge of Modern Greek is becoming more frequent; in this context one might mention Nevra Necipoglu, Engin Berber, Levent Kayapinar, Melek Firat, Sukru Illicak and Elcin Macar.
difficult to enter into a dialogue with scholars working outside of Turkey, in Greece or elsewhere.

The 'confrontationists'

Many of the 'confrontationist' authors will adopt an extremely emotional tone when discussing the 'Greek issue'. A good example is a work by Niyazi Berkes, a distinguished historian and social scientist, who for a long time, taught at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. Among the myths Berkes propagated, in a book first published in the year of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, we find the claim that the patriarchate in Istanbul had fomented the Greek rebellion. Amusingly enough, Berkes shares this error with some of the most conservative Greek historians. In fact, as can be seen from Barbara Jelavich's account, certain high church dignitaries did join the uprising in Moldavia and Wallachia, as did some of their colleagues officiating in the Peloponnese. Yet the Patriarch and his entourage are conspicuous by their absence from all preparations for the uprising. Only when military action just was about to begin did the head of the Orthodox Church intervene, declaring that all rebels were to be anathema.

But Berkes obviously did not much trouble himself with the already quite substantial secondary literature available at the time of writing. For Berkes it is the Orthodox Church which constitutes the source of all evil by introducing bribery into the Ottoman state. However, in this endeavor the church was not without competition: in the second half of the sixteenth century, this dubious distinction already had been attributed to Şemsi Pasha, who supposedly wanted to avenge the fall of the İşfendiyar-oğlu dynasty, from which he himself had issued.175 Be that as it may, ecclesiastical bribery resulted in an ungovernable Ottoman Empire, and throughout, the Orthodox Church proved its visceral ingratitude: For all these misdeeds were perpetrated even though "the Church was saved from the danger of Catholicism because of Turkish power".176 In addition, both the Greeks and the Orthodox Church are described as 'megalomaniacs', and in the Greek context, politics is supposed to mean "robbery, political murder or conspiracy".177

In The Development of Secularism in Turkey, destined for an international audience, Berkes uses a more restrained language. Even so, he claims that throughout

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173 Along with his colleagues the sociologist Behice Boran and the folklorist Pertev Naili Boratav, Berkes had lost his teaching position at Ankara University in 1948 due to conservative opposition to his views. See Mete Çelik ed., Üniversitede cadi kazanı, 1948 DTCF tasfiyesi ve Pertev Naili Boratav'in müdafası (Istanbul, 1998).

174 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 204-17. In a frequently used French work of reference (Georges Castellan, Histoire des Balkans, XIV-XIX siècle, Paris, 1991, 260-70), the bishop Germanos of Patras is given a prominent role, but once again the Patriarch himself appears only at the moment of his execution. For a Turkish translation of the 'Paternal Admonition' issued by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Anthimos in 1798, according to which those who 'dreamt of liberty' had been seduced by the Devil, see Millas, Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu, 133-134. According to Castellan (p. 261) this text had been issued by Patriarch Gregorios himself.


176 Berkes, Teokrasi ve laiklik, 119.

177 For a lengthy selection of Berkes' phraseology, see my Yunan ulusunun doğuşu, 213.
Ottoman history, the Greek millet was antagonistic to the 'Turkish' side, both economically and politically. As the main reason for Turkish nationalism, Berkes views the Megali Idea and its avowed intention of resuscitating the Byzantine Empire. It seems that Berkes was mainly concerned by the fact that the Greek presence in the Ottoman Empire impeded the emergence of a Turkish bourgeoisie; this worry probably was what caused him to quote at length a comment by the nationalist writer Yusuf Akçura from 1914:

... it was the native Jews, Greeks and Armenians who were the agents and middlemen of European capitalism ... If the Turks fail to produce among themselves a bourgeois class ... the chances of survival of a Turkish society composed only of peasants and officials will be very slim.

Berkes' tendency to equate the Ottomans and the Turks also can be found in Salahi Sonyel's book *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, which we already have encountered in a different context. According to the author, the very existence of the non-Muslim minorities accounts to a large extent for the 'destruction' of the Ottoman state. By contrast, the Ottoman government's attitude with respect to the non-Muslim population was "socially egalitarian" and the sultan aimed at an "impartial dispensation of law between Muslims and non-Muslims". The Greeks had no reason for complaint against the Ottoman administration, as the freedom of the Christians was secured. In fact, the minorities benefited enormously from the Ottoman leniency, magnanimity and tolerance, and from all the other benefits provided by a strong, just and benevolent Muslim state.

In actuality, Sonyel finds that the non-Muslims lived better than the Muslims, and even at the expense of the latter. For the power of the European states, and sometimes also the Greeks' trading partners from among the western merchants, protected non-Muslim Ottoman subjects from the tax demands of the Ottoman state. Yet the members of Greek families who in the eighteenth century were sent to govern Moldavia and Wallachia, the so-called Phanariots, fomented Greek nationalism, in close conjunction with the Orthodox Church. Once again, 'ingratitude' appears as the archetypical sin of 'the Greeks'.

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180 This work was published, in English, by the Turkish Historical Society, known for its close relations to the Turkish government. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that throughout the nineteenth century and even earlier, the confusion between 'Ottomans' and 'Turks' was very common in the secondary literature written by Europeans.
181 Sonyel, *Minorities*, 7 and 17.
The 'moderates'

If Berkes and Sonyel thus employ a terminology closely akin to that of the 'popular' literature, there are other studies in which the apologetic intention coexists with a will to produce a fair and realistic work. In this 'moderate' category I would place three studies, which have been authored by Gülnihal Bozkurt, Bilal Eryılmaz and Ali İlşan Bağış. Gülnihal Bozkurt's work constitutes a study in legal history, encompassing the period from the promulgation of the Tanzimat rescript in 1839 to World War I. Although in principle the study ends in 1914, the closing chapter does touch upon the Ottoman family law, which was only promulgated during World War I. The author has consulted German and British diplomatic correspondence of the period; as to French source materials, she has studied selected materials in translation.

At the beginning of her study, which has resulted from post-doctoral work in (West) Germany and Great Britain, the author explains that in the last decades of its existence, the Ottoman government legislated on all problems related to its non-Muslim subjects with a constant attention to the international implications. Bozkurt's work therefore contains a detailed discussion of the political contexts in which individual laws were decided upon, and herein lies the value of her work. On the basis largely of consular reports, she attempts a close analysis of the reasons which caused Ottoman non-Muslims to be dissatisfied with the reform edicts of the Tanzimat. She thus concludes that given non-Muslim nationalism and Great Power pressures, the Ottoman government's attempts to gain the hearts and minds of its non-Muslim subjects by the Tanzimat and reform edicts of 1839 and 1856 resulted only in a fatal weakening of state structures.

While Bozkurt has done, a considerable amount of work in the archives, the study of Bilal Eryılmaz, which covers more or less the same topics, is based on published sources, such as the writings of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha and Abdurrahman Şeref. Similarly to Bozkurt, Eryılmaz opens his study with a chapter on the regulations concerning non-Muslims decreed at the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, which in their basic features constituted the legal framework for the status of non-Muslims down to the Tanzimat. Here Eryılmaz quite realistically recognizes that the political organization of the Ottoman Empire was based on a differentiation according to religious criteria, and that the Muslims held the dominant positions. Non-Muslims were supposed to 'avoid getting involved in politics', but were also subject to various disabilities in social life. These included not only the prohibition to ride horses (according to the author, horseback riding was a privilege which, at least in Istanbul, was not extended to many Muslims either), but also the obligation to wear special clothes, avoid walking on the sidewalks or use the public baths without protecting the feet by wooden pattens. Moreover, Christians were not allowed to build new churches. Eryılmaz readily admits that some of these discriminatory measures, such as the prohibition to ride horses or use the sidewalks, were "wrong and unnecessary", their chief disadvantage being that they alienated the non-Muslims both from the state and their Muslim neighbors. In Eryılmaz's perspective, nationalist movements thus can partly be explained on the background of such disabilities. Yet at the same time, Eryılmaz places a high degree of confidence in the ability of wronged non-Muslims to obtain justice through the intervention of the sultans. Even so, he himself admits that "financial corruption, confiscations and favoritism" played a role in augmenting the

186 Eryılmaz, Gayrimüslimler, 48-49.
difficulties of the state and also of its subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim.\(^{187}\)

Whether under these circumstances, the author's confidence in sultanic intervention is justified remains another matter entirely.

Ali İhsan Bağış's short book on the capitulations and their effects upon the status of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century non-Muslim Ottomans is based on his London dissertation for which he has consulted documents both in the Public Record Office and the Prime Minister's archives in Istanbul.\(^{188}\) While today a number of studies exist concerning the problems of non-Muslim Ottomans and their links to the foreign communities resident in the Empire, this was much less true at the time of writing, and thus Bağış genuinely broke some new ground.\(^{189}\) It is probably fair to say that the author views the behavior of non-Muslims seeking the protection of foreign embassies exclusively from the viewpoint of the Ottoman state administration; and from that perspective, obtaining spurious appointments as 'translators' and other consular employees doubtless constituted a major abuse. But on the other hand, Bağış, himself admits that the non-Muslims who sought foreign protection did this in order to shield themselves from "confiscation, which was much feared by the [non-Muslim] Ottoman subjects" (and, although this is outside of Bağış's topic, by the Muslims as well).\(^{190}\) Moreover, Mahmud II's attempt to create two special categories of privileged traders (Avrupa tüccarları for the non-Muslims, Hayriye tüccarları for the Muslims) in itself implies the admission that to compete successfully with European merchants, Ottoman subjects needed special protection from the state. In the light of all this, it does not seem quite fair to place the major onus of responsibility for eighteenth-century abuses on the shoulders of the non-Muslims alone.\(^{191}\)

The 'liberals'

In this group I would place some of the most distinguished figures in present-day Ottoman studies. Among these scholars, the tendency to defend the Ottoman Empire against all possible criticism is much less obvious than among the 'moderates', to say nothing of the 'confrontationists'. Praise for Ottoman statesmanship, as evidenced by the treatment of the Empire's Greek subjects, only is expressed in a muted fashion, often by pointing out the real advantages which the Greek Orthodox might expect from the Ottoman state. By contrast, the difficulties with which non-Muslims had to contend are rarely discussed.

Thus when analyzing the resettlement of Istanbul after the Ottoman conquest, Halil İnalcık dwells on the 'equality' granted to Christian subjects of the Empire after they

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\(^{187}\) Eryılmaz, Gayrimüslimler, 216-18.

\(^{188}\) Ali İhsan Bağış, Osmanlı ticaretinde gayri müslimler (Ankara, 1983).


\(^{190}\) Bağış, Gayri müslimler, 103.

\(^{191}\) Thus the legal historian Ahmet Mumcu in Tarih içindeki gelişimyle birlikte Osmanlı devletinde rüşvet (Istanbul, reprint 1985), p. 108, holds the "ambitious and money-loving" character of the Greeks responsible for the spread of bribery in the Ottoman Empire.
had paid the special capitation tax, to which Muslims were not liable.\textsuperscript{192} This author stresses that after the conquest of the Byzantine capital, Mehmed II went out of his way to mitigate the consequences which, according to Islamic religious law, should have befallen the inhabitants of the conquered city. The slaves who had fallen to the Sultan as his one-fifth share of the war booty gained in Constantinople, were not sent off to distant provinces, but settled in the city proper. Moreover, many of the former Byzantine churches were, at least for the time being, left to the Orthodox.\textsuperscript{193} In another work İnalcık points to the tax exemptions which readily were accorded to Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire who did service in the sultans’ armies, stressing that in the fifteenth century it was possible to enter the Ottoman military class without previously having accepted Islam.\textsuperscript{194} Likewise, scions of certain great Byzantine families in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were successful as Ottoman tax farmers on a grand scale: \textsuperscript{195} “For the interests of their empire the Ottomans applied the Islamic prescriptions in a particularly liberal way in favor of their dhimmi subjects”.\textsuperscript{196}

In İnalcık’s perspective, what counts is the raison d’etat of the Ottoman state, whose policy, differently from the way in which Barkan usually perceived it, included a full-scale involvement in international trade and the money economy. In an Ottoman state for which control of trade routes constituted a major issue, Muslims and in a less prominent role, the Greek Orthodox subjects of the Empire found their respective places. What the latter may have thought of their station in life is of much less import. While İnalcık has authored a major and extremely influential article on the 'capitulations' granted to the subjects of foreign rulers residing on Ottoman territory, he has been less interested in the internal organization of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, the so-called millet system.\textsuperscript{197} Nor has he been greatly concerned by the role which these organizations played in the perpetuation of the Ottoman state. On this matter, however, we possess an important study by Kemal Karpat.\textsuperscript{198} The author attempts to construct a model of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century changes in the Ottoman millet system, which is intended to explain why in the former Ottoman lands, national identity did not become divorced from religion as was the case in western Europe. It is Karpat's thesis that

\textbf{nation... formation was conditioned to an important extent by the socio-ethnic structure and the religious identity engendered by the millet system.}\textsuperscript{199}

In Karpat's perspective, Ottoman non-Muslims divided their loyalties, of course under the Sultan who alone could command undivided allegiance. One claimant to non-Muslim loyalty was their millet, mat is the officially recognized

\begin{itemize}
  \item İnalcık, "The Policy", 235.
  \item Halil İnalcık, \textit{The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age 1300—1600} (reprint London, 1994), 114.
  \item Halil İnalcık, 'Greeks in Ottoman Economy and Finances, 1453-1500', reprinted in \textit{idem, Essays in Ottoman History} (Istanbul, 1998), 379-89. For more recent work on these ex-Byzantine businessmen, compare the study by Klaus-Peter Matschke “Research Problems concerning the Transition to Tourkokratia: the Byzantinist Standpoint” in \textit{The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography}, (Edit) Fikret Adanur & Suraıya Faroqi, Brill, 2002.
  \item İnalcık, "Greeks", 380.
  \item Compare the article “İntiyazat” in \textit{The Encyclopedia of Islam}, 2nd edition.
  \item Karpat, "Millets", 141.
\end{itemize}
religion/denomination, to which the person in question happened to belong. Another such focus of loyalty was the ethnic and cultural group of which every Ottoman subject constituted a member—there might be many such communities within one and the same millet. Finally, not the least among the claimants to the loyalty of any Ottoman subject was his family, the setting where religious and cultural values were inculcated in each new generation. Linguistic differences were of limited political significance until the eighteenth century, when the leaders of the Greek Orthodox church attempted to 'byzantinize' and thereby 'grecize' the multi-cultural organization under their control.

In the nineteenth century, non-Muslim nationalisms were strongly colored by the experience of religious community which Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians or Armenians had gone through within their respective millets. On the one hand, the millets lost much of their previous importance, as the central state of the Tanzimat now claimed to be the fountainhead of people's civic rights. On the other hand, the 'small groups' which had existed within the millets, with predominantly familial and parochial values, now 'de-universalized' religion. In the form of a particular denomination, 'parochialized' religion came to be seen as the apanage of one or the other ethnic group. In Karpat's view, the Ottoman elite committed a serious policy error when, instead of legitimizing the mosaic of different religious and cultural entities which had emerged after the decline of the millets, it attempted to impose a unitary Ottoman nationhood, of the kind which at the time had become popular in western Europe. According to Karpat's model, Ottoman millets were transformed during the eighteenth century, not only because of the policies of the Greek Orthodox hierarchy, but also due to the rise of local notables, both Muslim and Christian. The conflicts between these latter two competing elites encouraged disaffection among the non-Muslims, who, on the whole, could count on less support from the central state. Economic factors, such as the enrichment of many Balkan merchants, also had a role to play, as wealthy traders reacted against an underdeveloped school system shaped by clerical priorities and demanded a say in the business of the millet. And last but not least, it was the centralizing Tanzimat bureaucracy which, by its attempts to direct and control, succeeded in transforming and, in the end, fatally weakening the millet as an institution.

All this explains only the genesis of nationalism in a non-Muslim context, for instance the Serbian, Greek, or Bulgarian cases. In Karpat's view, Muslim nationalisms were, at least to a great extent, mere responses to developments within the non-Muslim millets. Muslims reacted to the loss of religiously motivated privilege which had been theirs during the Ottoman heyday and to the foreign protection upon which so many non-Muslims now could rely. Thus, as in a game of dominoes, changes in one section of the gameboard ultimately led to changes in the total configuration. However, this model does not help us to account for the fact that the Muslims also adopted a division into different nations according to linguistic allegiance. Within the framework of Karpat's model, asserting a unified Muslim identity probably would have made more sense.

Karpat makes another important point when he states that the position of a given person vis-à-vis the Ottoman state was more important in determining his tax status than even his religious affiliation. He thus demonstrates that the millets were part of

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200 In a recently published work: Christianity under Islam in Jerusalem (Leiden, 2001), Oded Peri has shown that this process actually began in the seventeenth century.
an interlocking political system, and not an absolute and isolated 'given'. In the picture
drawn by this author, the internal balance within a millet might be disturbed if

the representatives of a millet attempted to tailor religion according to the political
aspirations of an ethnic group.

In such cases, certain members of a millet might sever their ties to the organization to
which they had originally belonged. However, given Ottoman political
organization, for the individual person who did not leave the sultan's domains
abandoning one such group always meant that he or she came to join another.

The 'critical' historians

These ideas have been carried further by a number of historians, sociologists and
political scientists who, from the 1960s onward, have begun to pioneer a different
understanding of both the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects. These
academics constitute a minority within the Turkish intellectual community, but their
professional standing is often high. For the scholars sharing this outlook, the practices
and policies of the Ottoman Empire have lost much of their relevance for the present.
Often they see themselves as part of an international community of scholars, which
makes them less inclined to defend the Ottoman elite as their own 'ancestry'. As will
have become clear in the course of this chapter, these are the people who view nations
as comparatively recent creations, so that the history of the present is not too closely
connected to what happened in the fifteenth or even the nineteenth century.
Unfortunately however, none of these 'critical' scholars has written a major study of
the Greek Orthodox or any other millet. Therefore, their critical comments mostly are
made 'in passing' and very few of them have actually tackled the complex of
'traditional' attitudes which have been discussed in the present study.

However, in spite of these limitations, the critical stance adopted is worth noting.
Thus for example, the highly respected archeologist Ekrem Akurgal, who has taught
an entire generation of Turkish archeologists and ancient historians, at the very
General Staff conference already referred to, warned against naive and chauvinistic
attitudes toward the Greeks. As Akurgal put it, Greeks had intermingled considerably
with Turks, even if this fact did not please many of his compatriots.203

The economic historians Zafer Toprak and Çağlar Keyder, who focus on Turkish-
republican history while taking late Ottoman developments into account, both have
pointed the way to a more balanced evaluation of the Greek role. The same can be

201 Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", 148-49.
202 Critics of the apologetic stance of Turkish historians dealing with Greek affairs can look back upon
a distinguished 'ancestor' in the person of Osman Nuri Ergin (1883-1961), whose knowledge of
Istanbul's urban administration remains unrivalled even today. In his Tüirkiye Maarif Tarihi (repr.
Istanbul, 1977, 740) the author draws a realistic picture of the "educational system of the minorities".
He also criticizes implicitly various state policies with respect to the millets, and explicitly the
execution of many official translators, who in the eighteenth century, were usually Greeks.

Another critical voice comes from the analysts of Turkish schoolbooks, whom we already have
encountered in a different context. Apart from the previously cited works by Salih Özbaran, see Mete
Alkan, The Political Integration of Europe (Ankara, 1982), 68—69, also contains some pertinent
remarks.
203 Ekrem Akurgal, "Eski Anadolu'da Yunanlar", in Tarih boyunca Türk-Yunan ilişkileri, III. Askeri
said of the economic and monetary historian Şevket Pamuk, whose publications span the entire Ottoman period; and the political scientist Taner Timur forcefully has expressed his impatience with the 'apologetic' historiography which has occupied us here.

As we have seen, most Turkish historians view Turkish nationalism during the late Ottoman period as a reaction against minority nationalisms. While this is certainly justified, there is another side to the coin: Zafer Toprak points out that during the last years of the Empire, and especially during the war years, eliminating the non-Muslims from economic life became an avowed government policy. By implication, this cannot have had a favorable impact on the loyalty of non-Muslim businessmen still active in the Empire, of which, at least in principle, they were considered subjects.

In his influential introduction to Ottoman economic history, Şevket Pamuk is critical of eighteenth and nineteenth-century official policies, which did not aim at protecting local merchants and producers against competition on the part of European traders. Here the effects were felt by Muslims and non-Muslims alike; and Pamuk strongly qualifies the 'traditional' notion of non-Muslim merchants as the 'collaborationist' associates of European traders. The author points out that from the eighteenth century onwards, non-Muslim merchants played an important role also as the associates of the Ottoman administration, whose activities they helped to finance. As to the relations of non-Muslim merchants with their European counterparts, they were based on competition, particularly in regional trade, more than on subservient association. By this differentiated explanation, Pamuk has thus proposed a rational analysis of the role of Ottoman non-Muslims, instead of the emotional moralism so frequent in 'traditional' historiography.

Çağlar Keyder first made a name for himself by 'situating' Ottoman and Turkish history within the 'world systems' framework of Immanuel Wallerstein. In 1987 he brought out a synthetic work on this topic, which focused on the relationship between 'the state' and 'social class(es)', a problematique very much favored by historians of a Marxian background.

In Keyder's perspective, 'incorporation' of the Ottoman territories into the European world economy permitted the emergence of a bourgeoisie, which in Keyder's perspective had been absent from the Ottoman Empire during its 'classical' period. However, this bourgeoisie was mainly non-Muslim; it was unable to secure state support, and subsequently was eliminated during the upheavals of World War I and its aftermath. This disappearance of the bourgeoisie allowed the state bureaucracy, which had been the dominant class during earlier centuries, to gain a new lease on life. Only after World War II had 'bourgeoisie formation with state aid', whose beginnings Toprak had noted for the late Ottoman Empire, proceeded far enough that the bureaucracy was obliged to renounce its exclusive control of the state. In this context, it is worth noting that Keyder views the Greek, Armenian and Jewish merchants, compradors though they may have been, as an integral part of a 'peripheralized' Ottoman society, and not as some 'foreign' element which ultimately 'had to' be excluded.

When merchants and manufacturers, in their overwhelming majority Greeks and Armenians, became politically committed, the inter-state system had already condemned the Empire to dissolution. Under different conditions, with higher odds in

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204 Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de "Milli İktisat" (1908-1918) (Ankara, 1982), 19.
205 Şevket Pamuk, Osmanlı-Türkiye iktisadi tarihi 1500-1914 (İstanbul, 1988), 179-81.
favour of the survival of the Empire, they might have taken a different tack. As it was, their politics gambled on the breakup of the Ottoman realm.\textsuperscript{207}

The political scientist Taner Timur has analyzed Ottoman history as a process leading from 'primitive' (or 'early') feudalism to a 'semi-colonial economy'. In this context he emphasizes that down to the middle of the nineteenth century, and in some instances even beyond, the Ottoman state structure involved a 'caste-like' separation between rulers and ruled. Moreover, the ruled themselves were further divided into the Muslim 'first class' subjects, and the 'second-class' non-Muslims. Even after all subjects had been rendered legally equal by the Tanzimat and reform rescripts of 1839 and 1856, the integration of the non-Muslim subjects was a problematic process. Timur also stresses that Ottoman liberals evinced scant sympathies for the non-Muslims. Even the oppositionist poet Namık Kemal (1840-1888) did not demand a political order in which Muslims and non-Muslims would be legal equals; if anything, he criticized the Tanzimat bureaucracy because the latter did not take Islamic religious law seriously enough. Timur concludes that

A [political] movement occurring a hundred years after the French Revolution and not aiming at the removal of legal privileges cannot be regarded as a 'struggle for freedom', and [this deficiency] cannot be excused by the 'conditions of the times'.\textsuperscript{208}

Presumably a notable improvement of the quality of historical studies, at least at the elite universities, constitutes a major precondition for the emergence of the 'critical' historiography. Toprak, Pamuk, Keyder and Timur all work at such elite universities, or, as in Keyder's case, principally abroad. Their discourse thus is directed at 'educated readers' familiar with the major debates going on in the social sciences on an international level. Among these readers, students and fellow professionals probably make up a fairly high percentage. But given the number of university students and graduates, this is already a reading public of appreciable size. At the Foundation for Turkish Social and Economic History, with its headquarters in Istanbul and branches in Ankara and the major provincial cities, the 'critical' scholars have found a forum where their ideas can be discussed.

In addition, one should not underestimate the importance of the fact that the Republic of Turkey is now over seventy-five years old, and the tense period of nation formation is largely over. With telecommunications widespread and relatively cheap and access to the internet increasing, certain sections of the academic milieu and big city readership in general are also more attuned to intellectual trends outside of Turkey. In the long run, some of the young people who have attended school abroad as the children of Turkish workers and who now have entered into the Istanbul or Ankara milieu presumably also will also increase the readership of the 'critical' historians.

\textsuperscript{207} Keyder, \textit{State and Class}, 47.

\textsuperscript{208} Taner Timur, \textit{Osmanh Çalışmaları. İlkel feodalizmden yarı sömürge ekonomisine} (Ankara, 1989), 299.

An even sharper formulation of similar views is found in Taner Akçam, \textit{Türk ulusal kimliği ve Ermeni sorunu} (Istanbul, 1993), 66. Akçam's criticism apparently is directed at the Turkish political left, namely when he remarks that the non-Muslims have been equated with the capitalist class, "nourished by the capitulations". In the struggle against this class, every means seems to become legitimate, and even "the principle of general equality becomes suspect as if it were an imperialist trick".
Some indications of this trend well may be visible even today. In a few cases, the views of the 'critical' academics have been taken up by authors whose style is more journalistic; it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue.209 Books on the cosmopolitan culture of the nineteenth-century Ottoman capital, as well as photographs which allow us to visualize the same milieu, enjoy a fairly wide appeal in present-day Istanbul. Beyoğlu, the former Pera, where many Greeks used to live, has become a major focus of the 'nostalgia culture' of the last twenty years or so. It also is notable that many Istanbul cultural institutions currently are establishing themselves in this same area. A cynic might add that the absence of real-life non-Muslims probably has added to the appeal of this old town quarter and its 'intercultural' history.210 Whatever the causes, a new interest in 'minority culture' is perceivable.

A provisional conclusion

Intersecting with scholarly concerns, the desire to 'defend' the Ottoman Empire thus plays a significant role in all writings concerning Ottoman non-Muslim millets and Turkish-republican minorities, at least if we disregard the small number of scholars belonging to the 'critical' group. This apologetic tendency, by the way, is by no means limited to Turkish scholars. To many American, Dutch, French or German Ottomanists, refuting various and sundry accusations directed against the Empire also constitutes a significant reason for their scholarly endeavors. This 'slant' goes far to explain certain lacunae in Turkish Ottomanist historiography. To begin with, the early Ottoman period until 1453 receives very little scholarly attention as far as the Greek subjects of the Empire and their Byzantine opponents are concerned.211 Such a neglect doubtless is due in part to the lack of sources. But more must be involved; for in the 'transition studies' which deal with the end of Byzantine and 'Latin' ascendancy in the Mediterranean and the concomitant rise of the Ottomans, the participation of Turkish Ottomanist historians is limited indeed.212 Barring oversight, only İnalçık, Necipoğlu, Delilbaşi and Kafadar have made major contributions to this noteworthy sub-field of late medieval studies. Linguistic problems apart, presumably the fact that the early Ottomans were imbricated to such a degree with their non-Muslim neighbors has contributed toward making this field less than attractive to historians of lingering nationalist inclinations.

As a second 'gap' in Turkish Ottomanist studies relevant to Greeks, one might point to the extreme rarity with which documents emanating from Ottoman Greeks themselves are taken into account. Again, there is a trivial reason, namely, that so few historians active in Turkey know modern Greek. But beyond this simple fact, one could point to more profound motives. Identifying the 'voices', that is, the self-

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210 In this context, it is worth noting that a few Greeks resident in Istanbul, or formerly resident in this city, also have become interested in the affairs of the Rum milleti. The present author apart, one might point to Y. Benlisoy and É. Macar, Fener Patrikhanesi (Ankara, 1996) and Stephane Yerasimos, Azgelişmişlik sürecinde Türkiye. Bizans'tan 1971'e, 3 vols, in one (Istanbul, 3rd printing 1980).
211 As a major exception, however, there is Cemal Kafadar's sophisticated book Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1995).
212 For the new directions taken 'in transition studies', compare the article by Klaus Peter Matschke “Research Problems concerning the Transition toTourkokratia: the Byzantinist Standpoint” in The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography, (Edit) Fikret Adanır & Suraiya Faroqhi, Brill, 2002.
interpretation of Ottoman subjects, of the non-members of the ruling elite, is still very much a minor concern among Turkish historians. And when attempts of this kind are undertaken, they are usually limited to the early twentieth, or at most, the late nineteenth century. It is to be hoped that recent efforts, still rather isolated, to 'place' the non-Muslims of the late Ottoman period in their Istanbul context will inspire the specialists on earlier periods as well.

As a third 'blank spot' in the history of Ottoman Greeks, and of non-Muslims in general, the slave status of many members of this group rarely is taken into consideration. Yet this situation also is beginning to change. In a recent book, Hakan Erdem has developed the hypothesis that at least during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, most Ottoman zimmis were not 'really' zimmis at all, but, at least in principle, slaves of the state by law of conquest. Their original status was, so to say, reactivated when their sons were recruited into the levy of boys (devşirme) - by this hypothesis, Erdem resolves the contradiction that cizye-paying subjects legally could not be enslaved, while devşirme recruits definitely bore certain marks of slavery. It is still too early to say whether this hypothesis will gain general acceptance, but it does have the merit of highlighting the significance of slavery for many Ottoman non-Muslims in the early centuries of the Empire. On a more empirical level, the existence of agricultural slaves in the vicinity of fifteenth-century Istanbul, some of whom tried to pass themselves off as free non-Muslim subjects, recently has been emphasized by the historian Stephane Yerasimos. But these few swallows do not necessarily make a summer.

Another problem, the fourth, is linked to what might be called a tendency toward excessive simplification, which means that regional and local specificities are lost from view. Thus we may note the absence from the Turkish historiography on Ottoman Greeks of those people who were not under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox patriarch. Albeit grecophone, these men and women were Roman Catholics. Yet particularly on the Mediterranean islands, Greek-speaking Catholics formed a small but by no means insignificant group. Presumably a simplistic understanding of late medieval history lies at the root of the problem. As we have seen, 'popular' Turkish historiography makes much of the, claim that the Ottomans 'saved' the Greek-Orthodox from being overwhelmed by the Catholic church; the existence of grecophone Catholics disturbs this tidy picture. Another example of such excessive simplification can be discerned when Greeks are viewed as constantly forming a 'minority' within die Ottoman Empire. Of course, this is accurate if the Empire is being considered as a totality. But on the regional or sub-regional plane, die Peloponnese or the Aegean islands constituting prime examples, Greeks in fact might form a majority. Yet as Karpat has pointed out, local dynamics played a significant role in the emergence of non-Muslim nationalisms, so that it is not a good idea to limit one's study to the empire-wide perspective alone.

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213 As document publications in this vein, one might mention Ertuğrul sünvarisi Ali Bey'den Ayşe Hanım'a mektuplar, ed. by Canan Eronat (İstanbul, 1995) and Ahmet Nedim Servet Tör, Nevhiz'ın günlükleri, Defter-i hatrât, ed. by Kaya Şahin (İstanbul, 2000).
214 On the employees of the Osmanlı Bankası around 1900, where many non-Muslims were employed, see Edhem Eldem, 135 Yıllık bir hazine, Osmanlı Bankası arşivinde tarihten izler (İstanbul, 1997), 261-94. On the Armenian artistic milieu of Istanbul in the late nineteenth century, there is much information in Engin Özenoğlu, Abdullah Freres, Osmanlı sarayının fotoğrafçıları (İstanbul, 1998).
217 Karpat, "Millets and Nationality", 153-54.
A fifth and final point concerns the tendency of many Turkish scholars to place a possibly excessive confidence in the good-neighborly relations between Muslims and their Greek fellow townsmen or villagers. Doubtless numerous cases of this sort existed, and if only because Greek nationalist historians have so often claimed the contrary, such cases deserve close analysis. Yet especially at times of external tension, such as the Russo-Ottoman conflict of 1768-1774, pogroms did occur. Moreover, similarly to other non-Muslims, the Orthodox could get chased out of their homes and churches. Sometimes the houses were deemed too close to a mosque, or churches were converted into mosques because a ruler or vizier sought to gain support by a show of piety. Such events did not happen every day, but a working historian should not try to persuade him/herself that they did not happen at all.

Despite these deficiencies, especially the 'liberal' historians dealing with the Greeks in Ottoman history also have some solid achievements to their credit. To begin with, these historians have substituted historical analysis for mere assertions of moral superiority. In addition, the work of İnalçık and Karpat has made it clear that Ottoman millets were not immutable institutions within an unchanging Ottoman state. Quite to the contrary, the status of every millet, including of course the Greek-Orthodox, changed according to political conjunctures. Thus even though certain ground rules were laid in the time of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Greek millet of the sixteenth century differed substantially from that of the post-Tanzimat period.218 Thus a concern with social and political dynamics in Ottoman history in general has revitalized the study of the Greek Orthodox millet. Moreover in the last two decades, 'critical' historians, with little stake in the 'defence of the state', are attempting to take the Greek perspective into account when working towards an historical synthesis. Much remains to be done, but at least a beginning has been made.

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218 In the volume in which Karpat's article on millets appeared, we also find a study by Benjamin Braude which casts doubt on the entire history of the millets as commonly accepted in die secondary literature: "Foundation Myths of the Millet System", in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, ed. by Braude and Lewis, vol. 1, 69-88. On pp. 77-81, Braude concludes that the Greeks of Mehmed IPs time possessed an institution of their own, namely the Orthodox Church, and a communal leader, namely Patriarch Gennadios, but that the grant of formal privileges to the latter is not well attested. It is therefore doubtful whether the institution of the Greek millet really goes back to the Conqueror's time. However, we find little reference to Braude's work in the studies of Turkish historians dealing with Ottoman Greeks.
Constructing Memories of ‘Multiculturalism’ and Identities
In the Turkish Novels

The validity of an argumentation

The difficulty in discussing a trend and/or a theme in any national literature is the same: how can one verify the validity of his selections when he presents texts which ‘show’ (and suppose to ‘prove’) ones’ argumentation? How may one prove that the presented texts are of a significant importance and not marginal and ephemeral ‘exceptions’? One solution to this problematic is almost evident: The texts should not be ‘selected’ but all the texts should be taken into consideration or at least a considerable number of texts should be selected so that the statistical conclusions can have legitimacy, being ‘representative’. However, in the case of the novels technical limitations come into the agenda. There are hundreds of novels published every year and it is impossible for a researcher to follow up all developments.

This difficulty has not been surmounted in this presentation. In a previous review of the Turkish novel and the related ‘identities’ I had a greater assurance about my research not only because many novels were investigated (about 400) but because at that time the number of those investigated novels was a higher percentage of the published novels (Millis 2000, 2001 and 2005). Whereas the last 20-25 years the number of the novels increased manifolds and consequently the examples in this presentation constitute a smaller section of the whole production. A second shortcoming of this presentation is that in my previous investigation the novels were selected randomly and therefore the statistical results may be considered more representative of the whole, whereas in this present one the novels were selected mostly because of the theme which they incorporated, i.e., ‘multiculturalism’. The following presentation should be read having these reservations in mind.

A demarcation line in 1980?

A second methodological consideration, beyond the one of ‘validity’ just mentioned, is the comparison of the two periods, before and after 1980, as prescribed in the general title of this workshop. The ‘after’ can be approached only if there is a ‘before’ in mind. However, there are not enough studies on the Turkish novels related to issues such as ‘cultural memory’, ‘identities’ and ‘multiculturalism’ which cover various periods. Therefore, to discuss the period after 1980 may mean that a) it is assumed that there is a demarcation around that period – an assumption which is not demonstrated but taken for granted, and/or b) the focus of interest is limited to the period after 1980 and a comparison – before and after - is not looked for.
In my presentation I will not take for granted the ‘demarcation’, nor will I ignore some major changes (developments) that I believe to exist in the Turkish novel the last decades. I will try to show that there have always been issues of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘cultural memory’ and ‘identity’ in the Turkish novel and that this interest presents tendencies of a change the last years in tune with the change of the historical and social developments.

Memory and multiculturalism before 1980

The Ottomanists

The novels of the Ottoman period published in Turkish, written by authors such as Şemsettin Sami, Ahmet Mithat, Samipaşazade Sezai, Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil, Recaizade Mahmut, were ‘multicultural’ in a specific way: they reflected the spirit of a multinational, multi-ethnic empire. They were not national. The Christian characters for example were numerous in those novels and at the same time a ‘normal’ part of the immediate environment; they were the constituents of the story, an organic part of the society and almost never the ‘Other’. They were not portrayed as ‘negative’. On the contrary they often symbolized the ‘civilized’ and ‘advanced’ West.

These novels do not give emphasis to the past and consequently nor to ‘memory’. They are mostly involved with the present and the future. Not nostalgia but a feeling of yearning is apparent in many cases: The authors are for a society and for human relations that bring to mind the ‘West’ – as it is imagined at that time by these writers. The Christian heroes and heroines quite often are shown as the representatives of such a society. In other words, the ‘difference’ between the Christians and the Muslims is not ignored but this dissimilarity is not a reason either for confrontation or disapproval.

The nationalists

The appearance of the national/nationalist authors and the abrupt ‘disappearance’ of the Ottoman authors should be interpreted as a shift of paradigm. The Ottoman writers perceived the world (and the related identities - ‘us’ and the Other) to consist of parts that were characterized as civilized/uncivilized, as east/west, as Ottoman/non-Ottoman, and probably secondarily as Muslim/Christian. The numerous ‘national’ authors and novels that appeared after 1908 and especially with the founding of the new Turkish nation state heralded a new understanding. The world was perceived to consist of ‘nations’ and the national identity had to be reinforced with reference to a heroic or at least ‘valuable’ past. ‘Cultural memory’ came to the forefront and the ‘past’ was associated mostly with the recent past referring to the period 1910-1923 (by the Kemalist nationalists) or with an ‘ancient’ past (by nationalists influenced by racist understanding). Authors like Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Halide Edip Adıvar, Atilla İlhan belong to the first group and Nihal Atsız, Turhan Tan can be associated with the second.

These writers were distanced from a multicultural culture; actually they were xenophobic. The non-Muslim minorities were perceived not only as the ‘enemy of the

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220 For example Şemsettin Sami in Taasuk-i Tal’at ve Fitnat (The romance between Tal’at and Fitnat, 1872) praises the honesty of Christian women of Istanbul contrary to ‘our’ women and Ahmet Mithat in Hasan Mellah declares that the laws of Europe are needed in order to save a Muslim country (Morocco).
nation’ but also ethically inferior vis-à-vis the superior, brave, strong, honest, magnanimous ‘us’, too. All Greeks, for example, were portrayed negatively in those novels.221 A national identity was founded on the existence of the dangerous, treacherous, appalling, etc. Other. This school of nationalist thought describes a world of ethnic strife where the Other is an eternal opponent that should be kept at a distance if not exterminated.

**The Marxists**

In the late 1940s and in the 1950s a new school appeared which can be labeled brusquely as ‘Marxists’. These authors can be seen more as ‘internationalists’ rather than as multiculturalists. For them the world consists of classes (not nations or religious groups) and quite often they portrayed the minorities, especially the Greeks, as ‘modern’ and exemplary since they were advanced in a ‘class struggle’ against the common enemy, e.g., the capitalists. (Naturally the Greeks were fighting in Greece but the Greeks of Istanbul were perceived as associated with them.) The Marxists were not only ‘anti-nationalists’ but most importantly against their own ‘state’, too. This ‘distancing’ themselves from the official and dominant center of authority and power appears as closeness to the minorities that have been already marginalized.

The appearance of the Marxists and their positioning with respect to the Other – the Greeks and the non-Muslim minorities in general – is an expression of an identity. An identification with a world movement that transcended the national boundaries and the portrayal of a new enemy – a class – meant the negation of the national identity as that was presented by the new state. Authors that can be associated with this approach are Sabahattin Ali, Nazım Hikmet, Orhan Kemal, Suat Derviş, Vedat Türkali, Mehmet Kemal, Fakir Baykurt and many others.

**The humanists**

The above mentioned ‘Ottomanists’, ‘nationalists’ and ‘Marxists’ are relatively easy to detect because they are related to some schools of thought that have been extensively studied. The two additional groups of authors that are associated to multiculturalism and cultural memory, namely what I choose here to call ‘humanists’ and ‘Anatolianists’, are more difficult to distinguish for three reasons. First, they represent a complex and/or sophisticated manner of belief, second, they are indirectly associated at various degrees with the above mentioned three ‘schools of thought’ and third, they have not been studied to a satisfactory extent.

The ‘humanists’ resemble the Ottomanists and one may even claim that they represent a non-declared Ottomanism. Reşat Nuri Güntekin for example, not so much in his openly declared ideological ‘official’ choices, e.g., his attachment to the ideology of the new nation-state, but rather through the deconstruction of his texts which portray the non-Muslim minorities with a big affection and sympathy, seems to represent a nostalgic author who contemplates a lost world of multiculturalism, an Ottoman past. In all of his fifteen novels that have been investigated this tendency is apparent (Millas 2000, 173-179). The non-Muslim minorities are approached with empathy and love. Where Güntekin differs from the Ottomanists is in his nostalgic dimension. In his works, it is as if the time and the world have changed and the past has acquired a melancholic dimension of yearning. *Akşam Güneşi (Evening Sun*,

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221 The image of the Greeks in the memoirs is a different issue; see the article above “The Contrasting Images of Greeks in Turkish Literature: Fiction versus Memoirs”.

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1926) and *Ateş Gecesi* (*The Night of Fire*, 1942) are especially striking, typical examples of his nostalgic atmosphere that prevails in his works.

… I looked around in sorrow trying to find among the young girls Stamatoula, Rina, Marianne and Ritsa. I could not take my eyes from the dark slim woman who had her back turned to me, standing next to an old man who, with this bold head and rich mustache resembled the old Greek notable Mr. Lefteris. I was excited because I thought that if she turned around I would see aunt Vardar’s thin anemic face with the round nose pressed on her face (Güntekin 1926, 248).

In his *Kavak Yelleri* (*Poplar Winds*), he narrates how he enjoyed a calm night “in a poor vicinity of Beyoğlu with a poor Greek family’ and how he sang together with a bookseller named Sokrat, a priest and some Greek ladies. These people have ‘nothing in common with the people I had met years ago in my town, Karabağlı Yenge, Ablalar, Müstü, and so many others. In spite of that, I felt a serenity during that night that I spent with them, and I do not understand why.” (Güntekin 1991 (1961), p. 297)

Born in 1906, Sait Faik Abasiyanik was seventeen years younger than Reşat Nuri and therefore had no recollection of the multi-ethnic Ottoman environment. For this reason, he expresses less “nostalgia” than Güntekin does. However, what we find in Sait Faik is enormous sympathy for the (now relatively poor) members of the minorities; in this respect, we can say that Sait Faik resembles the Marxists. He yearns for a world where all, irrespective of religion or ethnicity, will live in peace: “I love not the flags but the human beings” (Sait Faik, 1989 [1936], 88). For him, all human beings, but most especially the underprivileged, deserve his love. This thought is well reflected in his work *Bitmemiş Senfoni* (*Unfinished Symphony*, 1989):

“My gaze is always turned towards … the light that shows the rotten fishing boats. My people are on that side. Kalafat is there. Vasilaki is there. Hasan is there.”

(*Bitmemiş Senfoni* 1989, 45)

There are many authors that may be classified under this category. Haldun Taner, Necati Cumali, Bilge Karasu, Ahmet Atlan, Oya Baydar and many others. They share some characteristics. The most important is that they are all critical, directly or indirectly, to the policy of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the non-Muslim minorities. In this respect they resemble the Marxists, too. On the other hand they do not perceive only ‘classes’ but they are well aware of the existence of ethnic differentiations; and they respect these differences.

The Anatolianists

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222 All translations are of my own.
Perhaps it is the non-acceptance of the right to exist as “different” that is the main characteristic distinguishing the authors I refer to as Anatolianists: They stress and praise the Other’s “sameness” with and “resemblance” to “us”; in other words, they equate the Other with “us.” At the same time, however, they construct a new negative Other: the “West”. This tendency also resembles one aspect of Ottomanism—that is, the demarcation line being drawn between the area of Ottoman rule and the “West”—and one aspect of the humanists—that is, considering certain sections of the society viewed as the Other by the nationalists to be “part of us.”

The Anatolianists have been perceived by Turkish historians of literature either as “humanists” (for example, Halikarnas Balıkçısı) or as Marxists (for example, Kemal Tahir). They constitute, however, together with many other authors such as Hassan İzzettin Dinamo and Yılmaz Karaköyulu, a group of intellectuals who, partly unconsciously, propagate a new Turkish national identity based on a historically-geographical understanding. They perceive the “self” as Anatolian geographically and the heir of all civilizations of this area historically. Neither the ethnic nor the cultural dimension, nor the self-identification of the citizens of old and modern Turkey are taken into consideration in this construction. In other words, everyone who belongs to “this geography” and who thus has automatically inherited its past civilizations are considered Turks, irrespective of religion, language, etc.

This “identity project” has been appropriated and highlighted by politicians, historians, and other intellectuals, too. Turgut Özal in his book La Turquie en Europe (1988), written only in French and later in English, mentions Halikarnas Balıkçısı to demonstrate that Turkey is “European” (Özal 1988, 21). Bozkurt Güvenç in his Türk Kimliği (The Turkish Identity, 1994) propagates similar views. Historians like İdris Küçükömer and Sencer Divişcioğlu flirted with the idea of the Asiatic Mode of Production.

At first glance, this “identity project” appears innocent and well-intentioned. It incorporates, however, many contradictions, nationalistic characteristics and weaknesses, wherefore it fails to be persuasive. It first appeared at a time when the Asia-based “Turkish Historical Thesis” was en vogue. This particular naïve thesis claimed that all ancient civilizations, and therefore all Middle East and Aegean civilizations, were created by the Turks that came from Asia. Anatolianists reject the Asiatic basis and develop the idea that the modern Turks are the heirs of all civilizations of the area. Actually, they answer the question “Who are we?” by claiming “we are the same,” we are all Turks, Anatolians, irrespective of our religion, language, beliefs etc. A new, geographically based national coherence is thus proposed. Of course, in order to formulate this coherence, differences are obscured, hidden, and masked.

In the novels written by authors categorized here as Anatolianist, the abovementioned identity project is presented as follows: The non-Muslims, especially the Greeks (or “Rums,” to be precise) are parts of “us”; they are, however, “exempt”

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223 Halikarnas Balıkçısı is known as the forerunner of the movement represented by Selahattin Eyuboğlu and especially by Azra Erhat known as “Anatolian Humanism” (Anadolu Hümanizmi). Kemal Tahir was imprisoned for twelve years due to his socialist convictions.

224 Turgut Özal was Prime Minister of Turkey when he wrote this book. Bozkurt Güvenç is a renowned intellectual. Turkish historians that developed theories to define the history of Anatolia are İdris Küçükömer and Sencer Divişcioğlu. According to these historians, the class and religious conflicts that shaped the western world did not take place in Anatolia. See, for example, İdris Küçükömer, Düzenin Yabancılaflması (The Alienation of the Social Order) and Sencer Divişcioğlu, Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumu (Asian Mode of Production and the Ottoman Society) in the bibliography below.
from their communal characteristics, which is to say that they like the Turks more than the members of their own community, they prefer to live under Ottoman or Turkish rather than Byzantine or Greek rule, they quite often (especially the women) rush to be converted to Islam, they tend to fall in love with Turks, they confess that the Greeks (i.e., the Christians, the Grecophones) have been unjust to the Turks whereas the Turks have been magnanimous, just, and tolerant to them. Thus does the Pax Ottomana (or rather Pax Turcica) come to the fore, whether directly or indirectly, in the Anatolianist works.

At the same time, the West is described as possessing extremely negative characteristics. In the works of Halikarnas Balıkçıısı, nearly all the Westerners are negative characters: mean, sadistic, etc. A typical example of this is to be found in his novel *Turgut Reis* (1966). In the case of Kemal Tahir, the negative West is “explained” by means of a Marxist model—the Asiatic Mode of Production. The West is historically associated with feudalism, that is, an authoritative ruling class and state that “exploited” the masses. The Turks and all the other Anatolians lived under a protective state (*Devlet Ana*) free of exploitation, oppression, or tyranny. The East and the West are two worlds completely apart.

In other words, the main constituents of the nationalistic discourse repeat themselves: We are good, they are bad. The role of the non-Muslim characters however, in the case of Anatolianists, is a special one. I call these characters “naively positive Other,” because the Other in this case is presented as positive but in a special way: he appears as a “historical witness” testifying as to the righteousness, moral superiority, magnanimity etc., of the “Turk.” The Greek myth created a “historical Turk” who is all-negative. The Turkish myth created a Greek who testifies exactly the opposite. This Greek is positive not because of his/her ethical etc., merits, but because in the last analysis he/she appears to “confess” that the Turks have been always “positive” and/or the Greeks not so good. This Other I called “naively positive Other” because it incorporates a naivety: he/she is good to the extent that he/she accepts his/her negative aspects and negates his/her own identity. The Greeks themselves would not recognize such a character as “Greek” in the first case; he is stripped of his identity and from thenceforth becomes the Other.

Obtaining the “approval” of the Other is highly appreciated by and is flattering for the nationalist Turks. Some writers therefore have developed a “historical interpretation,” according to which the Greeks appear very happy under the Ottoman regime, as they declare their fondness of the Turks. Cevat Şakir and Kemal Tahir, for example, developed a “historical thesis” of a “golden happy age” in which all “subjects” of the Turks lived happily.

The Anatolianist discourse incorporates silences and contradictions. The ancient civilizations are considered to be “ours,” but with the provision that not be associated with “existing” nations. The Greek aspect of Ionian civilization is securely silenced and the Armenians are normally “forgotten.” According to this discourse Homer, for example, is more an “Anatolian compatriot” than an ancient Greek poet. The legacy of the “more recent” thousand years of the Byzantine Empire is silenced as well. The “non-European” ethnic groups of Anatolia, like the Arabs and the Kurds, and especially Islam are “forgotten” whenever this legacy is discussed.

What, however, distinguishes the Anatolianists from the “Ottomanists,” “Marxists,” and “Humanists” mentioned above, is their political view *vis-à-vis* the West and the “Turkish state.” The Ottomanists were admirers of the West. The Marxists and the Humanists were very critical of the “state,” especially of the way it treated non-Muslim minorities. The Anatolianists, however, used different means to
show that the Turkish state, at the end of the day, was “positive.” When these differences are taken into consideration, the Anatolianists appear to be closer to the nationalists who praise everything “Turkish,” but at the same time, they seem to be rather in need of a more “European” façade, which leads them to create an idyllic, imagined national past and a new historical Other—not the internal enemy but, in this case, the West.

Memory and multiculturalism after 1980

I have discussed the period before 1980, and especially the “Anatolianists,” so that we may approach the period after 1980 on solid footing. Some tendencies pertaining to multiculturalism, cultural memory, national identity, and the Other have continued almost unchanged from 1980 up to the present day. I will briefly review these persisting approaches before moving on to a more thorough discussion of the major changes observed in the post-1980 Turkish literature vis-à-vis literature of the previous era.

The enduring nationalist approach

That a nationalist approach continues to appear in contemporary Turkish novels should be considered normal since nationalist ideology remains widespread. What is more interesting is that sometimes nationalism is expressed by authors who, from their own point of view, are humanitarians who claim to advocate coexistence, multiculturalism, and understanding between nations. These texts give the impression that they are the products of writers who have been carried away by uncontrolled anger, fear, and nationalistic stereotypes. The dilemma from the point of view of the critic lies in his decision either to respect the self image of the author or to analyze the text. Actually, this catch-22 situation applies to all the texts that follow.

The difficulty with the nationalist approach is that there is no consensus as to how this paradigm operates. Nationalism, irrespective of the attempts to “define” this ideology, expresses itself generally as follows: Nationalists perceive a world of “nations” and/or ethnic groups in strife, and it is assumed that these parties in controversy do not change their “character,” i.e., that they preserve their national idiosyncrasy over time, while “our” side—expressed by selected heroes in the novels—is better than the Other.

These characteristics are true, for example, of the novels of Ahmet Yorulmaz, published in 1997–2003 (see bibliography), in which the Greeks and the Turks are depicted as two groups that have engaged in conflict with one another for thousands of years. Even though, on the surface, the main theme of these books appears to be the identity of “Turks from Crete,” the narratives are explicitly presented as stories of “return to the homeland.” Ahmet Coral’s novel İsmir similarly depicts a “Greek” who is full of hate and a constant urge to harm the Turks from Byzantine times up until today. In Turgut Özakman’s Şu Çılgın Türkler (Those Crazy Turks, 2005), the Armenians and the Greeks (or Rum, as inhabitants of Anatolia of Greek origin were referred to in the Ottoman Empire, and are still referred to today in Turkey) of Anatolia, citizens of the Ottoman state, are depicted as natural collaborators with the enemy. (Özakman 2005, 171). A Turkish hero reminds an Armenian of the

225 For a more detailed analysis, see Millas 2005, 425–431.
“benevolent,” “just” and “moral” Ottoman/Turkish state: The theme “you have been treated well by us, we lived together happily, whereas you behaved like traitors” is repeated, as it has been in almost all nationalist novels published before and/or after 1980. In these novels, there is no criticism whatsoever of “our” side.

The minority on the minority: a continuance

Though marginal, the presence of minority writers in Turkish literature sheds important light on the role of ethnic identity in dealing with the Other. The voicing of certain issues concerning minorities, the portrayal of the individual members of the minorities themselves, and especially “sexual love” relationships between members of different ethnic groups are unique in these literary texts. As early as in 1966, the Armenian author Zaven Biberyan portrayed for the first time a love affair between a “Turk” and a minority in which the man was not the Turk but an Armenian (and the hero of the novel was beaten to death for this!). This taboo theme repeats itself in almost all of the works by the small number of minority authors writing in Turkish. Kriton Dinçmen repeats the theme as well in his Symphonia Kakophonica (1992). In this case, the Muslim girl who loves a Christian, Mehpeyker, goes mad. The theme is repeated in Mario Levi’s Lunapark (2005), but in this case, the relationship between the Jew and the Turkish girl seems more acceptable—yet one wonders if the fact that she is of Cretan origin implies something (Levi 2005, 98).226

Another peculiarity of the “minority” texts is their noticeably critical position vis-à-vis the Turkish state and society and especially with respect to some unpleasant events such as the “Wealth Tax” of 1942 and the “enlistment” of the same period, etc., themes which are rare in the Turkish literature.227 In general, a concealed and hesitant protest is felt in these texts. Also, we find an extremely rare depiction of a “poor Jew,” probably for the first time since Sait Faik, in a text by a Jew: Mario Levi’s Bir Şehre Gidememek (Not to be Able to Go to a City, 1990).

The nostalgic past of the “lost” minorities is apparent in these texts. We find this theme, for example, in the works of Mıgırdıç Margosyan and Mario Levi. Levi writes with nostalgia of the Greeks/Rums that they left Istanbul. “Rum meyhaneleri” are nostalgic for example in En Güzel Hikayemiz (Levi 1992, 20, 63). The title of another of his novels clearly expresses nostalgia: Madame Floridis Dönmeyebilir (Mrs. Floridis May Not Return, 1990).

This question of “nostalgia” for the “vanished” minorities (or the Other) is a theme that is directly connected to “multiculturalism,” “memory,” and the Other. This issue will be discussed in more detail below. For the moment, however, let us pose two questions related to this discourse:

a) Many “groups” previously present in Istanbul and other parts of Turkey no longer exist there (a phenomenon that may happen all over the world since things “change”). Why is it, in the case of Turkey, that the Greeks are the ones most often “chosen” to voice the “nostalgia” of the lost past?

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226 The love relationship between members of different ethnic groups as narrated in Turkish and Greek novels is characterized by the identity of the authors: in literary texts the man in all cases belongs to “our” nation and the woman to the Other! The same ethnic “sensitivity” is encountered in the minority novels, too. See: Millas 2001 and 2005.

227 In 1942, the Turkish state taxed the non-Muslim minorities (the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) heavily and also enlisted all male non-Muslim population aged 20–40.
b) This nostalgia seems to be associated with something “positive” and “good” that is now gone. What was, however, positive about the Greeks apart from some “secondary capabilities,” such as for example, as it is often mentioned in literary texts, their ability to run a tavern? This is never explained or shown.

A rupture after 1980: new identities (Islamists, Kurds, religious orders)

Islamic sentiments together with a related “legacy” and “way of life,” mostly as a kind of aesthetics and philosophical preference, have been present in the Turkish novel since the time of Namık Kemal, Peyami Safa, Semihya Ayverdi, Münevver Ayaşlı, and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. Just as it is not easy to draw a line between Turkish nationalist and Turkish-Islamic identity, neither is it easy to separate the “Islamic” novel from the nationalist one. The difference lies in which of these two identities is emphasized more.

The visible rift with the past appears in İsmail Hekimoğlu’s *Minyeli Abdullah* (Abdullah of Minye, 1968), which tells the story of a believer Muslim faces—in a “foreign” country. Especially after 1980, a new (not qualitatively distinguished) “school” of Islamic novel found a very broad readership. Writers like Yavuz Bahadroğlu, Afet İlgaz, Ali Kavaklı, Mustafa Miyasoğlu, Emine Şenlikoğlu, and many others appeared and voiced not only the discontent—according to their point of view—of a suppressed religious community, but also a new religious but also political identity. In these novels, the political agenda is strongly felt: criticism of past governments for their choices and comparisons with other countries with respect to religious matters are abundant.

However, the Islamic novels do not actually constitute a unity because they differ greatly amongst themselves in several respects. Some are against Christians and “socialists” (Hekimoğlu 1968), whereas Afet İlgaz, and many others, seem to preach a kind of “Islamic socialism.” Others condemn the Christian and Jewish “capital” that harms “us” (Şenlikoğlu 1994). Bahadroğlu refers to Said Nursi and Kavaklı praises the Germans who in his novel *Alman Doktor* (The German Doctor, 1993) are converted (willingly, of course) to Islam. Miyasoğlu in his *Güzell Ölüm* (Beautiful Death, 1982) exalts deaths (martyrdom) that occurred when the Greek troops captured Cyprus. In his novel *Berzan* (1995), Hurşit İl beyi—who is half Turkmen and half Kurdish—criticizes the state, defends the idea of a socialistic Islam, and praises democracy, NGOs, and freedom of expression. In these novels, the themes of “multiculturalism” and/or non-Muslim minorities rarely appear. These authors do not seem to be interested in such issues. It is not very clear what an Islamic novel is, in spite of the fact that the Islamic bookshops are full of novels such as those mentioned above, which fall under this rather amorphous category and cannot be found in the “laique” bookshops. What these novels do have in common, however, is that they are not in line with the state and the general state discourse.

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More easily categorized than the aforementioned Islamic novels is a series of novels that appeared (or at least that I noticed) mostly after 2000 which include portrayals of suppressed identities. These may be called novels of the (third generation) “muhacir”—emigrants or refugees. This “school” does not seem to have predecessors and the novels are a truly unique and original product of “post-2000.” Their voice is one of protest against the lack of recognition of different religious and/or cultural
identities and communities and they are critical of state policies. In a sense, they are reminiscent of the “novels of the minorities” and of the Islamists, only they seem to be more outspoken than the minorities and more sporadic than the Islamists.

In her novel *Rumeli Benimdi* (Rumeli was Mine, 2003), Ayten Aygen tells the story of her family’s Bektaşi and Melami past. She praises Ottomanism even though her entire family was devastated (massacred, actually) by the ruling Ottomans. This is a novel of a great trauma. Ali Ezger Özyürek in his *Muhacirler* (The Immigrants, 2003) declares, with pride, one might say, his Bektaşi identity. His family emigrated from the Balkans and was repressed in Anatolia for years. “They had to keep a lookout at the entrances to their new village in order to be able to perform their religious (prohibited) ceremonies” (Özyürek 2003, 173). Özyürek states that the prejudices that previously had targeted the Greeks and the Armenians were now turned against them, the migrants. He clearly states that they felt at home in their Balkan state, which he calls “European,” and not in Turkey.

These novels voice an anti-nationalist protest, too. Nationalist practices are condemned to the point that for some could be considered as “blasphemy.” Zeliha Midilli in her *Balkan Şarkısı – Saranda* (A Balkan Song – Saranda, 2003), in which she narrates the life of her Bektaşi family, wrote the following sentences, which are unheard in Turkish literature from the time of Namık Kemal’s *Vatan Yahut Silistre* (*The Home Country or Silistre*, 1873), i.e., when the time the word vatan/home country was used for the first time as a title of a literary work, a play, until this moment:228

> I never liked that word, “home country” (*vatan*). I personally find the word “homeland” (*memleket*) more endearing. The country perceives itself as superior to us, and if it feels like it, commands to die for it… But human beings do have a country, and it is the earth, that is to say, the whole world… To be free has nothing to do with having one’s own state. (Midilli 2003, 281, 140)

[Erzelden beri sevmedim şu vatan tabirini. Memleket tabirini şahsen daha sempatik bulurum… Vatan kendini bizden üstün bir mertebeye koyar ve icap ederse onun için ölmemizi emreder… Ama insanoğlunun vatanını vardır, o da bütün toprakların üstündür, yani insanoğlunun vatanı dünyadır… Hürl olanın kendi devletine sahip olmakla alakası yoktur.]

According to this novel, life in Albania was one of perfect “freedom.” The dervishes would visit and pray in the churches and the Christians would visit the *tekkes*: “God is not a Muslim, a Christian, a Jew, or of any other religion.” (Midilli 2003, 178).

Saba Altınsay’s novel *Kritimu – Girit’im Benim* (My Crete, 2004) (with a surprising title in Greek)229 is dedicated to “all Cretans.” Her novel is the first Turkish novel with a story that develops solely in Crete, narrating the story of the Greek speaking Muslims who had been “exchanged” with the “Greeks” of Anatolia in 1923. The story is based on the writer’s own family history and is narrated with sincerity, objectivity, and nostalgia for a lost co-existence. Necati Cumalı’s *Viran Dağlar–Makedonya 1900* (Abandoned Mountains – Macedonia, 1995) had already

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228 Two different words are used for “home country” in Turkish. “Memleket,” which is closer to “homeland,” and “vatan,” which is used in the context of national understanding and is closer to the French “patrie.”

229 *Kritimu* means “My Crete” in Greek.
proven groundbreaking, paving the way for others to tell their stories of “old
homelands.”

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Apart from the above, i.e., the novels that narrate and present suppressed identities
with reference to areas outside present-day borders of Turkey, we should also address
novels involving two additional identities, Kurdish and Karamanlis. Two novels are
evidence of rising interest in this field.

With his four volume novel (of which three volumes are published so far) Bir Ada
Hikâyesi (An Island Story, 1998–2002), which deserves a more thorough analysis
than the very short one here, Yaşar Kemal presents for the first time in his career a
Kurdish national discourse. The Greek and Kurdish heroes are described as “having
lived on these lands for three and five thousand years” (Yaşar Kemal 1998, 50, 267).
This identity, going back millennia, is repeated several times in the novel. As for the
Greeks, a distinction is made between the Rum and the Greeks, as is the case with the
“Anatolians” as well: The Rums (which are shown to belong to “us”) join the Turkish
army and fight against the Greeks. Nevertheless, they are expelled to Greece for an
unexplained reason and by agents who are not defined.

Nurten Ertul’s Kimlik – Osmanlı Topraklarında 700 Yıllık Yaşam ve Köklerimiz
(Identity: Our Life and Roots for 700 Years on Ottoman Lands, 2006) is about the
Karamanlis, the Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians who lived in central Anatolia
and were “exchanged” with the “Turks” of Greece in 1923. Some cases of injustice
done to this community and some cases of conversion to Islam are mentioned,
infering a multi-cultural legacy in Anatolia: “Rome, Byzantium, the Seljuks, and the
Ottomans ruled this place. Turkey is the synthesis of all these civilizations” (Ertul
2006, 124). At the end, the Karamanlis are sent to Greece. The author describes the
legacy of the area as follows: “The Ottoman Empire was a mosaic of many groups of
various languages, religions, and races” (Ertul 2006, 198). The need to be aware of
one’s identity is stressed (Ertul 2006, 45) and the Karamanlis are presented as the real
“local” people of Turkey (Ertul 2006, 222).

In Makriköy’e Dönüş (Return to Makriköy, 2003) by Selçuk Erez, a story of family
highlights a Balkan identity. Ethnic identity becomes secondary within the context of
the day-to-day lives of the characters. Giritli Gelin (The Cretan Bride, 2005) by
Yılmaz Ünlü is about a turbulent period in the history of Anatolia: the early twentieth
century, when Turks, Armenians, Kurds, Alevis, Gypsies, Jews, Greeks, Syriacs, and
others lived together and loved each other, but also fought due to nationalistic
ideologies. A multicultural Anatolia and some taboo issues, such as the killing of
Armenians, are presented and their truth accepted in this novel as well, albeit
indirectly (Ünlü 2005, 44, 221). Hakan Aytekin’s book in the English, Turkish, and
Syriac languages heralds a rising interest in a “forgotten” identity of Anatolia, of
Christians with a culture of their own living in Southeast Anatolia. The appearance of
a novel about the Syriac (Süryanı in Turkish) minority in the near future should come
as no surprise.

Indirect cosmopolitanism

There is an indirect way of presenting cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and a
Corresponding identity. For example, one way may be to tell such a story within such
a framework but without stressing the enterprise itself. Placing the setting of a novel
in a “foreign” country or environment and at the same time “accepting” it as your
“own” may be a perfect way of indirectly voicing a “cosmopolitan” preference. Bilge
Karasu and his Uzun Sürmüş Bir Günü'n Akşamı (The Evening of a Long Day 1970)
and Sevgi Soysal and her *Tante Rosa* (Aunt Rosa 1968) are examples of novels that take such an approach. The first is about Byzantium, the second about a German. Perhaps the best examples of this genre are two works by Aslı Erdoğan, *Kabuk Adam* (The Husk Man 1994) and *Kırmızı Perelinli Kent* (1998; The City in Crimson Cloak 2007). In the latter, the story takes place in Brazil, but the narrator is a Turk. The plot of the novels and the “narrations” of Demir Özlü take place not only in Istanbul but in various countries in Europe as well. Elif Şafak (Shafak) (who writes in Turkish and in English) narrates stories that take place in the United States in her *The Saint of Incipient Insanities* (2004; Araf 2003) and of Istanbul/France/Siberia in *Mahrem* (The Gaze 2000). Orhan Pamuk, too, narrates a story where (national and religious) identities are intermingled, in his *Beyaz Kale* (1985; The White Castle, 1991).

“Indirect” cosmopolitanism may also be seen as the “most” genuine form of cosmopolitanism because it is not planned—it is spontaneous, created without even being the intention of the author. The particular choice made by the author is itself an indication of the author’s mood. He/she professes an interest in the “foreign” and in the “different” at the very initial stage, when he/she decides to write about such an environment. It is of interest to note here that the Turkish critic Erdal Öz likened *Tante Rosa* to a “translated text” because it passes in a “foreign” environment. Actually, what Öz describes is an aspect of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.

Another example of indirect expression of a preference for “multiculturalism” and evoking “memories” of such a period is seen in the novel *Kar* (2002; Snow, 2004) by Orhan Pamuk. The story takes place in Kars (an eastern city of Turkey), which was once densely populated by Armenians. Although Pamuk does not make direct mention of the Armenians themselves, he does so en passant when he refers to old Armenian buildings while describing certain locations. He does this more than twenty times in 400 pages, i.e., in average once every 20 pages.

Orhan Pamuk has expressed his views about the issue of multiculturalism. In an interview published in the Greek newspaper *Eleftherotipia* (January 15, 1999), he said the following:

> I want to finish on a highly personal note. Lately many people seem to have learned what multicultural society is and they refer with nostalgia to the minorities that have left the country due to the policies of the Turkish state. I could understand this if it were an expression borne of sincerity. However, I believe that this nostalgia exists together with a kitsch nostalgia which is not seen in this magnitude in any other society. The only thing that I have to say with respect to the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews is that, starting from my youth, all my memories are related to them. Their non-existence now is like the non-existence of my youth. I would like to express someday my personal memories, but I do not want to do so in the manner that I have just mentioned.

The Greeks in Turkish novels

Statistically and in general, the Greeks appear roughly in every three out of four Turkish novels (Millas 2005, 315–318). Since 1980, and especially in the last ten years, the non-Muslims and especially the Greeks have become a theme that has many dimensions: the period and the “place” in which the Other is shown, the role that he plays in politics, in forming a part or not of “us,” the related role of “our” part (our state, for example) in the plot and in the results, the relationship between the Other
and our identity (national or local), and the role and character of the “women of the Other” are some of these dimensions. A few of these issues are addressed in greater detail below.

“Living together” in “old times”
This theme is more systematically presented in the novels of Gürsel Korat (Zaman Yeli [The Breeze of Time, 1994] and Güvercin Ağış [Pigeon Ode, 1999]). The general message is that the people of Anatolia in the Middle Ages lived next to each other, that they intermingled and shared ideas, ideals, and beliefs. Care is taken to show that these people did not have a national identity or any related bias. These novels sketch a “different” period.

A similar approach is seen in Bilge Umar’s Börklüce (2003), in which Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others—often with anachronistic tendencies—fight against “injustice.” In some passages, the coexistence is exalted: The Turks treat the local people very “friendly” and the “Turks” marry the “local” girls (Umar 2003, 12). There is a tension, however, between the “natural” inclinations for friendly coexistence of the local people (Muslims and Others) and those who represent the state and the authorities. In the end, the “people” lose and their revolt is suppressed. Anachronism is seen in Nedim Gürsel’s novel Başkesen (The Beheader 1995), in which “Turks” and “Byzantines” live next to each other in the fifteenth century.

The theme of a “historical” peaceful coexistence is a recurrent theme that occurs either as the primary theme or in passing in many Turkish novels. In Orhan Pamuk’s Benim Adım Kırmızı (1998; My Name is Red, 2001), various ethnicities, such as the Jews and the Greeks, appear in passing as an integral part of the story. In a single passage one may read, for example, references to all of the following peoples: Jews, Çerkes, Kıpçak, Acem, Türkmen, Abaza, Ermeni, Cenevizli, Syriac (Pamuk 1998, 173). The same approach is seen in İhsan Oktay Anar’s Amat (2005). On the very first page we learn that, in seventeenth-century Istanbul, a mosque is next to an Armenian church and a Greek Orthodox church. Nearby is the tower of the Genovese. A kind of cosmopolitanism is apparent, even though a Jew is shown to be very similar to Shakespeare’s Shylock (Anar 2005, 11).

What is new in these novels is not the “coexistence” part. This theme had already been seen in the earlier, aforementioned novels by the “nationalists” and especially the “Anatolianists.” In the case of these later novels, however, “our” part is not directly exalted; instead, it is indirectly stated, inferred, silenced, or even sometimes doubted. Another general characteristic of this “historical” theme is that there is no end to the story. What happened afterwards? This question is neither asked nor answered. How and why did the coexistence cease? How did nationalism come to create a new and controversial relationship between “us” and the Other? This problematic is ignored in the novels. For the answer, we need to turn to Kemal Anadol’s historical memoir, Büyük Ayrılık (The Great Separation, 2003):

First they injected a deep nationalism. Our Greeks and Armenians brought this to its peak during the First World War. Nationalism is a dangerous weapon. It creates its counterpart at once. The Young Turks were already ready for this! Megali Idea [“Great Ideal” of expansion] on one part, Turan and Kızılelma [expansionist project] on the other! Do you choose to revolt? You will face deportation! (Anadol 2003, 517)
When they write the history of that era, they will decide that nationalism was more harmful than plague or cholera... Because nationalism is a contagious, dangerous, and deadly disease. And this disease cannot be small or big! Even if small, it is still dangerous. (Anadol 2003, 520)

Eventually Captan Petridis speaks: “Both sides shed blood… Due to nationalism! This sickness was transmitted to us by our western shores. And from us passed to the Turks!” (Anadol 2003, 547)

**Nostalgia and multiculturalism**

There are many novels that can be classified under this general title, even though there are many differences between the “spirits” of each, which means that a general classification will do injustice to the efforts. Some novels published in the last 10–20 years and that narrate stories about the Greeks of Turkey (mostly of Istanbul) will be presented first. They are all characterized with nostalgia for the non-Muslims and mostly the Greeks who are “gone.” These novels can be divided into two categories:

a) One group, which expresses a willingness to be “self-critical,” blames the Turkish side (the state or the community) for the negative outcome. Some of these authors voice their criticism softly whereas others express it more emphatically and even develop an explanation for it, blaming mostly “nationalism.”

b) The second group voices nostalgia but does not get involved in the causes.

These two kinds of novels are encountered before 1980 as well. Sait Faik and Reşat Nuri are examples of these two tendencies. There are many authors of this “school” in the Turkish literature. After 1980, however, their frequency and degree of “self-criticism” increased. Demir Özlü, for example, from the seventies until recently refers quite often to the Greeks who were “badly treated” and subsequently left. In his *Bir Küçükburjuvanın Gençlik Yılları* (The Youthful Years of a Petit Bourgeois 1979), a complaint is voiced: “This is the vicinity where the old Greek (*Rum*) minority lived. The Greeks are growing fewer and fewer in number. They move to Athens. Now a middle class (*esnaf*) that comes from Anatolia replaces them.” (Özlü 1979, 166) The historical Christian buildings are turning into ruins and in their places new areas “like a stain of grease” are spreading “taking something from the inner self” of the hero (Özlü 1979, 168). In *Bir Yaz Mevsimi Romansı* (A Romance of Summer Time, 1990), again the change in the area of Tatavla (Kurtuluş) is mentioned: There was once a nice place with well-dressed Greek ladies, etc. (Özlü 1990, 56). The same nostalgia is voiced about Beyoğlu and Panayot, who used to sell wine, in *Tatlı Bir Eylül* (A Sweet September, 1995, 50).
Feride Çiçekoğlu’s *Suyun Öteki Yani* (The Other Side of the Water, 1992) is about a Greek from Greece and about the Greeks of Istanbul who are “gone.” The nostalgic song “Samniotisa” is mentioned a few times in the novel. Everything seems so far away now! Oya Baydar, too, mentions the Greeks who have left in her *Hıçbiryer’e Dönüş* (Return to Nowhere, 1998, 50). In her *Erguvan Kapısı* (The Purple Gate, 2004, 26), she blames the Turkish “nationalists” for this. She repeats the theme of Özlü: “It seems that the Greeks that left have been replaced by the people of the East, the Kurds... Let’s drink raki and lament the future of this country” (Baydar 2004, 312). The theme of “the Greeks that left” and the following “catastrophe” is expressed in Yiğit Okur’s *Hulki Bey ve Arkadaşları* (Mr. Hulki and his Friends, 1999) with a special emphasis:

Until the city was raped on the night of September 6, 1955 (the city was a virgin until then), it was composed of the polyphonic, most magnificent chorus of history, the most colorful, the most attractive mosaic of human existence, with the Turks, the Muslims, the Catholics, the Jews, the Armenians, the Greeks, each playing a different chord. Especially the Greeks, they added an aroma to its aroma, a tone to its tone...

However, with this night of September 6, 1955, this world which has no match in the world, would cease to exist within a few hours. Only a few hours would put an end to a thousand years. And then a corpse of a bitch would remain in front of the feet of history: a face full of deep wounds of chickenpox, checks full of razor cuts, one eye doused in nitric acid, the other blind, the nose bone broken, shoulders sunken, the thin, faint, slim feet that look like Christ’s now full of callus, stink infected, are huge, unable to fit into any shoe, the toes sore, nails fallen off, forgotten and deserted, bluish flies rushing to feast on it. (Okur 1999, 210)

The Turkish “side” is criticized for the departure of the Greeks from Pera/Istanbul in Ahmet Ümit’s novels, too. In his *Beyoğlu Rapsodisi* (The Beyoğlu Rhapsody, 2003), the “old” Pera is praised for the Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Dutch, Jewish, Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Russian, English, French, Italian, and Hungarian that is heard and then it is lamented that the Greeks are almost completely extinct. According to the hero of the novel, even though there is no more harassment in our times, there is no hope for the Greeks to remain. “It is as if you cut down the trunk of a tree and then you expect the roots to blossom” (Ümit 2003, 322). In *Sis Ve Gece* (The Fog and the Night, 1996), the Greeks of Istanbul are shown to be intimidated and their properties appropriated by some Turks. (Ümit 1996, 135). In Rıdvan Akar’s *Bir Irkçının Dönüşü* (The Betrayal of a Racist, 2002), the *Rums* are shown to be forced to speak Turkish (Akar 2002, 114) and tragically expelled from Turkey (Akar 2002, 124). Barış
Balcıoğlu’s Çayınızı Türkçe mi Alırsınız? (Would You Like Your Tea in Turkish? 1996) is especially interesting because the author tries to uncover the reasons behind the Turks’ interest in the Greeks of Istanbul, and especially of Beyoğlu:

(The middle class) had to find a city tradition. They searched the history books and they discovered Beyoğlu. And so they inevitably discovered the [non-Muslim] minorities, too. In spite of the discourse of “it was done by Europe’s money,” they were dazzled by the richness of Greece and they were even more interested in the Rums. This happened partly because the “West” is influential in Turkey. We remembered the Rums that we chased away to the West instead of the Armenians that had lived in the East. The “noble” Rum decorated our dreams. (Balcıoğlu 1996, 174)


Can Eryümlü in Kalimerhaba Đzmir (Good Morning Izmir, 2004) explains how İzmir used to be a “cosmopolitan” city with its Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, and Europeans, and how that all ended with a big fire in 1922. (Eryümlü 2004, 88) Nostalgia characterizes this novel, too. The most nostalgic of all, however, are the novels of Sergun Ağar and Nazlı Eray. In the first we read the passionate love story of a Greek woman, Efrosini, and Hasan Bey. Efrosini leaves Turkey and goes to Thessaloniki when her love dies, but her heart stays behind. She loved Istanbul—but still she left! In the second, the heroine meets an old Jew in Beyoğlu and they have some nostalgic days: “Mr Albert was like an amalgam of all the grocers, door keepers, and the plumbers in the Jewish neighborhood that I had met and had become friends with when I was boy.” (Ağar 2002, 40). In Mehmet Culum’s Alaçatılı (2006), some Turks and Greeks are shown to have developed a true friendship in Anatolia, in spite of the wars, and the grandchildren of the Greeks who had left return many years later to meet old friends of the family.

An assessment

The novels in which issues of multiculturalism, the Other, and the related memories are dealt with are grouped above. Provided this classification is a valid one, some conclusions can be drawn along two axes.

a) The perception of the environment and the relationship between the ethnic, religious groups etc. and the explanations that the authors put forth to explain this environment and these relationships and the values to attribute to them constitute the first axis.

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230 The author actually creates a new “Greek-Turkish” word, “Kalimerhaba,” taking syllables from two words which both mean “good morning”: kalimera (Greek) and merhaba (Turkish).
b) The second axis is comprised of the identity dimension of the above problematic. Where does the author need to place himself in this world? How does he/she perceive himself in this environment? The major findings will be listed below.

The perception of the (old and present) environment

1- The pre-nationalist movement of Ottomanism does not seem to continue after 1980 and even right after the establishing of the new nation-state (1923). However, an “imperial” approach, i.e., an antinationalist and “citizenship” identity based on the discourse of “our compatriots,” irrespective of religious and language differences, is seen in many novels until today. This tendency can be seen as an inclination toward multiculturalism. This “acceptance” of the Other is seen in novels that can be classified as Ottomanist, Marxist, Humanitarian, Anatolianist, etc. The end result is that the Other, in this case the non-Muslims, and the Greeks for example, are presented as positive and sometimes with nostalgia.

2- On the other hand, nationalist novels present the Other as very negative and unwelcomed until today. Also, the point of view of the authors who belong to the minorities themselves does not present major changes after 1980: They still complain about their status, politically and socially.

3- A more careful reading reveals that there are differences amongst the novels in the first group—Marxists, humanists, etc.—but not so much difference in the second group, that is, the “nationalists.” The nationalists are consistent and more uniform in their “explanations.” The first group presents a complexity both before 1980 and afterwards, up until the present day. Therefore, more attention is given to the approach I called “Anatolianism.” As mentioned above, the “we are very close to the Other” or “we lived happily together in the past” discourse may operate as a means to exalt the Ottoman/Turkish past. But it may have other sources, too. Therefore, other parameters should be taken into consideration in order to “understand” the various tendencies.

4- One determining parameter is the “cause” of the historical happy and unhappy incidents. The nationalist tendency (and that of the Anatolianists, too) is to silence the “reasons” behind the negative developments and to give credit to “us” (to the Ottoman legacy, for example) by discussing happy and positive developments.

5- Therefore, the “multiculturalism” that is expressed may operate as a means to negate a nationally xenophobic past. The author simply distances himself from these negative and not-politically-correct historical events by silencing the “cause” on the one hand, and by professing “multiculturalism,” a wish to “live together,” etc., on the other.

6- Seen from this perspective, the discourse of multiculturalism can divided into two classes, as follows: a) that accompanied by a critical approach to the past and b) that which is nostalgic without making an effort to “understand” the past. The second is characterized by a lack of empathy, too.

7- The presentation of “different” identities and of a new kind of multiculturalism is seen in the more recent novels which present “forgotten” or rather suppressed identities that have their bases outside Turkey (Crete, Balkans) and/or within Turkey (Kurdish, Karamanlis, etc). Actually, these novels are what is especially new in the field of multiculturalism in Turkey.

The Other as a national identity

8- What is surprising in the discourse of nostalgia for the “gone Other” is that there is a direct connection between the “gone” and the new arrivals to Istanbul from
Anatolia. It is as if the unhappy change is not in the “going” but in the “change” due to the new arrivals, too. In connection with this, it should be reminded that the lamentation is due more to the harm done to Istanbul (nostalgia of a golden age of a place) than to those that were forced to leave.

9- These phenomena can be interpreted in various ways and probably they do not all originate from the same reasons.
   a) One interpretation is that some authors do not feel close—or rather, they feel distant—to the people of Anatolia, who are mostly of peasant origin. This can be seen as a class reference and/or bias.
   b) Another interpretation can be that they perceive the non-Muslims, as well as themselves, as more European. This identification is more of a cultural one and the novels in this case operate as a means for professing an identity.

10- This second interpretation is backed up by another connected phenomenon. Many other ethnic groups are “gone” from Istanbul, too. They have either been assimilated or they have left. Apart from the Armenians and the Jews, who have become but a minute part of the population of Istanbul, ethnic groups like the Bulgarians, the Catholics (Levantines), the Karamanlis, the Albanians, the Bosnians, the Circassians, and the Arabs, as well as religious groups like the Bektashi, the Mevlevi, and so many other religious groups with their different and unique characteristics, are not mentioned in this “multiculturalism” discourse. In fact, they are even looked down upon. The existence of the Kurds in Istanbul, for example, is, surprisingly, not perceived as a sign of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, when expressed, is highly elitist and paradoxically xenophobic at the same time.

11- Therefore, this multiculturalism seems to be looking towards a single direction. Not only is it looking westward, but it is inclined to be closer to the Rum as a group, which is particularly connected with the Ottoman past. The Rums (often perceived as a group connected to Byzantium) are presented as witnesses who “prove” the happy past provided by the Ottoman state and society. Hence the connection of the nostalgia with the Anatolianist understanding mentioned above. In other words, “multiculturalism” may operate as a means to profess a western identity and an identification with the national positive past at the same time.

12- Looking at the issue from this point of view, one may say that the approach of “indirect cosmopolitanism” mentioned above is the most genuine “multiculturalism” movement in the present Turkish novel.
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The Imagined ‘Other’ as National Identity - Greeks and Turks

This study is a side product of three workshops that took place in Istanbul and in Athens in 2003 and 2004 and its object is to shed light to chronic conflicts that arise between neighboring countries. The participants were selected and invited to the workshops according to some criteria. They were mainly representatives of Greek or Turkish NGO’s, active in interethnic arena, preferably having prior experience with the Other, but also academics, mayors and other dignitaries in policy making. During the three workshops, among other activities, two questions were asked by me to the Greeks and Turkish participants:

a) What do you think as the negative qualities of the Other / what do you not like about the Other? and
b) What do you think the Other thinks as your negative qualities / what do you think the Other does not like about you?

The answers are illuminating. They not only provide, for the first time, a ‘list’ of complaints, grievances, resentments and laments of the Greeks and Turks but they also show the way the two sides perceive and experience differently a conflict that at first glance seems to be symmetrical and/or reciprocal. Each side has its own repertoire of issues and complaints, its own sources that reproduce the conflict, as well as its unique way of confronting and coping with its frustration.

The evaluation of the findings also showed that the citizens of the two countries, irrespective of their intentions, operate on different levels of consciousness. Sometimes they silence some crucial issues, not only to be politically correct, but also because they do not accept them as such. And some other times, they voice complaints only indirectly, not even noticing that they constitute expressions of acute grievances and anger. There are various areas of conflict that are ‘suppressed’ and expressed as simple political issues, hiding the real questions such as standing fears, sense of shame, communal identity based on ‘history’, etc.

First List of Complaints

The total number of participants that answered the first question are 74, 42 Greeks and 32 Turks. The 42 Greeks wrote down a total of 97 complaints and the 32 Turks 72 complaints. (For the complete list of the complaints of Greeks and Turks see Appendix 1).

Some of the grievances were voiced by various participants. For example, the Turks mentioned six times that the Greeks are ‘nationalists’ and the Greeks three times the same for the Turks. On the other hand, even though some accusations were phrased differently they seemed very close. The Greeks stated that they did not like ‘the role of the Turkish military in politics’ (5 times), ‘political and military intervention at all levels of life’ (3 times) and that ‘the Turkish army is imperialistic’. These three complaints that were heard nine times in total may form a group of complaints since they all seem to point to the same direction: annoyance with the role
of the army. Therefore the complaints were grouped to compose close clusters as shown in Appendix 1.

All the answers were also grouped in three main categories (a, b, and c). The grievances directed to the state, government, politicians, army, dignitaries etc. of the Other compose the first category. Complaints that are directed against the ‘character’, behavior, tendencies of the Other compose the second category. Complaints that could not be classified in the first two were shown in the third category. Quite often complaints of different categories are indirectly interconnected since some characteristics of the Other, for example, may be perceived as backing up the negative state and/or the government.

The complaints of the Greeks

The Greeks do not like the Turkish ‘state’ and the role of the army. The army is accused (in a1, total 9 times) for its ‘role’ and its political intervention at all levels of life. It is also characterized as ‘imperialistic’ (once). The state which is called various times in Turkish ‘derin devlet’ (i.e., the deep state) is accused being ‘oppressive’ and negative in general (4 times). It ‘influences’ the Turkish people and does not treat the Kurds well (4 times). The state influences relations with Greece negatively and delays solving problems such as the Cyprus issue, the school of Halki, etc. The Turkish politicians are not good either (a2).  

Other complaints give an indication as of what is not good with the ‘state’ and the political system in general (a3). The Greeks do not like the absence of ‘democracy’ and respect of ‘human rights’ (3), the lack of ‘freedom of expression’, the ‘negative state-citizen relationship’, the ‘suppression on journalists’ and the ‘intolerance of secular identity on religious groups’. ‘Ethnocentric education (2) and the ‘situation of women’ should probably be included in the shortcomings of the Turkish ‘state’ (a4).

These grievances sum up to a total of 33 and they comprise the 34% of all the complaints of the Greeks. The category ‘b’ complaints, which are directed to the ‘character’ and ‘behavior’ of the Turks are not completely irrelevant to the shortcomings of the ‘state’. In some cases it is as if the ‘negative’ behavior of the Turks sustains this negative ‘state’ and ‘army’. Many of the shortcomings of the Turks, such as ‘chauvinism’ and ‘nationalism’ for example, can be directly attributed to a citizen-state relationship that indirectly backs up a negative state. In other words, the ‘negative state’ is explained through a political and ideological milieu, which the citizens themselves compose.

Some complaints of this kind against the ‘Turks’ are the following (b1). Chauvinism and obsession with nationalism with national and/or with Atatürk (6) and nationalism (3) are mentioned 9 times in total. Arrogance ‘of a big country’ (3) superiority complex and aggressiveness, submission to political figures, not critical attitude (2) are political ‘complaints’ too. Kemalism is criticized twice: ‘devotion to father figure’ and as ‘confusing internationalism with Kemalism’. Turks are perceived as feeling they are the heirs of a big empire (this can be associated to superiority complex). Finally ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is mentioned without further explanation. The total of these complaints are 20 (21%) and if added to the previously given ‘a’ category, all together comprise the 55% of all complaints of the Greeks.

There follows another group of complaints which resemble the above, but they are rather less political and more idiosyncratic (b2). They appear as political tendencies

231 Unless it is otherwise specified, the complaints mentioned appear only once. From here on the number in parenthesis show the frequency of the complaint.
but they can be interpreted as the ‘characteristic’ of the Other, too. The statement ‘the average Turk accepts the deep state’ (2) is a complaint that presents a temperament of the Other. Statements such as ‘Turks do not have respect for human rights’ (3), they give ‘importance to hierarchy in work and family’ (2), they follow ‘strict social stratification’, they are not open on matters of family, (2), they are conservative and they ‘delay in adjusting to new developments’ (2) sound as ‘sociological’ observations and which endure time and compose rather to social reality than a political climate. They appear as ‘diachronic entities’ or in other words as stereotypes. Turks also ‘do little to change public life’; they are conformists and lack solidarity with the poor and weak. These are in total 15 statements and comprise the 21% of the complaints.

Another group of nine complaints (b3) are more closely associated with the Greeks. They compose a unity where the Turks appear with some ‘national characteristics’ vis a vis the Other. Turks have general insecurity about the Other, low self-esteem, they are paranoiac with the Treaty of Sèvres and the Megali Idea, feel a conspiracy coming from the West (syndrome of Sèvres), they are ‘attached to old hatred’, they do not understand the culture of the Other, they talk of ‘common culture’ too much, they present a superfluous friendship with the Greeks and are ignorant of ‘common history’. Naturally all these ‘national characteristics’ are in a sense political since they can be viewed as composing a unity of ‘anxiety about the Other’ in matters of security and historical references. The question remains however: whose is the ‘anxiety’? Is it of the Turks or of the Greeks who perceive an environment as the above? These complaints are nine in total (and only 9% of the total).

Turks seem to have some ‘personal’ shortcomings (‘vices’) too (b4). They do not ‘express their minds openly’ (4), they ‘conceal intentions under politeness’ (2), they are cunning and are easily carried away/influenced (probably by those higher in the hierarchy). The eight complaints of this kind comprise the 8% of all complaints.

There is a final category of complaints – ‘c’, Various – which is not easy to define. Some of these statements are quite technical, others difficult to classify and some others very humorous and/or irrelevant. In general these complaints seem the least ideological. There are twelve of them, seen in Attachment 1 and will dealt with in the final assessment.

Preliminary comments on the complaints of the Greeks

One should be very cautious in interpreting the above. These may not be the complaints of the Greeks but the ones voiced ‘in the presence’ of the Turks. The first interesting aspect is that there are very few complaints that are directly connected to Greek interests. There are two ‘political’ references to Greece (the Turkish state plays a negative role in matters of Greece, it does not solve Cyprus and Halki issues) and one stating that Turkish friendship with Greeks is superfluous. All the other complaints are either completely disassociated with the Greeks or one has to infer the connection in order to suspect the Greek connection of the complaint.
Why do the Greeks complain for issues that do not affect them? It is not clear why the negative perception of Turkish ‘state’ with the alleged negative effect on Turkish society is a main topic of grievances to Greeks. Derin devlet, lack of democracy, negative treatment of Kurds, bad politicians etc. (the first 33 complaints, except the two), are all internal problems of Turkey. Can we infer that the Greeks have only complaints about the local issues of Turkey or should we think that the Greeks believe that negative state apparatus is eventually harmful to Greek-Turkish relations? If it is the second, why don’t the Greeks directly say it but ‘silence’ their main concern?

The same questions apply to the next group of complaints. Is chauvinism, nationalism, arrogance, obsession with political figures, etc., shortcomings and vices of Turks or are they characteristics that eventually threaten and harm the Greeks? If the second case has predominance, why was it systematically avoided and not declared? Nobody said, for example ‘Turks have nationalistic intentions against Greece’, or ‘Turks have chauvinistic feelings against the Greeks’. How are we going to interpret the complaint of ‘big country complex’? Is it personal weakness of the Turks or a threat to Greeks?

These ‘shortcomings’ are valid for many countries of the world but also of the Balkans and the Middle East. But the Greeks have ‘problems’ almost exclusively with Turkey. Is it because of Cyprus and Halki only? Why did we not hear other complaints that would justify and explain the long duration of Greek-Turkish problematic relations? A systematic silencing and an avoidance of directly and openly stating the complaints seem to be in effect.

The complaints about the ‘character of Turks’ need also be interpreted first in order to make sense out of them. Acceptance of ‘deep state’, lack of respect to human rights, conservatism etc., – if true – are definitely negative aspects of Turkish society and it is normal for the Greeks not to like them. The question that comes to one’s mind is the following: are the Greeks so much concerned about the ills of the Turkish society or are they worried that the ills will have a negative effect on the Greeks? This possibility has not been voiced either.

The complaints that need a thorough deconstruction are the ones that have to do with the ‘insecurity’, the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, the ‘Megali Idea’, the ‘common culture discourse’ etc., of the Turks. Connected with a tendency (of the Turk) not to ‘express his mind openly and hide it behind politeness’ (one wonders what intentions the Turks hide) the ‘cunning Turk’ appears rather as a threat than a neighbor with weaknesses and shortcomings. The word ‘threat’ however, was not mentioned; not even once!

A final assessment will be tried below, jointly with the answers given to the ‘second question’: what do you think the Other does not like in you?

The image of a negative Turk

Had the Greeks been asked to write down the aspects they ‘liked’ in the Other, we would have ended with a much more cheerful list. There is not a consensus about Turkish image either. Each individual has normally a different image of the neighbor. Some may even refuse to think in these terms, i.e., with stereotypes of Turks and Greeks. However, I will venture to draw a profile of the Turk based on the above complaints. I will put all said (or almost all) together in *italics* and in one person. This portrait is not the worst possible ever! The stereotype will be ‘completed’ when the grievances of the ‘second question’ are also analyzed and the new ‘shortcomings’ of the Other will be added to this one.
An arrogant Turk
(Collectively sketched by Greeks)

Why does he look so arrogant? He behaves as if he is still the ruler of a big empire, and probably because of that he often reminds us that Turkey is a big country. He always wants to feel superior when he communicates with ‘us’. But he cannot fool me! In reality he is trying to hide his insecurity and his low self-esteem. (Because ‘we’ have always been superior to him) He has paranoiac fears against the West and the Megali Idea. He thinks that the West and the Greeks conspire against him.

It may be due to this insecurity that he feels the need to develop a powerful state (derin devlet) and an army, which controls all aspects of life. The military intervenes in all aspects of life. This state cannot but become oppressive. Not only by interfering and manipulating even the consciousness of the people but sometimes by directly suppressing the citizens themselves. See the situation of the Kurds for example. There is no freedom of expression, journalists are suppressed and even a secular identity is imposed to religious groups and to minorities.

And what does our arrogant Turk do when all these happen? Due to his devotion to ‘father figure’ Atatürk and his tendency to be carried away (and be persuaded) easily, let alone his lack of critical attitude, not only does he not fight against the state but on top of it he submits to political figures, he accepts the ‘deep state’ and he succumbs to the set hierarchy. In this country of his a negative state-citizen relationship prevails. He is unwilling to change this public life because he is very conservative, actually a conformist.

Is he clever? Maybe, but I would prefer to say he is rather cunning. He looks very polite but I am afraid he hides his intentions and his feelings behind this mask. To tell you the truth, these hidden intentions are what bothers me most. Let me explain why.

Right next to us he have this Turkish army which is imperialistic, very bad politicians and a state that negatively influences Greek-Turkish relations. See how they delay in solving standing issues such as the Cyprus problem and the closed-down school of Halki. This Turk is a nationalist and even a chauvinist. But no wonder, he has been brought up with an ethnocentric educational system. On one hand he talks a lot about our supposed common culture, about ‘dolma’ etc., but on the other hand he understands nothing about the culture of the Other. His friendship is superfluous and he is ignorant of our common history. He is actually attached to old hatreds. Considering his lack of respect to human rights and democracy I believe this Turk constitutes a threat to me.

The complaints of the Turks

The asymmetry is most striking in the complaints of the Turks vis a vis the Greek ‘state’ (a1). Actually the complaints are not targeted to the Greek ‘state’ per se, nor to the ‘army’. The complaints are against the policies of the Greek ‘government’: supporting separatist PKK, ill treatment of Turkish minority in Western Thrace, provoking the masses, ‘exaggerating’ Cyprus issue and creating tension and enmity in the bilateral relations. Some complaints are directed to bureaucracy (a2): visa problems, red tape (2 times) and the ‘behavior in the consulates’ and in the national borders and customs. Some criticized the ‘left’ political groups as ‘religiously dependent’ (a3). The image of the Turks in textbooks is a source of complaint as well as the ‘state-individual’ relationship. These sum up to 14 complaints and constitute 19% of the total of 72 complaints.

Complaints by Turks related to the ‘character’ of the Greeks show similarities with their Greek counterparts (b1). The Greeks are ‘nationalists’ (6), arrogant, fanatical and
too ‘preoccupied’ with the Turks, both left and right believe in conspiracy against them, they are ‘too critical’ and ‘exaggerate political issues’ (12 complaints, 17% of the total). The two groups of complaints, which are mostly ‘political’, put together (a and b1) comprise the 36% of grievances, whereas the corresponding Greek complaints, as we saw above, were 55%.

Then follows a list of ‘historical’ complaints, of concerns of negative Turkish ‘image’ and some resentment associated with the first two (b2 and b3). These complaints sum up to 20, (27%) of the total, whereas in the corresponding case of the Greeks the grievances comprise only 9% of the Greek complaints.

According to the Turks the Greeks are ‘proud of their past (of Ancient Greece for example) (4), ‘they write Ottoman-Greek history nationalistically’ and they ‘disregard our common past’. They do not ‘feel one community with us’. They have an ideological history’ and they ‘appropriate our common traditions (coffee, cheese etc.). (Total 9 complaints).

Next we have the ‘image’ complaints - a category of resentment that is not encountered on the Greek side. The Turkish participants complained that the Greeks think Turks are ‘aggressors’ (occupied Greek lands), see Turks as ‘barbarians’, Greeks have stereotypes, they think Turks smoke hashish and nargile and that they do not drink alcoholic drinks. Greeks believe everything they read in the media, do trust the Turks, they dislike, they even hate them and they develop insincere relationships. The indignation is expressed with long sentences and a rhetoric question: ‘Greeks did not invite Turks, not even as tourists (to a meeting?) while they invite all the rest of the world’ and ‘why aren’t the Greeks on top of the list of friends of Turkey?’

An asymmetry is noticed in complaints having to do with the ‘character’ and ‘behaviour’ of the Other too. According to the Greeks the Turks are ‘arrogant’ (4 times) on the political arena and with respect to the balance of power: ‘big country’ and ‘ex-empire’. The Turks on the contrary see lack of ‘humility’ in a different framework; rather at a historical/cultural level. Greeks lack humbleness, they are snobbish, they think they are Europeans (2), ‘they are sure they are right’ (2), they are self-satisfied, they do not listen to the Other, it is difficult to communicate with Greeks, they are restrained (3), they are superficial, they use demagogy and they always complain.

These lamentations are coupled with some more complaints that are associated with the negative ‘character of the Greeks’ (b5). Greeks are hot tempered (2), noisy (2), pedants, untrustworthy, too religious, not considerate, not punctual, honest but harsh (10 complaints, 14%).

The third category (c-Various, c1) of ‘complaints’ is a surprise. Four different Turkish participants did not point any complaint saying that that do not have any: ‘I meet Greeks for the first time’, ‘Greeks are not the Other’, ‘I wish peace between Greeks and Turks’ were the answers given. (These answers were not included to the ‘complaints’). There were two other answers with great sense of humour! ‘Greeks do not cook well’ and ‘they always win in basketball games’.

The Preliminary comments on the complaints of the Turks

Turkish participants voiced in total 72 complaints worded in 55 different ways (Appendix 1). When grouped together we obtain three big categories (a, b, c) and 9 groups (a1, a2 etc). Looking closely to see what the complaints about ‘situations’ that may cause a conflicts are, i.e., the situations that ‘harm’ or distress the Other, we see that these are of two kinds: a) real situations that need to be corrected, and b)
‘psychological’ attitudes that should be abandoned by the Greeks (or ignored by the Turks).

The real problems mentioned in the workshops originate from the Greek government or the bureaucracy: Greeks back up separatist PKK, the Turkish minority is not treated properly, the Turks face difficulties in the consulates and in the boarders (visa problems). These complaints are voiced in total 6 times (8%). Some other grievances against the Greek government (and Greeks) do not refer to real problems but only to ‘images’ and perceptions. The politicians (and the Greeks) are perceived to ‘exaggerate’ some (presumably) minor issues: ‘Greek government exaggerates Cyprus issue’, ‘Greeks exaggerate political issues’.

The majority of Turkish complaints seem to consist of ‘misperceptions’, ‘misunderstandings’, ‘prejudices’, non-valid ‘images’ etc., originating from the Greek camp. Apart from the ‘exaggerations’ mentioned above the policy of the Greek government to ‘provoke masses’, to ‘disturb cultural bilateral relations’ and to promote a ‘negative image of Turks in the textbooks’ are actions of this kind too. The Greek government behaves as if there is a problem (where in fact there is not); and this of course becomes the problem.

It is as if the whole difficulty is one of an ‘image’, of the image of the Turks. The whole group of b2 and b3 seems to consist of this image problem. Greeks disregard ‘our common past’, ‘write Ottoman history nationally’ and by ideological history writing they develop tension: ‘they do not feel one community with us’, ‘they think Turks occupied their lands’, ‘they see us as barbarians’, they have stereotypes etc. Actually, have these not happened the ‘Greeks would have been on top of the list of friends of Turkey’. These ‘image’ problems (voiced as complaints) are in total more than 30 (42%).

Some of the negative ‘Greek characteristics’ are also related to this image and prejudice problematic. The lack of humbleness of Greeks and the whole of group b4 (and partly b5) complaints can be associated to the unwillingness of Greeks (due to their haughtiness, pride, superiority complex) to transcend nationalism (6 times in b1) and fanaticism against the Turks (total about of 10 complaints).

When the complaints related to images and related issues (exaggerations, lack of humbleness etc.) are summed up we reach the total of about 40 complaints (55%). This is an interesting figure because it equals to the Greek case where we saw that 55% of the Greek complaints are directed to the Turkish ‘state’ and to the related power relations. Tentatively we can infer that the Greeks have voiced complaints of ‘state relations’ and political, and the Turks grievances, or rather resentments and offenses of image, misunderstandings and prejudices.

An additional indication that the Turkish participants are more inclined to ‘play down’ the differences and instead bring forward ‘misunderstanding’ is seen in the answers of four Turkish participants who, contrary to the instructions, declared that they have no complaints and talked of peace and good will.

The image of a negative Greek

Can we sketch a portrait of a negative Greek based on the list these complaints? Why not!

My Greek Brother
(Collectively sketched by Turks)

As a Turk I feel we are one community with my Greek brother. I do not have any complaint from him. He is not the Other for me and the more I meet him the more
I like him. My wish is to live in peace with him. We have the same traditions and under normal conditions this Greek is on the top of the list of friends of Turkey.

But the conditions are not normal! The Greek politicians and governments have provoked the Greek masses (and this Greek friend of mine), disturbed the cultural bilateral relations, created a negative image of the Turk in textbooks and media, exaggerated situations such as the Cyprus issue and other political issues and, what a pity, my Greek brother displays a strange attitude. He became a fanatic against Turks; he is preoccupied with me, all his compatriots, left and right, think we conspire against them.

My brother especially thinks that we occupied his land and he calls me barbarian. There are a thousand of stereotypes for a penny (this is a Turkish expression that means, abundance of stereotypes). Can you imagine it? He believes everything that he reads in media against me and the next day he reaches the point to ask me if I smoke hashish and nargile! Lately, I mean the last hundred years or so, he refrains from inviting me even though he invites everybody else.

I suspect he does not trust me any more; I feel that he dislikes me, maybe he even hates me. I think this nationalism of his is not an accident. It is the result of ideological history education. He has read books that present Ottoman-Greek history nationally. He ended up being too proud of his historical past, of Ancient Greece. He lacks the traditional humility and humbleness, now he thinks he is a European. You have to see how self-satisfied he looks. He never listens to me, and it is very difficult for me to communicate with him. He always thinks he is right, let alone his demagogy and his superficial behavior. Don’t you think that this means an insincere relationship? And what I hate most is that he always complains, complains, complains.

I forgive some of his personal weaknesses. Who is perfect? He is hot tempered, noisy, ‘ukala’ (smart ass), untrustworthy, inconsiderate, too religious, not punctual and harsh. But mind you, he is honest!

I am sure he is very upset that his government helps PKK and treats Turkish minority very badly. He told me personally that he is sorry that I suffer in the Greek customs and consulates to get a visa. He does not like Greek bureaucracy either.

Thinking it over, I think he might have some faults. But I repeat, under normal conditions this Greek likes me very much, because we lived for years together happily (under the Ottoman rule). Earnestly, I feel this Greek is my twin brother.

Second List of Complaints

The answers of the Greeks to the Second Question

There are in total 89 answers of the Greeks worded in 44 different ways (see Attachment 2). The 44 different answers (to the question “What do you think as the negative qualities of the Other / what do you not like about the Other?”) are grouped again to compose comprehensible unities.

The answers given by the Greeks bring a new dimension to the ‘complaints’ of the Greeks: they change the agenda of the grievances and introduce issues of sovereignty, irredentism, historical rights, etc. Even though when the Greeks were asked to list their complaints about the Turks they did not mention similar issues, whereas when asked indirectly they ‘complain’ that the Turks see the Greeks as having claims on Turkish lands.
The Greeks see Turks as perceiving the Greeks to ‘have claims on Turkish lands’ (2 times), to follow *Megali Idea* (4), to claim Aegean as Greek (2), wanting the ‘Enosis’ of Cyprus and ‘not forgetting 1919-1922’ (in total 10 times, 11%). In connection with these complaints, which are partly connected to ‘historical issues’, some other ‘historical’ grievances are voiced (7 in total). The Turks (according to the Greeks) see the Greeks being arrogant about their history, emphasizing their cultural background, ‘ungrateful to Ottoman period’, etc. Greeks also believe that the Turks see them in a kind of alliance with the West: ‘Greeks are the spoiled children of Europe’ (4 times) and they have convinced Europe that they are Europeans. These complaints total to 24 (27%).

There are some other ‘usual’ complaints and characterizations ‘against the Greeks’ which seen in the new perspective of ‘sovereignty rights’ they acquire a ‘meaning’ and ‘explanation’. The Turks supposedly see the Greeks as ‘hostile against the Turkish people’ (4), ‘against friendship’ (2), arrogant and selling Europeanism’ (4), creating obstacles and harming Turkey on issues of EU (5), etc. These are in total 19 (20%) complaints.

Taking all these as a package of complaints (43 in total, 48%) it can be seen that the image of the Greeks *vis a vis* the Turks is as follows: The Turks see ‘us’ as a nation which has irredentist claims on Turkish lands, operates contrary to the interests of Turkey, has Europe as her ally and does not like Turks (see Appendix 2, a, b).

There are other negative characteristics that the Turks attribute (according to the Greek perception) to Greeks that ‘make sense’: if a nation is irredentist it should have the following aspects too: Greeks are nationalists, chauvinists, arrogant, aggressive, tricky, manipulators, etc. (total 25 times, 27%). Only 21 complaints (24% of the total) do not ‘fit’ directly to the package of the sovereignty/historical claims: Greeks speak too much, are emotional etc. Still even some of these can be seen as part of the *Megali Idea* project: for example the Greeks lack an ‘open mind’ (3 times), they have egocentric education, they follow religious leaders (in the sense of ‘conservative’, ‘backward’ leaders), etc.

Therefore irrespective of how the Turkish side perceives the Greeks, the Greeks themselves see themselves perceived as dangerous neighbors of Turkey and of the Turks.\(^{232}\) The interesting part is that when asked to name their complaints (first question) there were only two complaints (2%) that were associated to this issue of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘irredentism’: ‘Turks have *Megali Idea* paranoia’ and they ‘have a syndrome of Sévres’

The answers of the Turks to the Second Question

There are in total 67 answers worded in 43 different ways (see Appendix 2). The 43 different answers are grouped again to compose comprehensible unities. The Turks also change their agenda of complaints when they answered the question ‘what do you think the Other does not like about you?’ The Turks see the Greeks having complaints against Turks many of which are directly associated to sovereignty, to historical rights and power relations.

According to the Turks the Greeks have complaints against ‘them’ for the following reasons: The Greeks do ‘not like Ottoman past’, they believe that ‘the Turks

\(^{232}\) This of course does not mean that the Greeks are dangerous neighbors with irredentist claims, or that they see themselves as such. It means that they see the Turks perceiving the Greeks in this manner. Which, as a consequence, raises the tension between the countries: once one sees the Other (or better, perceives the Other) so ‘prejudiced’ and negatively inclined against ‘us’ he develops the corresponding defenses and defensive feelings.
have oppressed them for hundreds of years’; ‘occupied and destroyed Greek civilization’; expelled Greeks from Anatolia; Istanbul and other presently Turkish lands should belong to Greeks; and Turks claim Greek cultural heritage. In total these complaints number to only 9, but a second group of (imagined or real) complaints follow the first group, and these appear supplementing the first, presenting Turks as a power that is still capable of ‘repeating’ this historical past. So the Turks think that the Greeks see them as follows: ‘militaristic and invaders’ (6 times), ‘a threat for Greeks’ (4), aggressors and arrogant (2), admiring the army and spending money on arms, dominating etc.

The total of these supposed Greek complaints, which can be read anew as Turkish grievances, total to 29 and are the 43% of the Turkish answers. When the Turks had been asked to state their complaints against the Greeks (first question) they mentioned directly only once that ‘Greeks think Turks are aggressors occupying their land’ (1%) and twice in a roundabout way (3%): Greeks ‘disregard our common past’ and ‘Greeks write Ottoman-Greek history nationally’.

Consistent with the image of the Greeks shown above, the Turks infer that the Greeks (should) think that Turks ‘dislike them’, ‘do not trust them’, ‘ask too much form Greeks’, etc. Turks also believe that the Greeks have a low esteem of them: Turks are nationalist, conservative, ignorant, hypocritical, primitive, too religious, not democratic, corrupt etc. (total 32 negative characterizations, 48%).

**In short the Turks, in the same way as the Greeks, ‘expect’ many grievances directed to ‘us’ and originating from history, from biased evaluation of history, from historical rights; all complaints pointing toward the same direction: sovereignty issues, militaristic treats, allies and power relations. However, these issues become apparent only when the questions are asked indirectly.**

**How much do the parties know the “Other”?**

A. The predictions of the Turks

This is a difficult question to answer. When we try to match the complaints of one party and the guesses the Other party predicting these complaints we see that in some items there is congruence and in some other fields not. For example, the Greeks had complaints about the militaristic character of Turkey (9 times, 9%) and the Turks foresaw that (10 times, 15%) but with a difference. The Greeks did not specify what is negative in being militaristic, whereas the Turks perceive the Greeks to characterize the Turkish army as ‘invaders’. Both sides ‘match’ in characterizing Turks as nationalists, but the Turkish side missed completely that Greeks would have complaints about Kemalism and submission to authority and hierarchy (8%). The Greeks saw Turkey as not democratic, conservative etc. (15%) but the Turkish side noticed lack of democracy by only 1% and used the word ‘barbaric’ which is not used by the Greek side at all.

The Greek side had many reservations about the Turkish state (and the infamous ‘deep state’) but the Turkish side missed it almost completely (only one participant mentioned this item). The Kurdish issue is mentioned only by the Greeks as a grievance that ‘they are not treated well by the state’. ‘History’ and (the related) threat are the issues where the greatest discrepancies are met. The Turkish side predicted that the Greeks would complain about ‘occupied Greek lands’ (13%) whereas the Greeks shortly mentioned that the Turks are paranoiac with the Megali Idea. Also the Turkish side mentioned that the Greeks would complain that the Turks compose a threat, that they are imperialists and the like. However the Greeks did not mention – at least directly – such ‘dangers’. They only mentioned a few times that Turkey has an
imperialistic army and a complex of being ‘a great power’, but they neither specified the targets nor its being a ‘threat’ to Greece.

At first glance it looks as if there is not real ‘knowledge of the Other’ and that the Turkish side did not guess successfully. One cannot be sure however, that the Greeks expressed themselves in sincerity. All that discourse of ‘arrogance, nationalism, militarism, oppressive state, lack of respect to democracy and human rights’ against Turkey and the Turks look irrelevant and thus sound suspicious. To whom is all this supposed potential ‘negativity’ directed if not to the neighboring country? But the Greeks did not voice this complaint. In that respect the appearance of lack of congruity may be misleading.

But more importantly, both sides declared and foresaw complaints of the same kind. Both mentioned the army, politics, nationalism, ‘history’, the way the society operated (politicians, democracy, etc.) and many negative national ‘characteristics’. Neither the Greeks mentioned concrete practical or technical operational shortcomings on the Turkish side, nor the Turks foresaw any. Both sides moved around similar parameters. At least in that respect they matched.

B. The predictions of the Greeks

Almost the same can be said about the guesses of the Greeks. The Greeks foresaw successfully that the Turks would complain that the European Union is used by the Greeks against Turkey. Also they predicted that the Turkish side would have grievances about the way the Greeks interpret the Ottoman history and the so-called ‘common past’. They correctly guessed that there would be complaints about how the Greeks are ‘too’ religious. On the other hand the Greeks only partly saw how important a complaint of a negative image of the Turks was for the Turks (27%) and thus they just mentioned the issue in passing.

Some other issues mentioned by the Greeks as possible complaints of the Turks did not appear in the list (of ‘first questions’) of the Turks. For example the Turks did not mention that the Greeks had claims on Turkish lands (10% for the Greeks). It seems that neither party mentions that the Other might compose a threat to their own sovereignty. Either because they do not want to give the impression that they have worries and fears – since this may be interpreted as a sign of weakness and will not be very flattering to the national pride – or because they want to behave politically correct and not accuse the Other on such a sensitive issue. But both sides systematically claims that the Other ‘thinks’ that ‘we’ have such alleged claim.

Asymmetry in the perceptions

Even though both parties have an agenda of ‘sovereignty’, of ‘history’, etc., there is an asymmetry with respect to the ‘lands’ in question. Whose lands are in jeopardy? The question can be answered having in mind two different perspectives. For the Turkish side it is their ‘present’ lands that are in question: ‘the Greeks think that we the Turks occupied their land, etc’. Therefore the issue for the Turkish side becomes one of sovereignty of the ‘present’ rights - irrespective of the Greek view on the same topic, i.e., if the Greeks do want to ‘recapture’ these lands.

For the Greeks, the lands in question – the Turks think ‘we’ have Megali Idea and irredentism in mind – are ‘old’ Greek lands. Therefore for the Greeks, again irrespective of their ‘intentions’, the issue has a ‘historical’ dimension.

The two sides have an agenda of ‘sovereignty’ but on different bases. The Turkish side perceives the ‘present’ issues whereas the Greeks the ‘historical’ ones. It would be expected that in this case, in order to confront the real or imaginary claims of the
Other, the Turkish side would be inclined to develop a reconciliatory historical interpretation of the Greek Turkish relations. On the other hand the Greek side uses ‘history’ to legitimize a national past, where they had been the ‘victims’, especially in the field of ‘sovereignty’, having lost their ‘homeland’.

Many Turkish complaints obtain ‘sense’ once seen from this point of view. In the ‘first question’ one-fourth of these complaints were about the Greeks who disregard ‘our common history’, ‘are proud of their history’ and about the Greeks who see ‘us as aggressors, barbarians and dislike us’. In the ‘second question’ too, the Turks perceive the Greeks as seeing them as invaders, aggressors, as a threat in the 43% of the complaints.

The Greeks, on the other hand, almost completely silenced the issues of ‘lands’ in the ‘first question’ and they did not ‘complain’; and in the ‘second’, where the question is addressed indirectly, they presented the Turks perceiving the Greeks as having historical claims on the Turkish lands; having the *Megali Idea*, being arrogant, in alliance with the West, hostile to Turks, etc., in short irredentist by 48%.

The overall impression is that the parties are somehow aware of the issues that occupy the mind of the Other. Their guesses are in the ‘vicinity’ of these issues: national, historical etc. However, their guesses presented serious omissions on the one hand and important distortions on the other. They are as if they view the same picture but using eyeglasses of different colors and at the same time looking at different parts of the same picture.

Assessment of the ‘Answers’

**Interpreting the answers to the First Question**

Very often what is ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’ for one side tends to be perceived as ‘prejudice’ and ‘image’ by the Other. This becomes clearer in the answers of the ‘second question’. More importantly, the complaints voiced as answers to the ‘first question’ do not match with those of the ‘second’. In some instances it appears as if there is neither ‘knowledge’ about the Other, nor the acceptance of its absence. The parties are not even conscious of the discrepancies and contradictions in their answers.

When one says the Greeks/Turks are nationalists, arrogant (against *me*) or ‘they do not like us’ etc., he/she at the same time expresses a mood, a feeling of discontent, a complaint, an opposition, a grievance etc. In this sense the ‘image’ is an expression of a relationship with the Other and a result of ‘our’ identity. In the case of Greeks and Turks the identity is a national one. It is of interest that almost all the answers given to the ‘first question’ were ‘national’ in the sense that the respondents perceived the Greeks as a community with some common tendencies, attitudes, etc.233

Irrespective of the extent to which the answers possibly ‘contain’ valid information (the ‘reality’) about the state of the Other, the ‘image’ part of the answers (no. 2

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233 The situation is more complex and will not be handled here. Actually the question itself (what do you not like in the Other?) leads the respondent to the ‘logic’ of national perception. We ask him/her to accept that there is a category called Greeks or Turks, i.e., to accept the national paradigm and to answer accordingly. However, on the other hand, this question was received as a ‘natural’ one. One or two of the respondents mildly voiced some reservations to the ‘generalization’ but more importantly, when they were enumerating their ‘complaints’ none used the adjectives ‘some’ (some of the Gs/Ts) or ‘the majority of’ or a similar adjective to avoid stereotyping the Other and to disunite the ‘negative’ from the ‘whole nation’. ‘The Gs/Ts are nationalists’ was considered a normal answer by almost all.
above) is valid and even predominant. Taking the list of complaints as a whole we see, not only the grievances that may exist on one side for the other, but also the domain on which these complaints are concentrated. Very few complaints refer to areas that are not ‘national’. The complaints of the kind ‘there is poverty’, ‘the streets are dirty’, ‘heavy traffic’, ‘food is not good’ are exceptional. Almost all of the complaints are in a domain where national interests are apparent: national history; national prestige, pride and dignity; national gains and security; difficulties that ‘our nation’ faces, etc.

Therefore the answers given to ‘question one’ should be analyzed as an indication of a national identity that is expressed through the perceptions of the Other. The image of the Other is a sign of the mood of the source of the image, i.e., of the one that states the complaint.

As for the ‘truth’ that this image may contain, it is debatable. To the extent that a) it contains contradictions and silences, and b) it is not accepted and/or it is challenged by the Other, this ‘reality’ expressed (only) by ‘us’ will remain rather as a hypothesis still to be demonstrated.

Interpreting the answers to the Second Question

The answers to the second question (‘what do you think the Other does not like about you?’) can be evaluated in different ways according to different points of views:
1. **Knowing the Other.** One can find ‘how much we know the Other’; if ‘we’ can predict the attitude of the Other. This can be documented by comparing our ‘predictions’ (of the feelings and the complaints of the Other about ‘us’) with the complaints of the Other already expressed in the ‘first question’. To the extent that the two sets match we can infer that we know or we do not know the Other. A precondition for accomplishing this is that the Other expresses his complaints earnestly without silencing some and exaggerating others.

2. **Image-complaint.** One can also evaluate these answers as an indication of a kind of ‘self-image’. Supposedly one tries to guess the complaints of the Other; we talk about the perceptions of the Other about ‘us’. But actually ‘we’ talk on behalf of the Other and produce an image of ‘us’. The answer to the question ‘how does the Other see you’, once is answered by ‘us’, it becomes ‘our’ image about ‘ourselves’: our self-image.

However, this is a self-image of the second order: it is ‘our image’ but as this is envisaged in the Other. Such an image in practice does not differ from a complaint. Every time an image of this kind appears to us as ‘unjust’ it equals to a complaint of ‘ours’. ‘The other thinks I am a barbarian’ or ‘the Other thinks I want to capture his lands’ are images of this kind. Let’s call this image ‘image-complaint’

3. **Self-knowledge.** The answer may contain ‘self-knowledge’. To the degree that our ‘self-image’ complies with ‘reality’ it can be understood as ‘self-knowledge’; and conversely, if there is considerable discrepancy between our ‘self-image’ and ‘reality’

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234 Two examples are worth mentioning. Two very young participants, actually representing youth organizations, not only did they give original ‘non-national’ answers but they also made it clear with a kind of self-satisfaction and pride, and a lot of humorous mood, that it was them who wrote down these answers. (The written answers were handled anonymously) The Greek girl had written down as her complaint that Istanbul is very humid (and her hair did not look well) and the Turkish young man said that the Greek basketball teams always win!

235 Even some innocent looking answers may be interpreted as nationally biased ones. The Greek who perceives the Turks ‘disorganized’ may have ‘missed’ that the Greek society is at least as disorganized as the Turkish one. Or isn’t it legitimate to suspect an answer stating ‘I haven’t got any complaint’ as an indication of silencing grievances?
we may conclude that ‘self-knowledge’ is missing. However, there is a problem to these ‘theoretical’ assertions: what is ‘reality’, whose reality is it and how is it reached?

Actually, as mentioned above, our image, which is expressed by the Other, in most cases is turned into a ‘image-complaint’. Naturally this image is not accepted by ‘us’ either as a ‘reality’ or as a ‘self-knowledge’ anyhow.

4. ‘Our’ image of the Other. The answers definitely is a manifestation of ‘our’ image of the Other. The response to the question ‘what the Other thinks of you?’ is the outcome of ‘your’ image of the Other. If ‘you’ perceive him as a friend you will say positive things, if you consider him an enemy or an opponent (or the Other) your answers will contain real or imaginary grievances of the Other. 236

5. National identity. All the above can be seen as identity relations. The two ‘groups’ identified as Greeks and Turks come to existence because of a ‘group coherence’, which in turn is possible due to a ‘national’ identity. The relationship with the Other and especially Greek-Turkish relations are connected to ‘national history’, to ‘national events and interests’ etc. All the relations with the Other and especially the perceptions and images about the Other are connected to this ‘identity’. Or maybe it would be wiser to say that what makes each ‘group’ see things in its own particular way is a socio-psychological dynamic which conventionally is called ‘national identity’.

Who are the ‘Greeks’, the ‘Turks’ and the ‘participants’?
The national/ethnic categories used until now in this study need some clarification. The ‘participants’ of the workshops were ‘special’ Greeks and Turks. As mentioned above they were mainly representatives of Greek or Turkish NGO’s, having prior experience with the Other. The participants that communicated with the Other for the first time were less than 5%. Almost 80% of the participants had higher education and more than 50% were members of a university. Most importantly they all shared the willingness to communicate with the Other and almost all were public activists with critical judgement. Many were working in fields that had to do with conflict resolution, stereotypes, prejudices, ethnic skirmishes, etc.

This ‘sample’ is far from representing the ‘average’ Greek or Turk. Especially the group of the third workshop was composed mostly of academics experts in education, minority rights, policy making, all involved in issues of stereotypes and images. There was a ‘third question’ that was asked only to this group and their answers are indicative of the ‘quality’ of the participants. The question was: ‘what do you see as a negative attitude in your side vis a vis the Other?’ (See Appendix 3). 237

The answers show that the participants are ready to accept many ‘shortcomings’ of ‘their side’ and negative attitudes vis a vis the Other. This is not a typical and widespread behaviour of nations worldwide. Twelve Greeks and eight Turks ‘confessed’ 26 and 18 of their shortcomings respectively.

A closer look at these answers however, may give the impression that even this group silences and/or avoids some issues. Classifying ‘our own vices’ as ‘political’, ‘prejudices’ and ‘bad behaviour’, one sees the following interesting situation. As

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236 Or vice versa, if you believe that the Other has a negative image of you (or negative attitudes against you), you will feel ‘yourself’ an ‘opponent’ to the Other. The premise that one is friendly towards the Other even if the Other hates him is not very persuasive and it rather camouflages grievances and/or unconscious aggressiveness.

237 It was a mistake on my part not to think to ask this particular question to all participants (of workshops no.1 and 2, too). Then we could have tried a more reliable evaluation of ‘self-knowledge’.
political mistakes the Greeks accept only two: having territorial claims ‘to articulate national identity’ and to act as if they know ‘what is right’ because they are ‘autochthon nation’. The wording of these ‘confessions’ is intricate. Do the Greeks have claims or do they simply ‘articulate an identity’ by voicing a claim? As for being an ‘autochthon nation’ this should be understood in contrast with the ‘Other nation’ which, automatically, is understood as not being ‘native’. The Turkish ‘political mistakes’ are only one: not recognizing the minority rights of Greeks (3 times). It is interesting that the Greeks did not complain about the minority rights but only about the school of Halki. In other words politically the parties seem to face only few minor issues.

Both sides accept that they have prejudices with respect to the Other, they blame the educational system for this and they accept in general that they do not feel at ease with the Other. The Greeks accept that they have a ‘superiority complex’. 54% and 66% of the ‘confessions’ of the Greeks and of the Turks respectively comprises the ‘negative behavior’ group. The Greeks accept that they are nationalists, arrogant, not sincere during communication (silencing issues) and the Turks add to the above military arrogance and lack of empathy. (See Appendix 3 for the details.)

On one hand these ‘acceptances’ are impressive and show the high degree of ‘self-knowledge’ and willingness of self-criticism of this particular group of participants. On the other, the list of shortcomings poses some problems and triggers questions. Are these the only ‘mistakes’ of the two parties in the political arena? Accepting prejudices and problematic education, as well as nationalism and arrogance ‘in general’, i.e., without mentioning the areas where these are implemented and affected the Other, can’t it be interpreted as avoiding the issue?

Even in this group ‘silencing’ seems predominant. The accepted shortcomings and mistakes are without ‘object’. Why is ‘nationalism’ a vice? How does nationalism operate vis-à-vis the Other? The question was not ‘what shortcomings each group had’ but the wrongdoings ‘with respect to the Other’. This question was not answered directly. The wording of the answers give the impression of a systematic avoidance of showing and naming the shortcomings and the problematic areas in Greek-Turkish relations and this is done by ‘generalizing the mistakes’.

Silencing the major issues
A personal experience form the workshops in question will be helpful at this point. At the end of the first workshop I was in a taxi heading to the airport to return home together with a participant that I knew quite well. During the workshop I had pointed at him and I had expressed my hope that this time he would name the difficulties he met during his cooperation with the counterpart NGO and the state officials of the ‘other country’ and he would not simply generalize, the way another colleague from his NGO had done in another meeting. In the taxi we were discussing the various problems he encountered during his work with the Other. I asked him if he had mentioned all these complaints in the session they had in the workshop. His answer was a blunt ‘no’. When I asked why he did not speak up since this was the purpose of the group’s session he simply looked at me!

I will quote few paragraphs from our ‘Final Report of the Greek Turkish Civil Society Dialogue Programme’ that give an indication of the extent of the problem:

‘A good example of this subconscious process could be the argument made by Murat Belge in the First Workshop. According to Belge, Greeks and Turks suffer from communication problems not only because of the content of their communication, but
also, and more importantly, from the basic ‘codes of communication’—that is, Turks and Greeks understand different things from a dialogue. When the dialogue is the issue, a Turk, for instance, means a general declaration of good will and reconciliation. A Greek, on the other hand, demands answers for specific issues. On several occasions these views found considerable support from the plenary, and illuminated by various examples from both the Turkish and Greek sides.

‘Both countries are still under the effect of real or imaginary plethora of ‘nationbuilding’ ideology. All over the Balkans, the way ‘state’ is constituted (in minds) is problematic.’

‘Attitude/behaviour problems’ are of more daily in nature and therefore could misleadingly be considered as ‘minor’ or ‘temporary’ problems. In fact the problems collected under this category could be the most persistent ones due to the fact that they are mostly practiced unknowingly. The problems of attitude or behaviour mostly originate from prejudices and stereotypes established during the formal and informal education of the people. The so-called ‘historical baggage’ attached to the behaviour of the Greek and Turkish people is an important factor in this issue; the only healthy solution is defined as coming to terms with the past of each society by their own people.’

‘Furthermore, due to emotional intensity of the workshop experience first-time participants often ‘exaggerate’ their friendship and relationship to the ‘Other’. Later on in their workshop, they are afraid to speak up and raise their objections because they don’t like to destroy the atmosphere.’

‘After studying the results of the three workshops it is becoming apparent that the relations between the two countries are dominated by discursive strategies that present the ‘other/enemy’ as a homogeneous, internally undifferentiated entity intending to deprive ‘our’ country of her identity and territory.’

All these ‘discursive strategies’ plus the surprising avoidance of my friend in voicing his complaints in the most appropriate moment shows the complexity of a situation that mostly passes unnoticed by the actors themselves.

Assessment of the ‘Answers’

The three workshops produced concrete results. The participants a) met, established acquaintances with each other and developed communication links, b) discussed many issues and defined problematic areas, and c) produced ‘strategic policy position papers’ which intended to be public declarations as well as policy suggestions for policy makers.

Apart from the above the following may also be considered as additional conclusions:
1. Even though the participants were experienced in communication and cooperation with the Other they still refrained for developing an open dialogue and silenced many issues.
2. Various reasons may have contributed to this: worries that bringing up problematic issues may spoil the ‘good atmosphere’; trying to be ‘politically correct’; feeling embarrassed to express grievances that may sound ‘old fashioned’ and/or ‘nationalist’, etc.
3. Whatever the reason is, this reluctance to communicate earnestly with the Other operates mostly on an unconscious level. People voice different kinds of complaints when they answer; depending on weather the questions were asked directly or indirectly.
4. Therefore the decision taken by the organizers of the workshops to concentrate on ‘self-knowledge’ was correct. The workshop report specifies the following:
There is still the need to deepen the understanding of each party about themselves in relation to the Other. This objective is defined as ‘self-knowledge’… Self-knowledge does not limit the perspective of dialogue with a single identity. On the contrary, this objective is rooted in the conceptual understanding that there is no essential, internal, self-same entity that makes an identity unique, that is to say, keep a given identity standing alone like an island. In this respect, self-knowledge is at the same time the knowledge of the Other.

5. ‘The questions and the answers’ discussed so far have a limited use and help. They successfully showed that direct communication cannot clarify all aspects of bilateral relations and related grievances, complaints and most importantly the deeper reasons – e.g., identity issues – of the parties that limit their capability to resolve some persisting problems and perceptions. The parties have many more ‘complaints’ than those ‘officially’ declared.

6. Other sources, such as opinion polls, historiography, literary texts, textbooks and texts of students, art in general, etc., can be of decisive help in understanding the ‘self’ and the Other.

7. Finally a word of caution, which may sound a little pessimistic. The interethnic relationship of Greeks and Turks is not at the level of the participants of the workshops mentioned above. Deep seated and unconsciously operating prejudices and stereotypes are widespread among the people of the two nations. The good omen is that the parties had never before been so ready and willing to cope with the past and with their ‘self’ as they are now.

Antagonistic historiographies, identities and the Other

What has been said for culture probably applies to identity too: ‘identity is more often not what people share, but what they choose to fight for’.\(^\text{238}\) Conjunctures brought Greeks and Turks to political and military confrontations in the past; or if the same is expressed conversely, the confronted parties chose different identities, such as ‘Greek’ and ‘Turk’, to legitimize and ‘explain’ these fights. The Greeks and the Turks proceeded with their ethnogenesis (nation-building) and developed different approaches of historiography to legitimize policies and to define the limits of their own identity.\(^\text{239}\) When the victorious Greek Revolution ended in 1829 and the modern Greek nation-state was established, ‘Tourkokratia’ and the negative image of the ‘Turk’ turned to a basic component of the national ideology\(^\text{240}\) In spite of some major military defeats, until 1947 the Greeks managed to expend their national frontier a few times at the expense of prior Ottoman conquests, (Thessaly in 1881, Macedonia and Crete in 1913, Western Thrace in 1920, Dodecanesse in 1947) either through wars or as a consequence of diplomatic agreements. The ‘Enosis’ (‘joining’


\(^{239}\) See: article “History Writing among the Greeks and Turks: Imagining the Self and the Other” in this volume.

\(^{240}\) See: article “Tourkokratia: History and the Image of Turks in Greek Literature” in this volume.
with Greece) of Cyprus was the last effort to annex an old Ottoman land – but British after 1878.

On the “Turkish” side the crisis of ‘secessions’ started with the Greek revolution of 1821. Until that time the Ottoman Empire had lost lands due to attacks of foreign countries (e.g., Russia, Austria, France). With the Greeks it was the ‘people’ that revolted and withdrew. In 1839, nine years after the Greeks established their nation-state, with the Tanzimat reforms ‘Ottomanism’, a model political model to secure equality among all citizens was tried. However, Bulgarians secede and Armenians revolted next. ‘Islamism’ was tried to secure at least the Muslim populations within the Empire. But there was unrest among the Arabs and Muslim Albanians who revolted and seceded too. ‘Turkishness’ seemed an alternative solution to accomplish a unitary state on ‘ethnic’ basis.

The second big shock that came from the Greeks to the ‘statesmen’ of the Ottoman Empire, and which still is noticed in the national discourse of Turkish politics, is the thesis of the Megali Idea. The idea of the Greeks that the Byzantine lands are actually Greek and that they should be ‘liberated’, posed a theoretical claim on Turkish lands. The Megali Idea was voiced at a period in which ‘historical claims’ were very popular. All irredentist and expansionist policies were based on similar arguments.

But the Greeks did not limit themselves with claims. They first annexed Crete (1908) and then with the Balkan Wars (1912), jointly with their allies, ‘liberated’ Macedonia and Western Thrace. The Turkish side evaluated this action as ‘grasping of its lands’. The Megali Idea was taking place! The Muslim populations were expelled from their homelands in the Balkans. Actually an ethnic cleansing took place. Finally in 1919, at the end of the First World War and following the defeat of the Ottomans and of its allies, the Greek army was landed in Izmir. The Greeks believed that they had liberated ‘ancient Ionia’ and the Turks saw their homeland to be under occupation. By a strange act of chance both the Greeks and the Turks had thus a) fought against the Other their ‘War of Independence’ and b) established their national-state as a consequence of this victory. In other word, both sides posses all the qualifications to become the par excellence Other of each other.241

Generalizations and stereotypes are closely related. On the other hand, sociological approaches can only operate with statistical data which usually serves to generalize from a given sample. The dilemma cannot be solved easily but it does not harm to remind often a) that generalizations are very risky and can lead even to racism, b) that there are always many exceptions to any generalization, and – this is the most important point- c) that any generalization describes a situation at a given time and cannot be attributed to any group as a ‘permanent’ characteristic. Generalizations do not apply for tomorrow. With these in mind I venture some generalizations.

The Greeks started to discuss their ‘national identity’ – their ‘Greekness’ – as a community, in the second half of the 18th century, and in the first quarter of the 19th they established their nation state.242 The Turks followed almost a century later. ‘Turkishness’ started to appear as a mass movement in the end of 19th century and the Turkish national state was established in the first quarter of the 20th (for some in 1923, for others in 1908/1910). Apart from this lagging, modern Turkey was the outcome of

241 For a detail account of the role of the ‘Greek’ in the formation of Turkish nationalism see: H. Millas, ‘Milli Türk Kimliği ve Öteki (Yunan)’ (The National Turkish Identity and the Other/the Greek), in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Milliyetçilik, vol. 4. İletişim, İstanbul, 2002.
242 Naturally sporadically and among the intellectuals ‘Greekness’ was discussed much earlier. According to some even in the 13th century. However, the community did not sponsor this ‘nationalism’ at that period.
a transformation of a multi-ethnic empire. This means the Turkish community is more ‘accustomed’ to living with the Other – the Other in the sense of ‘alterity’. Modern Greeks on the other hand established a nation state where minorities and ‘other’ ethnic groups compose a very small percentage of the population. Actually Greece is a country having one of the highest degree of national homogeneity.

These different backgrounds seem to affect the degree of ethnogenesis as well as the image of the Other. The Greeks have a minimum national consensus both on their ‘identity’ and consequently about the image of the Other. ‘Identity’ is not discussed much in Greece as it is in Turkey. Neither are there social groups who quarrel about similar matters. The Greek Church quite often stresses the role of Orthodoxy in ‘preserving the nation’ but there is no social opposition to this discourse. In Turkey ideological and identity issues are still quite en vogue. Islamism, Kemalism, ‘Westernization’, let alone the Kurdish issue, are issues that have not yet subsided.

Identities secure a kind of continuum. Especially national identity is a source of consolation and hope for eternal existence. ‘Nationalism has become an ersatz religion. The nation, as understood by the nationalist, is a substitute of god; nationalism of this sort might be called ethnolatry... Much more numerous ... are those who think themselves to be above nationalism but are in fact full of unconscious national prejudice’.243

In other words investigating national identity is like investigating a god that is believed. If his existence is investigated as a historical entity his essence is disturbed. Anything socially described cannot be superior to ‘us’; but our own creation, a creation of a human society. God – in order to play his role - has to be beyond sociological contingency. National identity too, is not prone to study. It is not a coincidence that national identity is studied by those who are not enthusiastically attached to it. Those who study it, mostly search for the mechanism that created this identity. The nationalists themselves ‘study’ only the outcomes of nationalism but they do not treat it as a social creation. For them national identity is an essence, probably not characterized as such but handled as if it is something that does not have a beginning and an end.

National identity but also the ‘Other’ and the role of the ‘Other’ are ‘taught’ with this understanding. Education, popular discourse and literature, museums and historiography both in Greece and Turkey show that identities and national prejudices are systematically reproduced.244 The end result is stereotypes that are confirmed by opinion polls: the Other is simple negative and unwelcomed.245 The existing situation of perceptions is not only the result of history but of the way history is perceived, taught and reproduced.

The ‘Other’ in all national popular discourse is distinct: different from ‘us’ and mostly negative. In most cases impressive silence reveals an uneasiness with respect to the ‘Other’: especially ‘our’ violent acts against the ‘Other’ and the rights of the ‘Other’ which have been violated by ‘us’ are systematically silenced. Silence coexists with absence of empathy. Also ‘we’- in comparison to the ‘Other’- are praised, blatantly or indirectly. Historical events are manipulated selectively and interpreted with double standard. All these are accepted as ‘normal’ by the native readers, or

244 Refer to the articles “History Textbooks in Greece and Turkey”, “Constructing Memories of ‘Multiculturalism’ and Identities in the Turkish Novels” and “Ethnic Identity and Nation Building: On Byzantine and Ottoman Historical Legacy” in this volume for details.
245 See: “Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in each other’s mirrors” in this volume.
rather, they are not even noticed as tendencies worth mentioning. The participants of the three workshops were members of nations with the above mentioned background.

Some Conclusions

My conclusions, apart from the ones already shown in the above, will be presented here in three different unities. The role of some ‘dynamics’, like ‘national identity’ and of the ‘Other’ will be summarized first. Secondly, the attitudes of the Greeks and the Turks and their relations will be reminded. Thirdly, some ideas that may contribute in transcending the ‘difficulties’ in the Greek-Turkish relations will follow.

A. On identity and the Other

A1 - The ‘national identity’, apart from what else it may mean and does, plays a role in the way we perceive our environment and ourselves.\(^\text{246}\) That is why the members of the same national group usually present similar reactions. They agree on many issues among themselves and at the same time they disagree on some issues with members of groups of a different national identity.

This does not mean that members of different national identities cannot agree on some and even on many issues. It does not mean that all members of a nation agree on all issues, either. However, there should be some major issues on which the consensus among the members of the ‘nation’ should be decisive. This composes the ‘minimum national consensus’ that enables one to talk of a ‘nation’ and of a ‘national identity’.

A2 – I tried to differentiate “spheres” of nationalism elsewhere.\(^\text{247}\) The sphere of consensual nationalism was differentiated from contingent nationalism. The first is a consensus that defines a nation; the second defines the political positions that may occur within the nation. Both are associated with group identities but the first is more durable resisting to major and rapid changes and the second more volatile following political expediencies. Consensual nationalism is the basis on which national dynamics and national myths are built; it is the views and beliefs that constitute the nationhood. Within the nations political discussions and disagreements, on the other hand, usually take place within the sphere of contingent nationalism.

This differentiation enables us to interpret the rapid changes within the second and the relative endurance of the first, i.e., of the national identity. This ‘difference’ is expressed in popular speech in various ways. Some make a differentiation of ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’, others of ‘nationalism in the good sense’ and ‘racism’ or ‘chauvinism’, etc. Whereas, it is more constructive to see that national identity is a belief and it may present various political programs. With this differentiation it becomes understandable how and why nations change their political targets (sphere of contingent nationalism), at the same time preserving their identity (sphere of consensual nationalism). It also becomes understandable how a nation (or a country) may change its political position vis a vis another nation, but still preserving its myths and all the related feelings vis a vis the Other. These happenings actually take place in different spheres.

\(^{246}\) Or if the same is phrased in other words, different opinions can be perceived as being the result of different ‘identities’; or, groups that share similar opinions compose unities that are perceived as having ‘something’ in common that is called ‘identity’.

\(^{247}\) See article “Perceptions of Conflict: Greeks and Turks in each other’s mirrors” in this volume.
A3 – National identity appeared worldwide in relatively recent times, only the last two or three centuries (depending on one’s interpretation of facts), but it was popularized as an ideology that propagated the belief that nations were ‘very old’. This process of ‘make-believe’ is called ‘ethnogenesis’ or nation-building. Irrespective of the great variety of individual cases of ethnogenesis, national identity is associated with national myths about ‘us’ as well as about the Other. These myths and the image of the Other operate within the sphere of consensual nationalism. In this sense the Other obtains an enduring (permanent) character too. The Other plays a decisive role in the national myths.

This is why the stereotypes about the Other persist, even though people declare that they do not have any problems with the ‘specific/concrete/real’ Other. The specific Other does not change the character of the ‘historical/imagined/abstract’ Other, who forms the basis of consensual nationalism. These clarifications are indispensable in order to understand what has changed lately in Greek-Turkish relations and the related perceptions and images.

A4 – Some self-evident facts should be reminded anew to prevent misunderstandings. A nation is not composed of identical individuals. Each personality is unique. ‘Common characteristics’ is a sociological abstraction and a statistical entity. The exceptions are numerous. Still there are some similarities – high correlation factors – which enable one to speak of group identities; e.g., of Greeks and of Turks. An indication of such ‘similarities’ is the answers given by the Greeks and the Turks to the ‘questions’ presented in this study above. Not only did each ‘nation’ expose different views, but also one can even predict the ‘nationhood’ by looking only at his/her answers.

A5 – Identity issues operate on an unconscious level. Actually this unconscious aspect of the national identity is the source of many ills. It hides primarily the subjectivity of cognitive operations that are related to ‘national’ issues. This shortcoming becomes more apparent in the contradictions, double standards and silences of most nationalistic discourses.

A6 – Finally, it is obvious that human beings do not have a national identity only; they have many identities. Someone may belong to a group defined by sex, age group, religion, language, profession, geographical area, family position, status, sports club, ideology, hobby, etc. Here priority is given to ‘national identity’ simply because the Greeks and the Turks and their relations are investigated. All these characterizations are ‘national’ in essence. Human beings in our case are chosen to become our focus of interest with their national identity.

B. On Greeks, Turks and their relations

The above (A1-A6) are general observations that characterize all nations. There are some other situations that are associated more closely specifically with the Greeks and

with the Turks. Here few supplementary comments related to the Greeks, to the Turks, to their relations and the ‘answers’ that the three workshops produced will follow.

B7 – All findings show that the ‘views’ of the parties (the Greeks and the Turks) are influenced by their identity. The ‘answers’ of each side to specific questions are at a very high percentage predictable; i.e., their evaluations are nationally determined. Each side has its own point of view; and these views are in most cases in opposition.

B8 – The parties are conscious of the fact that their views are in opposition. The Greeks and the Turks do not recognize however that their views are subjective and nationally biased. Once the ‘views’ are recognized as ‘objective observations’ neither self-doubt nor, as a consequence, self-knowledge can be attained. The confidence that their opinions secure to their bearers precludes further search.

B9 – The findings show that the Greeks and the Turks worry about a (real or imagined) negative past which prejudges a fearful future. In short, in spite of many different opinions that may exist among individuals on such matters, it is as if in general the Greeks regret that the past five centuries were the way they were and they think it is the Other responsible for this, and the Turks regret that the Other thinks the way he thinks about the past and about ‘him’.

B10 – Also there is no symmetry in the complaints and the prospects of the two sides. The Greek identity is associated with a ‘missed’ grandeur due to the Other. It is a story of mourning and distress. The Turks believe that they have a ‘misinterpreted’ grandeur – the Ottoman past.

B11 – Almost all complaints seem to be associated with a main concern: sovereignty rights. Historical and present grievances as well as future worries are connected directly or by way of insinuation to this par excellence ‘national’ issue. Even matters of images and interpretation of historical past can be seen as factors that eventually may create a climate that will endanger ‘our’ national integrity, ‘our’ liberty, etc.

‘Sovereignty’ here means something more than a political status. When viewed as a component of a national identity, any threat that is associated with ‘sovereignty’ is perceived as a situation that jeopardizes many aspects of personal life. As historical experience demonstrated, first, the everyday lives of the citizens are destroyed. People died or were treated badly, chased away from their homes and from their home countries, exploited, etc. Secondly, citizens that lose their ‘sovereignty’ and are not ethnically cleansed are lowered in status: they become ‘minorities’ if not ‘enemies’ within the country. This means losing prospects for equal treatment, i.e., ‘equality’, which is one of the main parameters of a modern democratic state.

Thirdly and probably the most important aspect of a ‘lost’ or a ‘wounded’ sovereignty is the sense of shame that accompanies the loss. National identity is associated primarily with a sense of pride of ‘being’, being a member of a nation that is sovereign. Without this – the sovereignty – the ‘existence’ itself appears to be in question. In other words, the fear of losing ‘sovereignty’ and the associated ‘worries’ presents an existentional dimension and is based on past experience, even though this past is mostly constructed in accordance with nationalist myths. The sense of ‘threat’ that is supposed to originate from the Other has a ‘historical’ parameter that is reproduced and kept alive within the nations.
B12 - The situation with the selected participants of the workshops is different. First they accept in principle that what the public calls ‘prejudice’ does really exist in their respective societies. They are at a varying degree critical to their own parties – to governments and to citizens. The ‘participants’ who answered the questions do not fit the profile of the members of the ‘polls’.

B13 - Even this ‘enlightened’ minority however, still seems to lack in some fields. In most cases they silence complaints and they do not voice their (negative) opinions about the Other. Either they lack the courage, or they refrain from ‘spoiling the nice atmosphere’ or they believe the Other is not ready to hear the criticism. They complain, e.g., about the ‘nationalism’ of the Other, but they avoid saying that this is expressed as a direct threat against their sovereignty right.

B14 - Another shortcoming of this group is that they do not know the Other and especially his/hers worries and sensitivities. This is expressed in the difficulty in foreseeing the complaints of the Other as well as a lack of empathy. The Greeks for example do not seem to be aware that the Turkish side is very much distressed from the negative image the ‘Christian West’ for a few centuries attributed to the Turks and which was eventually appropriated by the Greeks too. The Turks do not suspect that the Greek national identity is built on a certain historical interpretation (a national myth) that is closely connected to a ‘Turkish rule’ that cannot be readily accepted as a ‘happy period of tolerance and coexistence’.

B15 – This group expressed their worries of ‘sovereignty rights’ too, but in a special way. Instead of expressing themselves directly, they inferred that the Other ‘thinks’ that there is such an issue. It seems that even though the parties tried to play down the issue – the most sensitive issue in Greek-Turkish relations, i.e., the past and present sovereignty of the ‘nations’ – the idea was behind their mind.

B16 - Also the parties (the participants) do not seem to be aware that the Other in each country has an imagined historical dimension and that the Other plays a decisive role in forming and preserving the national identity of the parties. In the best case they recognize that the ‘press’ or the ‘schoolbooks’ play a negative role in Greek-Turkish relations but they do not seem – in general - to be aware that the ‘negative Other’ and the so called ‘national identity’ are somehow historically interconnected. The negative Other is not due to ‘mistaken information’ but due to a special ideological framework.

C. On transcending nationalist prejudices

C17 - Transcending national prejudices and developing a ‘neutral’ attitude vis a vis the Other is a complex process that is related to national identity and all the founding myths of each nation. Actually the whole enterprise is usually presented as an effort where, on the one hand, the Other would be stripped off from its negative characteristics, and on the other, ‘our’ national identity and ‘our’ related myths would be preserved.

249 For details see: H. Millas, Do’s & Don’ts for Better Greek-Turkish Relations, Papazissis, Athens, 2002.
This sounds as a contradiction, an oxymoron. The negative Other is a constituent of national identity. The revision of the historical Other presupposes a revision of ‘our’ history.

C18 - The political programs of the countries may be still changed relatively easily for the better, as Greece and Turkey did after 1999, without taking a decisive step and revising historiography. In this case however, the national myths and the image of the Other may still be active or ‘asleep in the subconscious’, ready to function with the first political crisis.

I developed the concepts of consensual nationalism and contingent nationalism in order to cope with situation. The decisive step is to secure changes in the first sphere, where the basic national myths and perceptions vis a vis the past and the Other are to be revised. However, the two spheres are interrelated. A prolonged period of peaceful coexistence of good neighborhood, i.e., a political decision to exercise calm and a reconciliatory policy, in the long run will facilitate major changes with respect to the basic nationalistic paradigm in the two countries.

C14 – Until then, and irrespective of the policies of the politicians, the members of the two communities, may try to pave the way towards a more permanent rapprochement on personal or on NGO basis. As it is done in the three workshops which were the aspiration of this study, bringing to the consciousness of the parties the mechanisms that form the ‘national’ basis and its paraphernalia such as the phobias on national and sovereignty rights, is the first and most important step in order to transcend nationalism.

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Appendix 1 - ‘First question’

‘First question’ to Greeks: What do you think the negative qualities of the Turks are? / What do you not like about the Turks?

a. Complaints against the Turkish ‘state’ (the government, the politicians, the army and other dignitaries such as religious circles, etc.)

a1
- The role of the Turkish military in politics (5 times)
- Political & military intervention at all levels of life (3 times)
- The Turkish army is imperialistic

a2
- The state regime, the influence of ‘derin devlet’ (deep state) (4 times)
- Oppressive state – unequal treatment of people (4 times)
- The influence of ‘devlet’ (state) on Turkish consciousness (2 times)
- The way Turkey deals with the Kurdish issue (2 times)
- The bad politicians
- State influencing policy against Greece
- Delays in solving problems such as Cyprus, School of Halki etc

a3
- Lack of democracy and/or human rights (3 times)
- Lack of freedom of expression
- Negative state-citizen relationship
- Suppression of journalists
- Intolerance of the national secular identity against religious groups and minorities

a4
- Ethnocentric education (2 times)
- Situation of women is not good

b. Complaints against the Turks (their character, behavior, tendencies etc.)

b1
- Chauvinism and obsession with nationalism (and/or Atatürk) (6 times)
- Nationalism (3 times)
- Nationalism, superiority complex, aggressiveness
- Arrogance declaring Turkey is a big country (3 times)
- Obsession with / submission to political figures, not critical attitude (2 times)
- Devotion to ‘father figure’ Kemalism
- Confusing internationalism with Kemalism
- The feeling of being ex (big) empire
- They want to feel superior during dialogs
- Islamic fundamentalism

b2
- Acceptance of ‘derin devlet’ by the average Turk (2 times)
- They do not have respect for human rights/democracy (3 times)
- Importance given to hierarchy in work and in family (2 times)
- Strict social stratification
- Not so open (on matters of gender, family, religion) (2 times)
- Conservatism, delays in adjustment to new developments (2 times)
- Do little to change public life
- They are conformists
- Lack of solidarity with the poor /weak

b3
- General insecurity about the Other
- Low self-esteem
- Not admitting their Sévres/Megali Idea paranoia with regards to Greeks
- Fears coming from the past: conspiracy of the West, syndrome of Sèvres Treaty
- Attachment to old hatred
- Lack of understanding for the culture of the Other
- They talk too much about ‘common culture/legacy’ – dolma etc.
- Epidermic (superfluous) friendship with Greeks
- Ignorance of common history (?).

b4
- They do not express their mind openly / too polite (4 times)
- Politeness that may conceal real intentions/feelings (2 times)
- They are cunning, not clever
- Turks get carried away (influenced/persuaded) easily

\textit{c. Various}

c1
- Lack of knowledge in professional collaboration – all proceed on a personal basis
- Unwillingness to cooperate economically (to invest in Greece or elsewhere)
- There is poverty.
- There are dirty public places.
- Chaos in the streets
- Turks are too sentimental
- The way I am treated as a foreigner
- The way I am treated as a second-class citizen
- Body language – the way they touch and stare at me
- They are disorganized

c2
- I do not like their accent!
- Istanbul is very humid!

\textit{*}

‘First question’ to Turks: What do you think the negative qualities of the Greeks are? / What do you not like about the Greeks?

\textit{a. Complaints against the Greek ‘state’ (the government, the politicians, the other dignitaries such as religious circles, etc.)}

a1
- Greek government policies
- Greeks back up separatist movements: visits in South-Eastern provinces during the earthquakes, being close to PKK
- Greek governments’ policy with respect to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace
- The policy of tension/enmity that provokes the masses
- Greek politicians disturb public and cultural bilateral relations
- Greek government and some politicians exaggerate Cyprus issue

a2
- Behavior in consulates/boarders \textit{vis a vis} the Turks
- Red tape obstacles, visa etc (2 times)
- Greek bureaucracy is slow

a3
- Left political groups are religiously dependent
- Negative image of Ts in media and textbooks (2 times)
- State-individual relationship

\textit{b. Complaints against the Greeks (their character, behavior, tendencies etc.)}

b1
- Geeks are nationalists (6 times)
- Gs are arrogant
- Gs have fanaticism against Turks
- Gs are too preoccupied with Turks
- Gs (both left and right) believe in conspiracy against them (conspiracy complex)
- Gs are too critical
- Gs exaggerate political issues
  b2
- Gs are proud of their historical past/background /Ancient Greece (4 times)
- Gs disregard our common past
- Gs write Ottoman-Greek history nationalistically
- Not seem to feel one community with us
- Gs appropriate common traditions as their own (coffee, white cheese/pheta)
- Gs have ideological history
  b3
- Gs think Turks are aggressors occupying their lands
- Gs see us as bad and barbarians
- Gs have stereotypes: They ask if they can drink alcoholic drinks when in Turkey
- Gs believe everything they read in media against Turkey
- Some Gs still think Ts smoke hashish and narghile
- Gs do not trust us
- I feel disliked in Greece
- Gs have hate towards the Turks
- Gs did not invite Turks (not even as tourists) while inviting all the world (for a meeting?)
- Why are not the Greeks on top of the list of friends of Turkey?
- Insincere relationship
  b4
- Gs present lack of humility (humbleness) / they are snobbish (2 times)
- Gs think they are Europeans (2 times)
- Gs are sure they are right (and are misinformed) (2 times)
- Gs are self-satisfied
- Gs have a loud way of communication / bashful (3 times)
- Gs do not listen to the Other, difficult to communicate with Gs
- Gs are superficial
- Gs use demagogy as they discuss
- ‘They complain, complain, complain’
  b5
- Gs are hot tempered (2 times)
- Gs are noisy (2 times)
- Gs are ‘ukala’ (pedant)
- Gs are untrustworthy
- Gs lack consideration
- Gs are (too) religious
- Gs are not punctual
- Gs are honest but harsh
  c. Various
  c1
- I meet Gs for the first time and I did not dislike anyone/anything (3 times)
- I have no complaints
- For me the Other is not necessarily the Greek
- I wish peace between Gs and Ts
  c2
- Gs do not cook well!
- Gs always win in basketball games!

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Appendix 2 - ‘Second question’

‘Second question’ to the Greeks: What do you think the Turks think as your negative qualities / what do you think the Turks do not like about you?

a. Issues of sovereign rights, irredentism, ‘historical rights’, history and allies of Greece
- Gs have claims on Turkish lands
- Gs have a claim since they have been in Anatolia before the Turks
- Gs have the Megali Idea in mind (4 times)
- Gs say the Aegean is Greek (2 times)
- Gs want Cyprus and Enosis
- Turks have in mind 1919-1922
- Gs are arrogant about their history (2)
- Greeks misinterpreted history
- Gs emphasize their cultural background
- Gs are ungrateful to the Ottoman period (and are clever diplomats)
- Gs do not enforce a common history
- Gs are without real historical continuity with the classical past but clever enough to exploit the situation and attract sympathy from the West
- Even though Gs are the ‘same’ with Turks, Gs have convinced Europe they are Europeans
- Gs impose western model on Turkey
- Gs are not kind when Ts are in Greece
- Greeks do not ‘respect’ their (Turks’) power
- Gs attack Turks as inferiors

b. Direct enmity and negative acts
- Gs show hostility against the Turkish people (4 times)
- Gs are against friendship / hate Turks (2 times)
- Gs show arrogance / cheap Europeanism (4 times)
- Gs create political obstacles to Turkey on the EU issues (2 times)
- Gs do not want Ts in the EU – causing economic problems to Turkey (3 times)
- Gs impose western model on Turkey
- Gs are not kind when Ts are in Greece
- Greeks do not ‘respect’ their (Turks’) power
- Gs attack Turks as inferiors

c. Other negative aspects of Greeks
- Greeks are nationalists / chauvinists (4 times)
- Gs are nationalists and arrogant (2 times)
- Gs are arrogant – rude, culturally aggressive (6 times)
- Gs are arrogant (5 times)
- Greeks are tricky/ manipulators (4 times)
- Gs think they are Europeans (3 times)
- Gs are patronizing
- Gs speak too much (3 times)
- Gs speak loudly; interrupt when they converse (2 times)
- Gs are emotional and talk too much
- Greeks (Gs) are ready for a row (kavgacı) (3 times)
- Gs show lack of cooperation and open mind (3 times)
- Gs are interested in their personal interests and not in the community
- Extensive oppression of journalists/freedoms
- Gs have egocentric education
- Gs have too much trust in religious leaders
- Greeks are attached to religion and traditions
- Gs are narrow minded (2 times)
- Gs are thieves
- Gs are lazy

3. Various
- Athens is ugly
- Gs give priorities to worldly pleasures
- Greeks drink too much coffee
- Speak too much on cell telephone
- ‘Difficult to say’

‘Second question’ to the Turks: What do you think the Greeks think as your negative qualities / what do you think the Greeks do not like about you?

a. Issues of sovereign rights, irredentism, ‘historical rights’, history and the sense of military threat
- Gs do not like the Ottoman past
- Gs believe that Ts oppressed them for hundreds of years (and the Turks are not even aware of this)
- Ts occupied and destroyed the Greek homeland (2 times)
- Ts destroyed Greek civilization
- Ts caused Gs to leave Anatolia and Turks should not have Istanbul
- Gs believe they have a right to have a part of our land
- Gs ask what Ts are doing on Greek lands (and the Gs wait for an opportunity)
- Ts claim some of Greek cultural items (‘heritage’?) that are on Turkish land
- Ts are a militaristic force (invaders) (6 times)
- Turkey composes a threat against Greece / is imperialist (4 times)
- Ts are harmful and aggressive (arrogant) (2 times)
- Ts are destabilizing force
- Ts are domineering
- Ts have threatening gestures
- Ts create problems in Cyprus
- Ts have a sense of greatness
- Ts admire their army (2 times)
- Ts spend much money for arms (2 times)

b. Direct enmity and negative acts
- Ts consider Gs dishonest
- Ts do not trust Gs (2 times)
- Ts do not like Gs
- Ts ask too much from the Greeks
- Ts cause human trafficking from Turkey

c. Other negative aspects of Turks
- Turks are nationalists (2 times)
- Ts are nationalists, conservative society (2 times)
- Ts take too much pride in their history
- Turks have too many flags
- Gs do not like the mentality the Turks have about the state
- Ts are not open to debate/discussion (2 times)
- Ts are overconfident
- Ts believe they are right; Ts have no self-doubts
- Ts are always on the ‘defensive’
- Ts are unskilled / ignorant (4 times)
- Ts are not transparent enough / are hypocritical (4 times)
- Ts compose a primitive society / Asiatic / are barbarians (4 times)
- Ts are arrogant
- Ts are not modernized
- Ts are too religious
- Turks are not democratic / are oppressive
- Ts are corrupt
- Ts are silent (they do not speak up)
- Ts are noisy
- Ts are lazy

c. Various
- Ts and Gs look alike; therefore they need ‘differences’ to prove their distinct identity – structural obstacle
- These Gs (the participants) have no complaints since they are specially chosen
- Turks have moustaches

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Appendix 3 - ‘Third question’

‘Third question’ to the Greeks: What do you see as ‘negative’ attitude in your side vis a vis the Turks?

POLITICAL SHORTCOMINGS / MISTAKES – 2 ‘confessions’
- We (the Greeks) have extreme territorial claims / imperial dreams articulating national identity
- We as autochthon nation think we know what is good and bad (not very clear what it means)

PREJUDICES – 10 ‘confessions’
- We (the Greeks) have prejudices (due to educational system and family tradition) (2 times)
  - We have a complex of superiority (we look down upon the Other) (3 times)
- We do not know the Other and we do not want to know him either
- We do not trust the Turks
- We as ‘Europeans’ think we are the best
- We do not respect the culture of the Other
- I may be deceiving myself (it is not clear on what issues he/she is deceived, but most probably on the image of the Other)

BAD BEHAVIOUR - 14 ‘confessions’
- We have (excess) nationalism / racism (3 times)
- We are arrogant / rude (3 times)
- We (try to?) dominate conversation in public
- We fear to be misunderstood (probably meaning, we do not speak openly)
- We fear of hurting the national feelings of the Other (does this mean, ‘therefore we do not say what we think?’)
- We silence issues sometimes
- We do not exert effort to make the Other understand
- We do not have tolerance
- The Greek Church interferes in politics
- We believe the Other can change history and future (?)

‘Third question’ to the Turks: What do you see as ‘negative’ attitude in your side vis a vis the Greeks?

POLITICAL SHORTCOMINGS / MISTAKES – 3 ‘confession’
- We (the Turks) do not recognize minority rights / are repressing Greek minority (3 times)

PREJUDICES – 3 ‘confessions’
- We (the Turks) have prejudices
- We perceive the Other as threat
- We feed hate through textbooks

BAD BEHAVIOUR - 12 ‘confessions’
- We (the Turks) use military and political power
- We have national arrogance
- We have aggressiveness (the last three items in short may mean ‘political aggressiveness’)
- We have not enough empathy
- We do not know the issues of history that are important for the Greeks
- We have not enough consideration
- We have not enough magnanimity
- We ignore Others problems (the last four items in short state ‘lack of empathy’)
- I do not express myself clearly – see the culture of the Other as impolite
- I use different codes when I communicate (the last six items may simply mean ‘bad communication with the Other due to our shortcomings’)
- We are short sighted
- We talk of justice rather than live and let live
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